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Abstract
Many Canadian law schools are in the process of implementing the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission’s Call to Actions #28 and #50. Promising initiatives include mandatory courses,
Indigenous cultural competency, and Indigenous law intensives. However, processes of social
categorization and racialization subordinate Indigenous peoples and their legal orders in Canadian
legal education. These processes present a barrier to the implementation of the Calls.
To ethically and respectfully implement these Calls, faculty and administration must reduce racial
stereotyping and prejudice against Indigenous peoples and Indigenous legal orders in legal
education. I propose that social psychology on racial prejudice and stereotyping may offer nonIndigenous faculty and administration a familiar framework to reduce the harm caused by settler
beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors to Indigenous students, professors, and staff, and to Indigenous
legal orders. Although social psychology may offer a starting point for settler harm reduction, its
application must remain critically oriented towards decolonization.
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Introduction
To varying degrees, Canadian law schools and law societies are in the process of implementing
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s Call to Actions #27, #28 and #50. These Calls attend
to the need for cultural competency, and Aboriginal and Indigenous law training,1 for law students
and legal professionals, and for the creation of Indigenous law institutes.
27. We call upon the Federation of Law Societies of Canada to ensure that
lawyers receive appropriate cultural competency training, which includes the
history and legacy of residential schools, the United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Treaties and Aboriginal rights, Indigenous law,
and Aboriginal – Crown relations. This will require skills-based training in
intercultural competency, conflict resolution, human rights, and anti-racism.
28. We call upon law schools in Canada to require all students to take a course
in Aboriginal people and the law, which includes the history and legacy of
residential schools, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, Treaties and Aboriginal rights, Indigenous law, and Aboriginal –
Crown relations. This will require skills-based training in intercultural
competency, conflict resolution, human rights, and anti-racism.
50. In keeping with the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, we call upon the federal government, in collaboration with Aboriginal
organizations, to fund the establishment of Indigenous law institutes for the

1

For the purposes of this thesis, Aboriginal law refers to Canadian law as it relates to Indigenous peoples, whereas
Indigenous law refers to the legal orders of Indigenous peoples.
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development, use, and understanding of Indigenous laws and access to justice in
accordance with the unique cultures of Aboriginal peoples in Canada.
Mandates for Indigenous legal education (ILE)2 may also be inferred or found in the precedent of
the Supreme Court of Canada, within federal and provincial statutes, in the rules of professional
conduct of law societies, and within Indigenous epistemologies, cosmologies and ontologies
(Indigenous lifeways).3 Thus, ILE is broader than the specific content or objectives set out in the
Calls.

For the purposes of this thesis “Indigenous Legal Education” and “Indigenous programming” includes programming
in Aboriginal or Indigenous law, and non-Indigenous and Indigenous epistemologies and pedagogies. It is not limited
to law per se, but also includes content that might otherwise be called “policy” or “politics”, “spirituality”, “culture”
or “history”. It includes the content directed in the Calls as well as institutional policies related to funding and
resourcing, facilities, community relationships, hiring and advancement, discrimination and anti-racism, and
decolonization.
3
The need for Indigenous legal education can be inferred in the Supreme Court of Canada’s jurisprudence on s. 35 of
the Constitution Act, 1982: “While it is impossible to give an easy definition of fishing rights, it is possible, and,
indeed, crucial, to be sensitive to the aboriginal perspective itself on the meaning of the rights at stake”, in R v Sparrow,
[1990] 1 SCR 1075 at 1112; “Aboriginal rights cannot, however, be defined on the basis of the philosophical precepts
of the liberal enlightenment” (para. 19), “[...] the only fair and just reconciliation is, as Walters suggests, one which
takes into account the aboriginal perspective [note that Walters’ says ‘legal culture’] while at the same time taking
into account the perspective of the common law. True reconciliation will, equally, place weight on each” (at para. 50),
in R v Van der Peet, [1996] 2 SCR 507 at paras 19, 31, 40–42, 50 and see also 263-264 (Justice McLachlin, dissenting,
but not on this point); Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010 at 81, 147–148; Mikisew Cree First Nation
v Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2005] 3 SCR 388 at para 1 (locating the federal and provincial
governments’ lack of respect for Indigenous peoples’ difference as a source of conflict and barrier to reconciliation);
“[...] what is required is a culturally sensitive approach to sufficient of occupation based on the dual perspectives of
the Aboriginal group in question - its laws, practices, size, technological ability, and the character of the land claimed
- and the common law notion of possession as a basis for title”, in Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, [2014] 2
SCR 257 at para 41, see also paras. 34-35; Beckman v Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, [2010] 3 SCR 103 at 10
(describing the importance of interpreting modern treaties generously and not as if they are ordinary commercial
contracts). Indigenous legal education is essential for lawyers to assist the courts in the incorporation of Indigenous
legal orders in Canadian law: see, for example, R v Meshake, 2007 ONCA 337 at para 33; R v Ippak, 2018 NUCA 3
at paras 73–77, 83–94 (Justice Berger, concurring); Pastion v Dene Tha’ First Nation, [2018] 4 FCR 467 at paras 7–
14. In addition, courts consider Indigenous peoples’ history and experiences in criminal cases: Criminal Code of
Canada RSC 1985, c C-46; R v Ipeelee, [2012] 1 SCR 433 at paras 59–61; R v Gladue, [1999] 1 SCR 688 at paras
67–69; R v Williams, [1998] 1 SCR 1128 at 22 (recognizing the danger of racial stereotyping and prejudice against
Indigenous peoples in criminal jury trials); R v Barton, 2019 SCC 33 at para 201 (describing the need for specialized
judicial instructions to address racial and gender stereotyping and prejudice towards Indigenous women who are
victims of crime). Indigenous legal education is required for all lawyers, then, since all lawyers are potential judgesin-waiting: Karen Drake, “Finding a Path to Reconciliation: Mandatory Indigenous Law, Anishinaabe Pedagogy, and
Academic Freedom” (2017) 95:1 Can B Rev 9–46 at 20–22 and 45; see also Lance Finch, The Duty to Learn: Taking
Account of Indigenous Legal Orders in Practice (Vancouver: Continuing Legal Education Society of British
Columbia, 2012) at 47. Furthermore, the rules of professional conduct of law societies may also require Indigenous
2
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My research responds to the following question: how may we better understand the barriers to,
and opportunities for, the implementation of the Calls in Canadian law schools? I hypothesize that
an interdisciplinary approach that integrates social psychology on racial prejudice and Indigenous
scholarship will help identify potential barriers to, and opportunities for, the implementation of
Calls. I argue that racial stereotyping and prejudice is a barrier to the implementation of Indigenous
legal education in Canadian law schools. I also argue that settler-colonialism – the legalized
dispossession and redistribution of material and immaterial resources to settlers through Canadian
law – is a barrier to respectfully and ethically engaging with ILE in Canadian law schools. As I
will argue, these two challenges – racial stereotyping and prejudice, and settler-colonialism – are
connected. Despite these barriers, hope may be found in the many ILE initiatives and institutional
commitments led by Indigenous students and professors (and some non-Indigenous persons) in
Canadian law schools.
Implementing ILE without decolonization (a term that I will define shortly) will be challenging, if
not impossible. Efforts at Indigenizing the law school curriculum, through the inclusion of standalone courses on Indigenous legal orders or the demographic inclusion of Indigenous law students
or professors cannot, on their own, meaningfully satisfy the Calls nor the objectives of ILE.4

legal education as a prerequisite for competent practice related to Indigenous peoples and for the fulfillment of each
lawyer’s civic responsibilities: Nicholas Healey, “Ethics, Legal Professionalism and Reconciliation: Enacting
Reconciliation through Civility” (2018) 26:1 Dal J Legal Stud 113–136. However, for a discussion of how professional
norms and rules have excluded Indigenous peoples and their legal orders in the practice of law, see Constance
Backhouse, “Gender and Race in the Construction of ‘Legal Professionalism’: Historical Perspectives” (2003) SSRN,
online: <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2273323>. Finally, on the topic of sourcing the need for Indigenous legal
education in Indigenous legal orders, see John Borrows, “Outsider Education: Indigenous Law and Land-Based
Learning” (2016) 33:1 Windsor YB Access Just 1–28 at 2; and, generally, John Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous
Constitution (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010).
4
Broadly, Indigenization refers to the inclusion of Indigenous peoples, perspectives, and legal orders in Canadian
legal contexts. For a general critique of neo-liberal inclusionary policies and practices as insufficient for transformative
change, see Frances Henry et al, eds, The Equity Myth: Racialization and Indigeneity at Canadian Universities
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2017); Devon Abbott Mihesuah & Angela Cavender Wilson, eds, Indigenizing the Academy:
Transforming Scholarship and Empowering Communities (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004). As Tuck
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Moreover, there is a risk of harm – of distortion, severance, and misuse – to Indigenous lifeways
that stems from the imposition of a Eurocentric Canadian legal education and practice.5 In some
cases, non-Indigenous professors and students may deny that Indigenous legal orders are law, in
the same sense that Canadian law is law.6 Further, many Indigenous law professors and students
recall experiences of racial prejudice, stereotyping and discrimination against Indigenous peoples
and their legal orders in Canadian law schools.7 These latter experiences are my focus. In this

and Yang note, Indigenisation, or the superficial inclusion of Indigenous peoples and knowledges in Canadian
education, often operates as “enclosure of Native peoples into the politics of equity”: Eve Tuck & Yang K Wayne,
“Decolonization is not a Metaphor” (2012) 1:1 Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society 1–40 at 23. Such
enclosure is a far cry from Mihesuah and Wilson’s intent in Indigenizing the Academy; for a discussion on the cooptation of “Indigenization”, see Jeffery G Hewitt, “Decolonizing and Indigenizing: Some Considerations for Law
Schools” (2016) 33:1 Windsor YB Access Just 65–84 at 70.
5
Broadly, these risks include the internal distortion caused by the assimilation of non-Indigenous worldviews, external
distortion caused by the recording of Indigenous legal orders in non-Indigenous sources, the severance of Indigenous
legal orders from their epistemological, ontological and cosmological foundations, and the risk that Indigenous legal
orders may be interpreted incompletely or incorrectly: Gordon Christie, “Culture, Self-Determination and
Colonialism: Issues around the Revitalization of Indigenous Legal Traditions” (2007) 6:1 Indigenous LJ 13–30; Finch,
supra note 3 at 34–35; Borrows, “Outsider Education”, supra note 3; James Youngblood Henderson, “Postcolonial
Indigenous Legal Consciousness” (2002) 1:1 Indigenous LJ 1–56; Drake, “Finding a Path to Reconciliation”, supra
note 3 at 20–21 (on language, interpretation and translation); Tracey Lindberg, “Critical Indigenous Legal Theory Part
1: The Dialogue Within” (2015) 27:2 Can J Women & L 224–247 at 229, 233–234, 242, 245 (on the challenge of
interpreting and translating Indigenous legal orders). Some communities also oppose recording Indigenous legal
orders in writing: John Borrows, Recovering Canada: the Resurgence of Indigenous Law (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2002) at 15. There is the risk that Indigenous legal orders and liberal constitutionalisms are
fundamentally incommensurable: see, generally, Aaron James (Waabishki Ma’iingan) Mills, Miinigowiziwin: All that
has been Given for Living Well Together: One Vision of Anishinaabe Constitutionalism (Thesis, University of
Victoria, 2019) [unpublished]. Finally, courts currently limit Indigenous legal orders as evidence, rather than
according them judicial notice as a non-domestic legal system: Bruce Granville Miller, Oral History on Trial:
Recognizing Aboriginal Narratives in the Courts (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011) at 106–109 (on Indigenous legal
orders as evidence of practice, customs and traditions). However, Val Napoleon and Hadley Friedland argue that
Indigenous legal orders are robust enough to withstand the distorting potential of Eurocentric education and settler
colonialism. Napoleon and Friedland argue, “[w]hat we do not want to do is let these critical questions paralyze us
into inaction. Narratives of fragility or incommensurability related to Indigenous laws are narratives of colonialism.
The stories, and the elders and communities we have learned from, all teach us that Indigenous laws are made of
stronger stuff”: Val Napoleon & Hadley Friedland, “An Inside Job: Engaging with Indigenous Legal Traditions
through Stories” (2015) 61:4 McGill LJ 725–754 at 754.
6
As Fraser Harland argues, despite the Supreme Court of Canada’s statements in Delgamuukw and Tsilhqot’in on the
reality of Indigenous legal orders, judges remain unable to appreciate Indigenous legal orders as anything more than
evidence of practices, customs and traditions: Fraser Harland, “Taking the Aboriginal Perspective Seriously” (2018)
16–17:1 Indigenous LJ 21–50 at 25, 35–39, 41–43, 47–48.
7
The term “Indigenous” is a non-racialized term that includes First Nations, Métis communities and Inuit. However,
I refer to settler or non-Indigenous peoples’ “racial” stereotypes and prejudices of Indigenous peoples. As I describe
in Chapter 2, I use this language because Indigenous peoples are racialized in Canadian society. I argue in Chapter 2
that Indigenous peoples’ Indigeneity – their political, social, spiritual, and legal difference – is restricted or denied
through racial and settler-colonial discourse.
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context of potential harm, scholars differ in their approach towards revitalizing Indigenous legal
orders within a settler-colonial context.8
In this thesis, I argue that, given that decolonization remains limited, Canadian law schools must
consider the effects of racial stereotyping and prejudice on the inclusion of Indigenous students,
professors and legal orders in Canadian legal education, and on non-Indigenous9 professors’ and

8

The decision to engage in Canadian legal contexts is perhaps one of the most confounding ethical problems facing
Indigenous legal scholars and practitioners. Some scholars envision a sui generis relationship in which Indigenous
and non-Indigenous legal orders are equally valued and respected. John Borrows locates this relationship in Indigenous
Nations’ historical treaty relationships with the British Crown: John Borrows, “Creating an Indigenous Legal
Community” (2005) 50:1 McGill LJ 153–182 at 161–163; see also John Borrows, “Wampum at Niagara: The Royal
Proclamation, Legal History, and Self-Government” in Michael Asch, ed, Aboriginal and Treaty Rights in Canada:
Essays on Law, Equity, and Respect for Difference (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997) c. 6. James Youngblood Henderson
articulates a relationship based on treaty federalism: James Youngblood Henderson, “Empowering Treaty Federalism”
(1994) 58:2 Sask L Rev 241–330. “Indigenous legal warriors”, Indigenous persons trained in both Indigenous and
non-Indigenous legal orders, use settler-colonial law strategically for the advancement of Indigenous selfdetermination and sovereignty: see Henderson, “Postcolonial Indigenous Legal Consciousness”, supra note 5 at 3;
Christine Zuni Cruz, “Toward a Pedagogy and Ethic of Law/Lawyering for Indigenous Peoples: The Pedagogy of
American Indian Law” (2006) 82:3 NDL Rev 863–902 at 880–881; see also the related concept of “Indigenous word
warriors”, described in Dale Antony Turner, This is Not a Peace Pipe: Towards a Critical Indigenous Philosophy
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006) at 9, 74–75. For some, a concern remains that Indigenous legal orders
cannot be constructed through Canadian law. James Sakej Henderson argues that “Indigenous peoples cannot
construct Indigenous order, law, remedies and solidarity on Eurocentric foundations”: Henderson, “Postcolonial
Indigenous Legal Consciousness”, supra note 5 at 44; for a further discussion on the concept of using the “master’s
tools”, see John Borrows, Drawing Out Law: A Spirit’s Guide (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010) at 143.
Finally, some scholars ask us whether we might be better starting with our own Indigenous intellectual and legal
communities than reasoning with the “elephant” of the dominant, settler experience: see, for example, the exchange
between Kerry Wilkins and Aaron Mills in Kerry Wilkins, “Reasoning with the Elephant: The Crown, Its Counsel
and Aboriginal Law in Canada” (2016) 13:1 Indigenous LJ 27–74 at 73. In her writing, Patricia Monture-Angus
frequently questioned her engagement with Canadian law and Canadian legal education: Patricia Monture-Angus,
“Standing against Canadian Law: Naming Omissions of Race, Culture and Gender” (1998) 2:1 YB NZ Juris 7–30 at
7–9. In Thunder in My Soul, Monture-Angus explains, “I still believe in educational systems as a site of future change.
I do not cling to the same hope for law as a vehicle for change toward Aboriginally inclusive systems”: Patricia
Monture-Angus, Thunder in My Soul: a Mohawk Woman Speaks (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 1995) at 69. In
response, scholars like Taiaike Alfred and Glen Coulthard reject a politics of recognition and advocate for a return to
Indigenous political and legal communities: Taiaiake Alfred, Wasáse: Indigenous Pathways of Action and Freedom
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005); Glen Sean Coulthard, Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial
Politics of Recognition (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014).
9
I use “non-Indigenous” and “settlers” at different points in this thesis. Generally, I use the term “non-Indigenous”
when discussing the application of social psychology to reflect the comparators used in that literature. Instead of using
racialized language, such as “White” and “Indian”, I opt for non-racialized social categories of Indigenous and nonIndigenous. “Indigenous” also centres discussions around Indigeneity (rather than Eurocentricity) and “nonIndigenous” is inclusive of other racialized, non-European persons. In other cases, I have used the term “settler”. I do
this most often when describing the roles of non-Indigenous peoples (including other racialized persons) in settler
colonialism and their impact on Indigenous peoples and their communities. As Vowel explains, the intent behind
these terms is not to “put us at odds” but to assist us in talking about “a wider context than the first person and second
person singular”: Chelsea Vowel, Indigenous Writes: A Guide to First Nations, Métis, and Inuit issues in Canada
(Winnipeg: Portage & Main Press, 2016) at 15.
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students’ ethical and respectful engagement with Indigenous peoples and their legal orders and
perspectives. Based on the scholarship and my experience as an Indigenous law student and
lawyer, I argue that non-Indigenous peoples cannot ethically and respectfully relate to Indigenous
peoples, their perspectives, and legal orders if such engagements are rendered through a distorting
fog of stereotypes and prejudices, which includes the belief that Indigenous legal orders are not
part of the rule of law in Canada. Moreover, the inclusion of Indigenous peoples and their legal
orders in Canadian legal education will remain less than meaningful, perhaps even harmful, until
racial stereotyping and prejudice is reduced. To be clear, non-Indigenous students and professors
cannot learn, and Indigenous students, professors and communities will not be meaningfully
welcomed, in law schools unless racial stereotyping and prejudice against Indigenous peoples is
addressed and reduced. In my view, racial stereotyping and prejudice is a barrier to ILE in
Canadian legal education and practice.
Why or how ILE is taught is not my focus.10 I do not believe that current ILE pedagogies are the
problem. Indigenous legal educators11 have developed programming that is consistent with
Indigenous lifeways, and that facilitates the reduction of prejudice and supports Indigenous
students’ learning journeys.12 It appears to me that the problem is not in ILE but rather the racial
stereotypes and prejudices about Indigenous peoples and their legal orders that permeate Canadian
society. Many, if not all, students and professors have, some more and some less, integrated this
milieu into their beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors. Some may not like acknowledging the fact that

Napoleon and Friedland argue that the “why” of Indigenous legal education has been answered, so now the work
must turn to “how... we can build on the current momentum to revitalize and fully realize the potential application of
Indigenous law in the world today”: Napoleon & Friedland, “An Inside Job”, supra note 5 at 733.
11
When I refer to “Indigenous legal educators” I am referring to either Indigneous or non-Indigenous professors who
engage in teaching ILE.
12
For two recent examples of Indigenous courses that intend to follow Indigenous lifeways, see Aaron James
(Waabishki Ma’iingan) Mills, “The Lifeworlds of Law: On Revitalizing Indigenous Legal Orders Today” (2015) 61:4
McGill LJ 847–884 at 874–883; Drake, “Finding a Path to Reconciliation”, supra note 3 at 22–33.
10
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this is true for them; they may resist it. Some will be better at denying or confronting their racial
stereotypes and prejudices than others. Some may even advocate for systemic change, going
beyond the individual-centered focus of most prejudice reduction approaches. But this reality
remains: almost every person, if not all persons, in Canada at this moment in history can access
and apply a broad range of stereotypes and prejudices about Indigenous peoples and employ a host
of socially and legally acceptable rhetorical and discursive strategies to deny this reality. This is
the social context in which ILE is received by some students and professors.13 Thus, the question
may be reframed as: how are non-Indigenous students able to learn about Indigenous legal orders,
and how can Indigenous students be meaningfully included, in Canadian legal education and
practice, in contexts that are oppositional to Indigenous peoples and their lifeways? To respond
to this question, I must consider the effects of racial stereotyping and prejudice on both Indigenous
and non-Indigenous peoples’ engagement with ILE.
Decolonization is not, per se, my focus, though I believe it is necessary for respectfully and
ethically engaging with Indigenous legal orders. Tuck and Yang define decolonization as the
repatriation or rematriation of Indigenous land and life and the transformation of Indigenous and
non-Indigenous peoples’ relationship outside of settler colonialism.14 For Hewitt, decolonization
in Canadian legal education “is the complicated work of acknowledging historic and ongoing
wrongdoings along with claiming responsibility through naming, dismantling, countering and
neutralizing both the collective and individual assertions and assumptions made in relation to

13

Not all students or professors are socialized in Canada or in other settler-colonial contexts.
See Tuck & K. Wayne, “Decolonization is not a Metaphor”, supra note 4 at 21, 35. See also note Error! Bookmark
not defined. and accompanying commentary. On decolonizing education, see Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Eve Tuck & K
Wayne Yang, eds, Indigenous and Decolonizing Studies in Education: Mapping the Long View (New York:
Routledge, 2018); Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples, 2d ed
(London: Zed Books, 2012); Marie Battiste, Decolonizing Education: Nourishing the Learning Spirit (Saskatoon:
Purich Publishing, 2013).
14
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Indigenous peoples.”15 I define decolonization as the dismantling of racial and settler-colonial
hierarchies embedded in the rule of law.
Because I believe that racial stereotyping and prejudice is a barrier to ILE and is related to settler
resistance to decolonization, I take a narrower focus: settler harm reduction. A settler harm
reduction approach raises the critical consciousness of settlers and is “crucial in the resuscitation
of practices and intellectual life outside of settler ontologies.”16 It seeks to “alleviate the
consequences of white supremacy and colonialism – by treating their symptoms as historical
inequities to be mitigated.”17 Harm reduction approaches aim to create spaces where Indigenous
peoples and their lifeways are safer from the effects of settler colonialism, and racial stereotyping
and prejudice.18 Settler harm reduction is only the start of a much longer, intensive process towards
decolonization.
As I explore in this thesis, in a range of contexts, settler harm reduction approaches may be
necessary to prepare some non-Indigenous peoples for engaging ethically and respectfully with
Indigenous peoples and their legal orders and to meaningfully include Indigenous students,
professors and Indigenous legal orders in Canadian legal education. Willie Ermine proposes the

Hewitt, “Decolonizing and Indigenizing”, supra note 4 at 70.
Tuck & K. Wayne, “Decolonization is not a Metaphor”, supra note 4 at 21.
17
Eve Tuck & K Wayne Yang, “Series Editors’ Introduction” in Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Eve Tuck & K Wayne Yang,
eds, Indigenous and Decolonizing Studies in Education: Mapping the Long View (New York: Routledge, 2018) x at
xiv. Harm reduction is also a matter of what is ethical. Ermine writes, “the word ethics is… the capacity to know what
harms or enhances the well-being of sentient creatures”: Willie Ermine, “The Ethical Space of Engagement” (2007)
6:1 Indigenous LJ 193–203 at 195.
18
Settler colonialism occurs when colonizers “come to stay”: Lorenzo Veracini, “‘Settler Colonialism’: Career of a
Concept” (2013) 41:2 J Imp Commonw Hist 313–333 at 313. Tuck and Yang define settler colonialism as “a form of
colonization in which outsiders come to land inhabited by Indigenous peoples and claim it as their own new home”:
Tuck & Yang, supra note 17 at xii. Veracini notes that unlike earlier manifestations of settler colonialism, which
exploited Indigenous peoples’ labour, contemporary manifestations prefer land unpopulated by Indigenous peoples:
Lorenzo Veracini, “Facing the Settler Colonial Present” in Sarah Maddison, Tom Clark & Ravi de Costa, eds, The
Limits of Settler Colonial Reconciliation: Non-Indigenous People and the Responsibility to Engage (Singapore:
Springer, 2016) 35 at 48.
15
16
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concept of an “ethical space of engagement” as a “theatre for cross-cultural conversation in pursuit
of ethically engaging diversity and disperses claims to the human order”:19
Engagement at the ethical space triggers a dialogue that begins to set the
parameters for an agreement to interact modeled on appropriate, ethical, human
principles. Dialogue is concerned with providing space for exploring fields of
thought and attention is given to understanding how thought functions in
governing our behaviours. It is a way of observing, collectively, how hidden
values and interactions can control our behaviour, and how unnoticed cultural
differences can clash without our realizing what is occurring.20
The path towards an ethical space of engagement requires that non-Indigenous peoples work
through a series of complex, deeply personal processes.21 In short, settlers must consider how their
beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors reinforce settler colonialism and exclude Indigenous legal orders.
If settlers have their own path to this space of ethical engagement, then settler efforts at
decolonization might start from familiar western frameworks such as psychology.22

19

Ermine, supra note 17 at 202.
Ibid at 202–203.
21
For a moving account of one settler’s journey through in this ongoing process, see Paulette Regan, Unsettling the
Settler Within: Indian Residential Schools, Truth Telling, and Reconciliation in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press,
2010).
22
Do non-Indigenous epistemologies and ontologies offer settlers the tools for decolonizing their relationship to
Indigenous peoples and Indigenous peoples’ lifeways? Battiste seems to suggest this is possible when she writes that
“[p]ostcolonialism is not about rejecting all theory or research of Western knowledge. It is about creating a new space
where Indigenous peoples' knowledge, identity and future is calculated into the global and contemporary equation”:
Battiste, supra note 14 at 185.
20
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I use law and psychology,23 specifically the social psychology literature on racial stereotyping,
prejudice, and discrimination,24 as a starting point for understanding the effects of these
phenomena on ILE in Canadian law schools. I do so for a few reasons. First, social psychology is
oriented towards the reduction of prejudice and the advancement of social change in society.25 It

23

I used two texts to orient my understanding of this literature: Curt R Bartol & Anne M Bartol, Psychology and Law:
Research and Practice, 2d ed (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2019); Andreas Kapardis, Psychology and Law: A Critical
Introduction, 4th ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
24
I started my research with Gordon Allport’s seminal text on racial prejudice: Gordon W Allport, The Nature of
Prejudice, 25th Anniversary ed (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1979). Then, I reviewed an
anthology revisiting and updating Allport’s work: John F Dovidio, Peter Glick & Laurie A Rudman, eds, On The
Nature of Prejudice: Fifty Years After Allport (Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell, 2005). From there, I
reviewed the most recent collected essays on racial stereotyping, prejudice and discrimination: Lynne M Jackson, The
Psychology of Prejudice: From Attitudes to Social Action (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association,
2011); John Dixon & Mark Levine, eds, Beyond Prejudice: Extending the Social Psychology of Conflict, Inequality
and Social Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Todd D Nelson, ed, Handbook of Prejudice,
Stereotyping, and Discrimination, 2d ed (New York: Psychology Press, 2015); Chris G Sibley & Fiona Kate Barlow,
eds, The Cambridge Handbook of the Psychology of Prejudice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).
Because this literature is wide-ranging, I relied on a standard textbook to orient my understanding of the literature:
Bernard E Whitley Jr & Mary E Kite, The Psychology of Prejudice and Discrimination, 3d ed (New York: Routledge,
2016). Along the way, I reviewed the relatively recent critical race realism movement, which integrates social
psychology with critical race perspectives on the law: Gregory Parks, Shayne Edward Jones & W Jonathan Cardi, eds,
Critical Race Realism: Intersections of Psychology, Race and the Law (New York: New Press, 2008). This led me to
consider critical and Indigenous perspectives on the use of social psychology to explain social, political and legal
phenomenon: Jonathan Kahn, Race on the Brain: What Implicit Bias Gets Wrong About the Struggle for Racial Justice
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2018); Professor Sander L Gilman & James M Thomas, Are Racists Crazy?:
How Prejudice, Racism, and Antisemitism Became Markers of Insanity (New York: NYU Press, 2018); Vine Deloria,
C. G. Jung and the Sioux Traditions: Dreams, Visions, Nature and the Primitive, Philip Joseph Deloria, ed (New
Orleans: Spring Journal Books, 2009); Nuria Ciofalo, ed, Indigenous Psychologies in an Era of Decolonization
(Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2019); Uichol Kim, Kuo-Shu Yang & Kwang-Kuo Hwang, eds, Indigenous and
Cultural Psychology: Understanding People in Context (New York, NY: Springer US, 2006); Thomas Teo, The
Critique of Psychology: From Kant to Postcolonial Theory (New York: Springer, 2011). In preparation for another
article, I also reviewed the law and psychology literature on racial stereotyping, prejudice and discrimination in jury
trials: Dennis J Devine, Jury Decision Making: The State of the Science (New York: University Press, 2012); Eugene
Borgida & Susan T Fiske, eds, Beyond Common Sense: Psychological Science in the Courtroom (Malden: Blackwell
Publishing, 2008).
25
Allport’s The Nature of Prejudice is an emblematic example of a social psychologist’s commitment to social change.
In this work, Allport investigates the role of personality, society, cognition, and law in the perpetuation, and perhaps
“smashing” of, prejudice. He discusses a range of potential interventions, from intercultural education (264-265, 434,
485-486, 508) vicarious experiences through media (488), intercultural exchanges such as festivals and travel (484,
265, 279, 488-489), small group processes like role playing and conflict resolution (484-485, 491, 492), friendships
(264-276) and even therapy (485, 495-496): Allport, supra note 24. Allport’s work significantly informed the
discipline’s orientation: John F Dovidio, Peter Glick & Laurie A Rudman, “Introduction: Reflecting on the Nature of
Prejudice Fifty Years After Allport” in John F Dovidio, Peter Glick & Laurie A Rudman, eds, On The Nature of
Prejudice: Fifty Years After Allport (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2005) 1. Social psychologists remain aware of,
and often committed to, their discipline’s potential for aiding in social change. For only two examples, see Jackson,
supra note 24 at 159–176; Fiona Kate Barlow & Chris G Sibley, “Where Do We Go from Here? Eight Hard Problems
Facing the Scientific Study of Prejudice and its Reduction” in Chris G Sibley & Fiona Kate Barlow, eds, The
Cambridge Handbook of the Psychology of Prejudice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018) 408 at 428-
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actively imagines, and sometimes prescribes, interventions for reducing prejudice; in this way, it
may function as a settler harm reduction approach. These interventions may be taken up and put
into practice by students, professors, and institutions, as long as we keep in mind that we are taking
up these interventions as lay readers of social psychology. Second, social psychology offers a
familiar epistemological framework – the scientific method – through which to understand the
effects of racial stereotyping, prejudice and discrimination on the inclusion of Indigenous students,
professors and legal orders in Canadian legal education, and on non-Indigenous professors’ and
students’ ethical and respectful engagement with Indigenous peoples and their legal orders and
perspectives.26 Third, and related to the second point, social psychology aspires to the status of a
“paradigmatic science” through which society may understand the objective “truths” of our social
and psychological experiences of racial stereotyping and prejudice.27 Fourth, social psychology
may pivot settler resistance to the experiences of racialized and Indigenous persons presented in
critical race and Whiteness, anti-racism and settler colonial studies.28 Indigenous and racialized
scholars and communities have explained many times, in many ways, their experiences of
racialization and settler colonialism. In just as many ways, their experiences have been rationalized

431 et passim. For a 2009 meta-review of the literature on prejudice reduction interventions, see Elizabeth Levy Paluck
& Donald P Green, “Prejudice Reduction: What Works? A Review and Assessment of Research and Practice” (2009)
60:1 Annu Rev Psychol 339–367. That said, social psychology does appear to suffer from a researcher-practitioner
divide, which limits the practical application of interventions in social contexts: Walter G Stephan, “Bridging the
Researcher-Practitioner Divide in Intergroup Relations” in Biren R Nagda, Linda R Tropp & Elizabeth Paluck, eds,
Reducing Prejudice and Promoting Social Inclusion: Integrating Research, Theory, and Practice on Intergroup
Relations (Malden, MA: Blackwell Synergy, 2006) 597 at 604–605.
26
Thomas Teo, Outline of Theoretical Psychology: Critical Investigations (London: Palgrave Macmillan Limited,
2018) at 28.
27
For a description of psychology’s aspirations to the status of Thomas Kuhn’s “paradigmatic science”, see
Christopher D Green, “Why Psychology Isn’t Unified, and Probably Never Will Be” (2015) 19:3 Rev Gen Psychol
207–214 at 207–208. Even though psychology will likely never be a unified and paradigmatic science, “[t]his doesn’t
mean that we have accomplished nothing of import. It means that we are a vital bridge from the less adequate
understandings of the past to the (we hope) more adequate standings of the future. That said, much of what we stand
on is probably not bedrock”, ibid at 212; see also Teo, supra note 26 at 28–43.
28
In The Trojan Horses of Race, Kang argues that “[r]ace talk in the legal literature feels like it is at a dead end. No
new philosophical argument or constitutional theory seems to persuade those sitting on one side of the fence to jump
to the other. One way to break current deadlocks is to turn to new bodies of science, specifically the remarkable
findings of social cognition”: Jerry Kang, “Trojan Horses of Race” (2004) 118:5 Harv L Rev 1489–1593 at 1495.
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away or dismissed. Fourth, there has been some uptake in Canadian courts and in the legal
profession for implicit bias training, which is related to the implicit social cognition theory of racial
stereotyping and prejudice.29 Even though psychology seems a separate discipline from law, the
fact is that judges and lawyers are already applying lay theories of stereotyping and prejudice,
sometimes badly, sometimes selectively.30 It makes sense, then, to test some of these lay
conclusions by turning to the law and psychology literature.31 Fifth, by illuminating the processes
underlying social categorization, stereotyping and prejudice, it becomes more difficult to deny
one’s normative responsibility for the effects of these processes on Indigenous peoples and their
legal orders.32 In short, social psychology may provide a heuristic for making our normative
choices transparent. Sixth, the neoliberal marketplace’s fascination with measurement and
efficiency dovetails with psychology’s love of parsimony and the universal.33 Even if not explicitly
so, most institutions are drawn towards diversity, inclusion, and cultural competency training for

Kang writes, “[f]or better or worse, law has turned sharply in favor of quantified and empirical analysis. Social
cognition allows a phalanx of those who study race to take that same turn, instrumentally to fight fire with fire, and
substantively to profit from a body of science that supports, particularizes, and checks what we intuit as the truth of
our lived experiences”: Ibid at 1497. See also Katheryn Russell-Brown, “The Academic Swoon Over Implicit Racial
Bias: Costs, Benefits, and Other Considerations” (2018) 15:1 Du Bois Review 185–193 at 188–189.
30
As Krieger argues, “[p]ast the familiar terrain of the jury or bench trial, there is a whole juridical world out there in
the nation's courtrooms, where judges are doing psychology, much of it demonstrably bad psychology, and weaving
it, unscrutinised and unvalidated into the law”: Linda Hamilton Krieger, “Behavioral Realism in Law” in Eugene
Borgida & Susan T Fiske, eds, Beyond Common Sense: Psychological Science in the Courtroom (Malden: Blackwell
Publishing, 2008) 383 at 396. Bartol & Bartol similarly comment, “[i]t should be clear by now that a vast store of
knowledge obtained by the sciences is making its way into the legal arena”: Bartol & Bartol, supra note 23 at 21.
31
Like Kang, Crosby and Dovidio suggest that social psychology on contemporary prejudice may test the intuitive
assumptions of courts about the nature of stereotyping, prejudice and discrimination: “By documenting how, like a
virus that has mutated, contemporary racism has evolved in such a way as to perpetuate racial disparities without
producing unlawful behaviour, current research calls attention to the limitations of intuition - even when the intuition
exists in the minds of legal scholars and practitioners”, in Faye J Crosby & John F Dovidio, “Discrimination in
America and Legal Strategies for Reducing It” in Eugene Borgida & Susan T Fiske, eds, Beyond Common Sense:
Psychological Science in the Courtroom (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2008) 23 at 29.
32
Parks writes that “...when individuals or institutions can no longer employ empirical uncertainty to continue to
engage in conscious or unconscious racist conduct, they must ultimately state their normative preferences”: Gregory
Parks, “Toward a Critical Race Realism” in Gregory Parks, Shayne Edward Jones & W Jonathan Cardi, eds, Critical
Race Realism: Intersections of Psychology, Race and the Law (New York: New Press, 2008) 1 at 5.
33
This wave towards implicit bias training coincides with the development of implicit measures of prejudice and neoliberal legal reforms related to workplace discrimination and harassment in the United States and Canada. For a history
of these social and legal shifts in the American courts and workplaces, see Kahn, supra note 24 at 39–54, 146–149.
29
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its purported ability to make workplaces more efficient and harmonious. It is reasonable to assume
that, at least for some audiences, this thesis will be attractive because it offers a framework that
can be used to identify and measure the progress of prejudice reduction interventions in Canadian
law schools. Finally, but perhaps most importantly, social psychology may (re)affirm some
Indigenous students’ and professors’ experiences of racial stereotyping, prejudice and
discrimination, a point to which I will return shortly.34
Social psychology, however, is not perfect; nor is it determinative of any explanation of our
collective social reality or the progress of ILE. Although social psychology is oriented towards
action, its vision of “action” is limited by its historical, disciplinary, and social context.35
Mainstream prejudice reduction theory owes its origins, for the most part, to the study of racial
prejudice held by White towards Black Americans, in a country where the societal objective has
shifted from racial antipathy and desegregation towards “implicit bias” and more harmonious
intergroup relations.36 Some prejudice reduction theories can sometimes miss the normative and
practical significance of structural relations of power and privilege.37 Furthermore, the
practitioners and subjects of social psychology are overwhelming from western, educated,

34

Parks and Kang each suggest that social psychology may bolster or support the experiences of racialized persons:
Parks, supra note 32 at 5; Kang, “Trojan Horses”, supra note 28 at 1496–1497.
35
On the embeddedness of psychological science in history, generally, see: Teo, supra note 26 at 41–42; see also
Thomas Teo, “Historical Thinking as a Tool for Theoretical Psychology” in The Wiley Handbook of Theoretical and
Philosophical Psychology (John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2015) 133 (on the history of “objectivity” in psychological
science).
36
A brief overview of this history can be found in John Dixon & Mark Levine, “Introduction” in John Dixon & Mark
Levine, eds, Beyond Prejudice: Extending the Social Psychology of Conflict, Inequality and Social Change
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 1 at 1–5. For a critical history of psychology’s pathologization of
racialized peoples and the shift towards pathologizing individuals as “racist”, see Gilman & Thomas, supra note 24.
As Teo notes, “[s]cience frequently serves to reinforce the ways individuals and groups in marginalized positions are
constructed as social problems”: Teo, supra note 35 at 141.
37
Some social psychologists identify this as part of the “prejudice problematic”, which includes a focus on individuals
and intergroup harmony, rather than social groups and conflict: Margaret Wetherell, “The Prejudice Problematic” in
John Dixon & Mark Levine, eds, Beyond Prejudice: Extending the Social Psychology of Conflict, Inequality and
Social Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 158 at 160–168.
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industrialized, rich and democratic (WEIRD) countries, like the United States.38 Although the field
of Indigenous psychology considers “psychological phenomena within [its] political, economic,
historical, philosophical, religious, cultural, and ecological contexts”,39 this field remains indebted
to psychology’s universalising commitments.40 Psychology’s faith in universality may be held too
unequivocally, sometimes harmfully so. Before pathologizing White people as racists,
psychological science was complicit in colonialism and White racial supremacy; racialized peoples
were pathologized as deviant and as objects of study.41 Even with the best of intentions, social
psychology cannot completely avoid the risk of pathologization.42 For Indigenous peoples,

38

Internationally, the United States ranked first in both general and psychology publications: Ana Teresa GarcíaMartínez, Vicente P Guerrero-Bote & Felix de Moya-Anegón, “Produccion Cientifica de Psicologia a Nivel Mundial
(World Scientific Production in Psychology)” (2012) 11:3 Universitas Psychologica 699–717 at 701–703. Among the
six leading American Psychological Association journals, American populations were overwhelmingly represented:
Jeffrey J Arnett, “The Neglected 95%: Why American Psychology Needs to Become Less American” (2008) 63:7 Am
Psychol 602–614 at 602. Moreover, a recent comparative review found that experimental research was often limited
to western, educated, industrialized, rich and democratic countries and populations (WEIRD): Joseph Henrich, Steven
J Heine & Ara Norenzayan, “The Weirdest People in the World?” (2010) 33:2–3 Behav Brain Sci 61–83 at 1–4 and
62.
39
Ciofalo, supra note 24 at 7.
40
Uichol Kim, Kuo-Shu Yang & Kwang-Kuo Hwang, “Contributions to Indigenous and Cultural Psychology:
Understanding People in Context” in Uichol Kim, Kuo-Shu Yang & Kwang-Kuo Hwang, eds, Indigenous and
Cultural Psychology: Understanding People in Context (New York: Springer US, 2006) 3 at 4; Uichol Kim & YoungShin Park, “The Scientific Foundation of Indigenous and Cultural Psychology: The Transactional Approach” in Uichol
Kim, Kuo-Shu Yang & Kwang-Kuo Hwang, eds, Indigenous and Cultural Psychology: Understanding People in
Context (New York: Springer US, 2006) 27 at 28.
41
Eve Tuck, “Suspending Damage: A Letter to Communities” (2009) 79:3 Harv Educ Rev 409–428 at 412 (describing
practices of eugenics research by White scientists in Aleut communities). An excellent example of this pathologization
of Indigenous peoples can be found in the literature on the “windigo psychosis”, a “culture bound syndrome” among
Cree and Ojibway societies. For a review of this literature, see: Hadley Louise Friedland, The Wetiko Legal Principles:
Cree and Anishinabek Responses to Violence and Victimization (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2018) at 24–
38; Lou Marano et al, “Windigo Psychosis: The Anatomy of an Emic-Etic Confusion [and Comments and Reply]”
(1982) 23:4 Current Anthropology 385–412. “Windigo psychosis” remains in the Penguin Dictionary of Psychology:
Arthur S Reber, Rhiannon Allen & Emily S Reber, The Penguin Dictionary of Psychology, 4th ed (London: Penguin
Books, 2009) at 875.
42
In 1940, John Collier, the Commissioner of the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs (B.I.A), established the
Indian Personality Project “to investigate the formation of Native American personalities on several reservations in
the United States”. As Gilman and Thomas write, the Indian Personality Project was “intended as a means whereby
Collier's supporters could devise ways of helping Native American groups maintain their languages and cultures in
the face of institutionalized prejudice.” In this way, Collier inverted the civilizing strand in scientific discourse: “In
other words, the ideology of this scientific undertaking was to prove not only that the so-called 'civilizing project'
applied to Native Americans was faulty, but that the Native Americans were actually not in need of any such
undertaking, as their cultures were rich and their identity not weakened, but strengthened, by their experience of
'dominant' culture.” However, as Sanders and Gilman note, the Indian Personality Project applied intelligence tests to

14

psychological science’s claim to authority and objectivity has been part of the problem. All of this
calls into question whose experience matters in social psychology. For most of its history,
prejudice reduction theory investigated the racial stereotypes and prejudices of White Americans.
Critical race and Indigenous theorists, in contrast, center our understanding of settler colonialism,
racialization, and racial stereotyping and prejudice in the experiences of racialized and Indigenous
peoples. Fundamentally, then, ILE and social psychology hold different problematizations and
objectives. For ILE, settler-colonialism is the primary barrier to engaging with Indigenous legal
orders, whereas for prejudice reduction theorists, it is racial stereotyping and prejudice (keeping
in mind, as well, that each theory defines “prejudice” in a different way). ILE is oriented towards
ethically and respectfully engaging with Indigenous legal orders, whereas most prejudice reduction
theories focus on the reduction of prejudice (the precise object depends on the theory) and
harmonious intergroup relations. Thus, although we may start with racial stereotyping and
prejudice, we must advance to discussions of law and psychology’s settler colonial problem. This
leads to my next point: conflict is not avoidable or necessarily to be avoided. Some implicit social
cognition interventions, particularly implicit bias training, strive to make learning nonconfrontational and easy; Jonathan Khan calls this “recreational anti-racism.”43 But Hewitt
reminds us, through the story of the Animiiki, the thunderbirds, that important change can come
from conflict.44 Social psychological theories that explain stereotyping and prejudice as the result

demonstrate Native Americans' resiliency to colonialism, inadvertently excusing the impacts of American colonial
policy, a kind of ‘no harm, no foul’: Gilman & Thomas, supra note 24 at 170–171. Joseph Gone, an Indigenous clinical
community psychologist and professor of anthropology, warns that clinicians, without proper training, may
“unwittingly enculturate our suffering patients into the ways of Western personhood through the subtle negotiations
and transformations of self…”: Joseph P Gone, “Keeping Culture in Mind: Transforming Academic Training in
Professional Psychology for Indian Country” in Devon Abott Mihesuah & Angela Cavender Wilson, eds, Indigenizing
the Academy: Transforming Scholarship and Empowering Communities (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
2004) 124 at 133.
43
Kahn, supra note 24 at 153.
44
Hewitt, “Decolonizing and Indigenizing”, supra note 4 at 65–66 and 83.
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of implicit or natural processes may dismiss the social, ethical and normative commitments made
by individuals, the choices we each make in unsettling, uncomfortable moments of conflict, and
may obscure relations of power, domination, and subordination.45 Such behavioralist explanations
shift our focus away from the agency and responsibility of individuals as social agents.46 Implicit
social cognition theory, the proposition that stereotyping is a natural and implicit, or nonintentional, process is attractive because it avoids any unsettling discussion of power, of
racialization, and of intentional behaviors that are discriminatory.47 In contrast, racialized and
Indigenous peoples’ experiences challenge the idea that racial stereotyping and prejudice is largely
unintentional or natural. The risk, then, is that White or non-Indigenous individuals in positions of
power and decision-making, such as lawyers and judges, will prefer explanations of racial
stereotyping and prejudice that minimize their personal responsibility and the need for
accountability. This is the risk of what Seigel calls “preservation through transformation”, the
transformation of seemingly emancipatory language – of racial stereotyping and prejudice – that
does little to shift inequitable relations sustained through law.48 Finally, we must cautiously
approach the evaluation of prejudice reduction interventions. Explicit measures of prejudice, such
as self-reported beliefs and attitudes, can be inaccurate, and implicit measures, such as the implicit

45

Kahn, supra note 24 at 129–132.
Kahn argues that “[f]or the behavioral realist, ambiguity is bad because it creates space for discretion; discretion is
bad because it relies on judgment; and judgment is bad because it is tainted by implicit biases. Although there is
certainly a logic to this way of thinking and empirical evidence to support the idea that discretion and judgment are
often tainted by bias, the logic and evidence do not necessarily mean that the best or primary way to address such
problems is to eliminate ambiguity, discretion, and judgment […] This idea also threatens to obscure democratic
accountability by asserting that expertly defined metrics can be used to evaluate and address bias definitively, which
absolves political and legal actors of responsibility for the consequences of their actions”: Ibid at 196–197.
47
On the de-racination of racial stereotyping and prejudice and the obscuring of power, see Ibid at 111–113, 129–132.
48
Reva B Siegel, “The Rule of Love: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy” (1995) 105:8 Yale LJ 2117–2208 at
2179–2181. Kahn cautions that “… far from changing the game, [the use of social psychology to advocate for social
change] may be inadvertently reinforcing some of the game's most pernicious rules”: Kahn, supra note 24 at 64. Sears
notes, for example, how American conservative have appealed to Martin Luther King Jr.’s "color-blindness" to justify
policies and laws that prejudice racialized groups and maintain social inequality: David O Sears, “Inner Conflict in
the Political Psychology of Racism” in John F Dovidio, Peter Glick & Laurie A Rudman, eds, On The Nature of
Prejudice: Fifty Years After Allport (Malden, Massachusetts: Wiley-Blackwell, 2005) 343 at 354.
46

16

association test, are impractical in educational contexts.49 If prejudice reduction interventions and
ILE have different objectives, then the evaluation of prejudice cannot be used to assess the success
of ILE.50 At most, the evaluation of prejudice reduction interventions may support the experiences
and knowledge of Indigenous professors and students.
For many of these reasons, I found it necessary to integrate social psychology with the experiences
of Indigenous professors and students. Throughout my research, I prioritized the experiences of
Indigenous educators, law professors, students, and lawyers.51 I also considered, however, the
experiences of settlers, particularly those who worked through discomfort towards an ethical space
of engagement with Indigenous peoples and their legal orders.52 Finally, I include my own

Michael A Olson & Kevin L Zabel, “Measures of Prejudice” in Todd D Nelson, ed, Handbook of Prejudice,
Stereotyping, and Discrimination, 2d ed (New York: Psychology Press, 2015) 175 at 181, 192–194 (describing the
reactiveness of modern racism scales to motivations to appear non-prejudiced and some reliability concerns with the
implicit bias association test).
50
Reicher reminds us that we should also be mindful that “the way the problem is framed and the nature of its solutions
are interdependent. If you misconceptualize the former, you will never arrive at the latter”: Stephen Reicher, “From
Perception to Mobilization: the Shifting Paradigm of Prejudice” in John Dixon & Mark Levine, eds, Beyond Prejudice:
Extending the Social Psychology of Conflict, Inequality and Social Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2012) 27 at 27–28.
51
The prioritization of Indigenous persons’ own stories is consistent with Indigenous methodologies and critical race
theory: Jo-Ann Archibald, Jenny Bol Jun Lee-Morgan & Jason De Santolo, eds, Decolonizing Research: Indigenous
Storywork as Methodology (London: Zed Books, 2019) Art 3; Borrows, supra note 8 at 62, 71, 212; Battiste, supra
note 14 at 184; Richard Delgado, “Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative” (1989) 87:8 Mich
L Rev 2411–2441 at 2415–2416. Dominant cultures, too, tell stories that establish the boundaries of a nomos, a
“normative universe”: Robert M Cover, “Foreword: Nomos and Narrative” (1983) 97:1 Harv L Rev 4–68 at 4–12. In
this way, Indigenous storytelling functions as counter-stories or as stories constitutive of their own nomos, their own
lifeways. My movement between social psychology, a largely Eurocentric discipline, and Indigenous storytelling is a
rhetorical move, intended to sharpen or expand our “zone of attention and field of discourse” about what is and what
is not relevant to legal education and practice: James Boyd White, “Law As Rhetoric, Rhetoric As Law: The Arts of
Cultural and Communal Life” (1985) 52:3 U Chicago L Rev 684–702 at 698. Finally, storytelling is an effective
prejudice reduction intervention; readers may benefit from hearing the experiences of Indigneous students and
professors in their own words: Paluck & Green, “Prejudice Reduction Interventions”, supra note 25 at 353–354; see
also Ifat Maoz, “Contact and Social Change in an Ongoing Asymmetrical Conflict: Four Social-Psychological Models
of Reconciliation-Aimed Planned Encounters Between Israeli Jews and Palestinians” in John Dixon & Mark Levine,
eds, Beyond Prejudice: Extending the Social Psychology of Conflict, Inequality and Social Change (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2012) 269 at 278–281 (in the case of protracted, asymmetrical conflict not unlike under
settler colonialism).
52
Rupert Ross, Dancing with a Ghost: Exploring Aboriginal Reality, 2d ed (Toronto: Penguin Books, 2006); Rupert
Ross, Returning to the Teachings: Exploring Aboriginal Justice (Toronto: Penguin Books, 1996); John Reilly, Bad
Medicine: A Judge’s Struggle for Justice in a First Nations Community (Victoria: Rocky Mountain Books, 2010);
John Reilly, Bad Judgment: The Myths of First Nations Equality and Judicial Independence in Canada (Victoria:
49
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experience in Canadian legal education and practice. It can often be difficult to see the
contradictions within settler colonialism. Indigenous peoples’ experiences of the “obsidian
quandaries”, those fault lines of Indigenous legal orders in Canadian legal education, may provide
relief.53
I cannot stress this enough: the use of social psychology is instrumental54 for, not determinative
of, understanding the effects of racial prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination on Indigenous
and non-Indigenous students and professors’ engagement with ILE in Canadian law schools.
Social psychology is helpful insofar as it (re)affirms Indigenous professors’ and students’
experiences, assists us in tailoring and justifying ILE and institutional commitments, articulates
meaningful anti-prejudicial norms, and provides tools for reducing prejudice in the classroom. It
is only one tool and one epistemological lens through which to understand barriers to, or
opportunities for, ILE. None of these social psychological theories are, on their own or even
together, a panacea.
Earlier, I said that I would come back to decolonization. As I completed this research, I concluded
that social psychology offered only a preliminary and partial story of the barriers to ILE in
Canadian law schools. Several theories, including contemporary theories of prejudice and social
identity theory, accentuated the stories of Indigenous professors and students in Canadian law
schools. I could see how the theory of “old-fashioned” prejudice described the hostility and
antipathy some Indigenous professors and students face, for example in references to “dead

Rocky Mountain Books, 2014); John Reilly, Bad Law: Rethinking Justice for a Postcolonial Canada (Victoria: Rocky
Mountain Books, 2019); Finch, supra note 3; Kirsten Anker, “Reconciliation in Translation: Indigenous Legal
Traditions and Canada’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission” (2016) 33:2 Windsor YB Access Just 15–44; Hannah
Askew, “Learning from Bear-Walker: Indigenous Legal Orders and Intercultural Legal Education in Canadian Law
Schools” (2016) 33:1 Windsor YB Access Just 29–46.
53
Here, I mean relief both in a sense of resolution as well as relevo, “to raise”, as in the sculptural technique applied
to stone. A sculptural relief requires concentrated action against what appears to be a stable form.
54
In the sense of being used as an instrument, not in the sense of “essential”.
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Indians” and in misogynistic fantasies of violence towards Indigenous women. Aversive racism
theory illuminated why some non-Indigenous students feel uncomfortable around and avoid
Indigenous peoples and their legal orders. The stories of Indigenous students and professors, who
felt tokenized and patronized by the missionary-like helping behaviors of their peers, found a home
in benevolent prejudice theory. But it was social identity theory, particularly intergroup threat
theory, that launched my understanding of the barriers to ILE much further, towards a
consideration of settler colonialism. I concluded, and conclude here, that the primary barrier to
ILE is the perception by settler law students and professors that Indigenous peoples and their legal
orders threaten the resources they enjoy as settlers in Canadian society, a perception associated
with explicit prejudice towards Indigenous peoples. It is as James (Sákéj) Youngblood Henderson
has said: “[i]n the post-colonial era, Canadians are comfortable believing Canadian federalism
grew out of mystical democratic traditions, just as they are comfortable in assuming the rule of
law exists. These beliefs are as much a matter of prejudice as convenience.”55
In this thesis, there are four chapters and a conclusion. The first chapter – “We are all here to stay,
but not in the same way” – and the conclusion complement each other. I begin with my story in
Canadian legal education and practice as a Métis person; in a way, I hope to return the gifts given
by other Indigenous professors and lawyers, who share their stories in writing. In my story, I
provide examples for understanding the theories of social psychology that I introduce and explain
in the chapters that follow. I have already flagged for you these theories, which are described
mostly in chapter 2 and the beginning of chapter 3: social categorization, “old-fashioned”
prejudice, contemporary theories of prejudice (“modern”, aversive, and benevolent prejudice), and
social identity theory (specifically, integrated threat theory and intergroup contact theory). In
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chapter 3, I identify individual and intergroup processes for reducing prejudice before inventorying
current ILE initiatives (ranging from Indigenous law camps to admissions and hiring policies) and
describing how these initiatives support prejudice reduction. In chapter 4, I briefly introduce
measures for evaluating the success of prejudice reduction interventions. In the conclusion, I
review this thesis within the framing of the first chapter, my experience. There, in the conclusion,
I ask that you consider re-reading the first chapter with what you might have learned through the
thesis. This thesis’ roadmap forms a circle.
I structure the content of this thesis as a gradually rising topography. I intend to address different
audiences, each with unique needs and prior levels of knowledge and commitment. For this reason,
I start with the basics in social psychology on social categorization, and racial stereotyping and
prejudice. Although the literature may appear as a relatively even terrain, it is not; social
psychologists disagree about even these basic concepts. I hope to introduce successively more
complex and challenging propositions, each building on the last. This stepladder approach is
consistent with Monteith and Devine’s models for self-regulating prejudice, which start with a
high-level explanation of the processes of social categorization and of stereotyping and prejudice
before asking participants to turn inward.56 The most alarming proposition for some readers will
be that settler colonialism, not just racial stereotyping and prejudice, is a barrier to ILE. By the last
half of chapter two, I will have introduced two important theories, integrated threat theory and
intergroup contact theory, that disclose how stereotyping and prejudice is related to group positions
and threats to settler resources, in short, settler colonialism. Towards the end of Chapter 3, I also
provide a critique of interventions that focus on individuals and on the fostering of intergroup
harmony, and argue for interventions that sustain collective action towards social change, in short,

56

Monteith and Devine’s models will be discussed in Chapter 3.

20

decolonization. This progress in my argument is what moves us forward from a settler harm
reduction approach to a decolonial one.
Readers who endorse decolonization may wonder why I take so long to get to an analysis of settler
colonialism and decolonization. They may wonder what my normative commitments are. My
argument is that prejudice reduction can start small and incremental, with implicit bias training
and intergroup contact, but the respectful and ethical implementation of ILE will require the
decolonization of Indigenous legal education and practice, which for me, is the dismantling of
racial and settler-colonial hierarchies embedded in the rule of law. This thesis’ incremental
structure and its centering of Indigenous peoples’ experiences is intended to function
pedagogically as a prejudice reduction and settler harm reduction intervention.
Action-oriented readers may want to get out and do something. I do not prescribe any specific
intervention. Instead, I emphasize the importance of agency and responsibility. For this reason,
what you do depends on your familiarity and comfort with an intervention, the people you hope to
engage, and your normative and ethical commitments. In chapter three, I explore two different
prejudice reduction interventions, self-regulation and intergroup contact, consider those
interventions alongside what some law schools are currently doing and mark out, in broad strokes,
the scholarly conversations about these interventions. In chapter four, I briefly introduce how
prejudice reduction interventions may be evaluated in Canadian law schools, while also flagging
some of the limitations of these measures. Each of the theories presented in this thesis are only an
explanation, none of which are universal or objective. They may be useful in certain situations for
certain individuals. It will be important to recognize both the usefulness and limitations of a
particular theory or intervention, which I will identify for you in this thesis. I intend to update my
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website, www.reconcilelaw.ca, with additional resources.57 By the end of this thesis, several
theories and related interventions, and examples of ILE, will be available to you.
It is my hope that this thesis offers non-Indigenous students, professors and administrators a
familiar framework through which they may continue to relate to the experiences and insights of
Indigenous students and professors, and to respect Indigenous legal orders. I believe that nonIndigenous peoples’ racial stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination is a barrier to the
implementation of the Calls and ILE in Canadian legal education and practice. For those who are
on board with decolonization, at least theoretically, I hope that this thesis can support your
engagements with colleagues, friends, and family who are starting from a different place. For those
who are not on board, I hope that this thesis provides a relatively familiar framework to understand
the barriers to, and opportunities for, the implementation of the Calls and ILE in Canadian law
schools. Perhaps it will speak to you personally in a way that inspires you to respectfully and
ethically support ILE, and perhaps even decolonization, in Canadian legal education and practice.
For Indigenous students and professors, I hope that this thesis (re)affirms some of your experiences

Johnson’s Reconciliation Syllabus is an excellent portal for TRC-related materials for teaching law: Rebecca
Johnson, “Reconciliation Syllabus”, online: reconciliationsyllabus: a TRC-inspired gathering of materials for
teaching law <https://reconciliationsyllabus.wordpress.com/>. Practical prejudice reduction interventions, both
personal and intergroup, are also described in: Paluck & Green, “Prejudice Reduction Interventions”, supra note 25;
Jackson, supra note 24 at 159–176; Barlow & Sibley, supra note 25 at 428–431. There is also a well-developed
literature on Indigenous cultural competency in Australia: Indigenous Cultural Competency for Legal Academics
Program: Final Report, by Marcelle Burns, Anita Lee Hong & Asmi Wood (Armidale, Australia: University of New
England, 2019). For a global review of Indigenous cultural competency in legal education, see A Global Survey of
Indigenous Legal Education and Research, by Kerry Sloan (Victoria, B.C.: Indigenous Law Research Unit, University
of Victoria, 2013). Finally, Demers’ literature review on cultural competency, generally, in legal education is helpful:
Annette Demers, “Cultural Competence and the Legal Profession: An Annotated Bibliography of Materials Published
between 2000 and 2011” (2011) 39:1 Int’l J Legal Info 22–50. Paulette Regan and Robin DiAngelo’s works are also
useful introductions to settler colonialism and racism, respectively, for non-Black and non-Indigenous audiences:
Regan, supra note 21; Robin DiAngelo, White Fragility: Why It’s So Hard for White People to Talk About Racism
(Boston: Beacon Press, 2018). Of course, my warning in this thesis – that we must consider collective action – applies
to all of these resources, some of which can appear too much like the “prejudice problematic.”
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and functions as one tool for engaging with non-Indigenous peers and institutions towards a full
implementation of the Calls and the decolonization of Canadian legal education and practice.
To recap, in the first chapter, I introduce myself and the experiences that led to this thesis and
approach. In the second chapter, I integrate social psychology and the experiences of Indigenous
students and professors to describe the impacts of racialization and racial stereotyping, prejudice
and discrimination on Indigenous peoples, their perspectives, and legal orders in Canadian law
schools. In the third chapter, I examine individual and intergroup prejudice reduction interventions,
as well as social change theory, before moving on to an inventory and preliminary assessment of
ILE programming and institutional commitments as settler harm reduction. In the final chapter, I
briefly address how prejudice and settler harm reduction efforts may be evaluated, while also
noting the importance of prioritizing Indigenous methodologies and perspectives. To conclude, I
return to my experiences in legal education and practice, introduced in the first chapter and
expanded upon in subsequent chapters.
What follows is my story as an Indigenous student and lawyer committed to the implementation
of the Calls in Canadian legal education and practice.58 This story not only orients my methodology
in the thesis but establishes my personal relationship to ILE initiatives in Canadian legal education
and practice.

Some conventions require sanitizing any trace of the researcher’s subjective interpretation of the literature. I think
this is counterproductive to the kinds of conversation and engagement that is necessary to implement the Calls. Law
and psychology’s claim to universality and objectivity is part of the problem: Henderson, “Postcolonial Indigenous
Legal Consciousness”, supra note 5 at 48; Battiste, supra note 14 at 26, 95–96, 103, 158–159. My interpretation of
my personal and professional experiences are central to this thesis. Hiding this behind more “formal” language would
not respect your – the reader’s – interpretation of this thesis. In addition, my “informal”, personal approach is rhetorical
and strategic: White, “Law As Rhetoric, Rhetoric As Law”, supra note 51. I hope that readers can relate to my writing
as if I am in speaking to them at a dinner table. Furthermore, this “informal”, personal approach is consistent with
indirect contact interventions through media, such as storytelling, narrative and perspective shifting: Paluck & Green,
“Prejudice Reduction Interventions”, supra note 25 at 353–354. It also reflects Indigenous and critical race storytelling
methodologies: Archibald, Lee-Morgan, & De Santolo, supra note 51; Delgado, supra note 51; Borrows, supra note
8 at 62, 71, 212.
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I.

“We are all here to stay, but not in the same way”59
“I remember once coming across an old white pine that had fallen in the forest.
In its decayed roots a young birch and a young black spruce were growing,
healthy and strong. The pine tree was returning to the earth, and two totally
different species were growing out of the common earth that was forming. And
none was offended in the least by the presence of the others because their own
identities were intact.”60

I am a Métis person from northern Saskatchewan. I was raised for most of my life in Treaty 6
adhesion territory, in the settler community of La Ronge, Saskatchewan. My mother traces her
Métis ancestry to the Red River settlement. My maternal great-great grandparents are William
Frank(s), an English ferryman, and Margaret-Harriet Sanderson, a Métis person from Fort Ellice,
Manitoba. I was raised by my mother with my non-blood auntie Gloria, a Nêhiyaw woman, and
her daughter – my non-blood sister or cousin – Diandra. My biological father, a member of the
Prince Albert Métis society, is connected through the Red River Métis community around San
Clara, Manitoba.
Growing up, I attended a settler elementary and high school. I was fortunate that the Northern
Lights School Division incorporated both Nêhiyawewin (Cree language) and culture into our
curriculum (though this was elective in upper years). I did not consciously know that I was
choosing to learn from the experiences of both Indigenous and non-Indigenous kin and
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community. It seems it was just always that way. At some point, around the age of seventeen, I
was told that my role was to leave La Ronge so that I could learn from others.
After an alienating experience in college and university, I moved to British Columbia. I worked
with the Greater Victoria Police Victim Services in Victoria, British Columbia to improve the
agency’s relationship with the First Nations in the Greater Victoria region: Tsartlip, Tsawout,
Tseycum, Songhees, Esquimalt, T’Sou-ke and Pauquachin. Starting with consultations, we were
told that the agency should develop education and training for its victim services workers.
Although there was a deep cultural competency literature in multicultural education and labour, I
found these competency models insufficient and a poor fit for Indigenous-settler relationships. The
next year, I worked for Reciprocal Consulting on an Indigenous cultural competency (ICC)
program. These experiences introduced me to the Indigenous cultural competency and prejudice
reduction literature.
I chose to attend Osgoode Hall for my Juris Doctor, rather than a law school in British Columbia,
because I wanted to work with non-Indigenous students in, frankly, a less culturally safe
environment. I had gotten it into my mind that a “buddy system” could be useful for reconciliation.
I had some training and prior experience doing this when I attended an international college
(located in Canada). I had been told as a youth that my gift or skill was my curiosity and care for
others’ experiences. The “buddy system” was also consistent with my understanding of Indigenous
relational ethics and the cultural competency and prejudice reduction theory I learned in previous
projects. I imagined the “buddy system” like a tether of relationships, a characterisation I now find
as too codependent and oddly paternalistic to non-Indigenous people.61 I was looking for
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something closer to John Borrows’ interpretation of the relationship between teacher and student,
or, perhaps more appropriately, friendship.62
After listening to Senator Murray Sinclair speak at the Indigenous Bar Association Conference at
Rama First Nation in 2013, I anticipated that Canadian law schools might strongly welcome
Indigenous cultural competency training. However, I also worried that this momentum could be
short-lived; I saw the stop-start of national support for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
At that conference, Jeffery Hewitt spoke of the hummingbird doing all that it can to put out a fire,
one drop at a time, and I wondered if the hummingbird needed a buddy too.63
In my second year, I joined the Osgoode Indigenous Students Association (OISA) as co-chair.64
My experience with OISA challenged some of the assumptions I made about coming to Osgoode
to work with non-Indigenous students. I thought, at the time, that the best way to create safer spaces
for Indigenous students was to create relationships with non-Indigenous students. Now, I can see
that I was focused on settler harm reduction. I summarised this in a vision: “My vision is to foster
reciprocity between Indigenous and Canadian laws, Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal communities
and within Canadian legal education.”65 Since I thought that relationships were integral to my
vision, I worked to be as inclusive as possible in the organization. I knew that including settlers

There is a relationship of dependence. Yet, at the same time, learners exercise agency in choosing how and what they
learns and how they apply that knowledge; see Borrows, supra note 8 at 44–47, 106–109. See also Battiste’s
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138–157 at 156.
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within OISA could increase the risk to Indigenous members in the short-term, but I also believed
that any Indigenous student who would choose to go to Osgoode – rather than the University of
Victoria or the University of British Columbia – would have prepared themselves for this
possibility; I had, so I made the incorrect assumption that others did too.
At an OISA executive meeting, a mature, non-Indigenous student argued that if the Indigenous
students received a separate facility, so too should the mature students.66 I was offended and so
were many other Indigenous students at the table. I did not say anything within the group because
I believed that as co-chair my responsibility was to listen and then to talk privately with the student.
This is what I had learned from elders. I tried to remain friendly and welcoming, believing that I
could be accountable for my actions, but some of my colleagues avoided me for most of the year.
This destroyed me for a time. OISA later amended its constitution to create a separate honorary
“ally” category for non-Indigenous students. When the mature non-Indigenous student approached
me towards the end of the year to thank me for what they had learned, the experience felt like an
unsettling dream.
I had assumed that other Indigenous students carried the same assumptions and expectations as me
when that was not the case. I had spent so long thinking about non-Indigenous learners that I had
completely missed what was happening for the Indigneous students that I had a responsibility to
represent. We failed to culturally and spiritually support some of the Indigenous students. I could
see, too, that my own positionality was important in all of this. I came to doubt the effectiveness
of the “buddy system”. One-on-one, positive, interpersonal encounters were too few, too limited

On June 21, 2017, Hart House was renamed as Skennen’kó:wa Gamig, the House of Great Peace, and set aside for
use by Indigenous students at York University:. York University, “York University’s Hart House renamed to create
safe space for Indigenous peoples – YFile”, (21 June 2017), online: York University
<https://yfile.news.yorku.ca/2017/06/21/york-universitys-hart-house-renamed-to-create-safe-space-for-indigenouspeoples/>.
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in their capacity to immediately and broadly alter structural inequities and power imbalances. My
approach appeared to have done nothing for the immediate needs of the Indigenous students at
Osgoode and little to create structural change. It was also personally draining.
When the Truth and Reconciliation Commission released its report in 2015, I was working with
the Constitutional Law Branch for the Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General (MAG). MAG’s
Indigenous Justice Division was established around that time as well, in order to implement the
findings of the Debwewin Committee, which was responsive to Justice Frank Iacobucci’s Report
on First Nations Representation on Ontario Juries.67 Quite quickly, broad based institutional
support appeared for the Calls in law schools. I worried, however, that this momentum could be
co-opted and processed through a neoliberalization of “reconciliation”, an interpretation that
favoured what Tuck and Yang describe as “settler futurity” or the status quo of settler
colonialism.68
With this fresh momentum, the Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice (CIAJ) held
its annual conference on the banks of the South Saskatchewan river in mid-October 2015. The title
of the conference, “We are all here to stay”, repeated the memetic closing line of Chief Justice
Lamer’s reasons in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia.69 No better statement of settler futurity may
ever be spoken.70 In his opening address, Saskatoon Tribal Council Chief Felix Thomas challenged
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the meaning of the conference’s theme. For Chief Thomas, “being here to stay” meant the overincarceration and criminalization of Indigenous peoples. “Here,” Chief Thomas explained, “means
in jail.”71 He offered an alternative interpretation based on treaty principles; that the conference
should be about “gathering together” to reflect on not only Canadian law about Indigenous peoples,
but also Indigenous realities, life and legal orders. Now, I reflect that Chief Thomas was inviting
the participants into an ethical space of engagement. Justice LaForme shared Chief Thomas’
concern, adding that “we are all here to stay, but not in the same way.”72 Justice LaForme was
hopeful that change was possible.73 He reflected that “we have moved on from hearing ‘there is
no such thing as sovereignty’ [among non-Aboriginal lawyers and judges] to reconciliation and
the kinds of discussions that we are having here [at this conference].”74
What followed at the conference was remarkable to me. Over eighty judges heard some of the
most renowned Indigenous scholars in Canada chart a path towards respecting Indigenous legal
orders in Canadian courts.75 John Borrows laid out arguments for taking judicial notice of
Indigenous stories as sources of law. Aimee Craft shared her community-based work on
Anishinaabe nibi inaakonigewin, or Anishinaabe water law, in Manitoba and Northwestern
Ontario. Jeffery Hewitt and Caleb Behn each tailored their presentations to incorporate Indigenous
and non-Indigenous ways of understanding, explicitly in the hopes of speaking in ways familiar to
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non-Indigenous participants. How could the participants not come away with a greater
understanding of the importance of Indigenous laws to the rule of law in Canada?
During Behn’s presentation, an executive director of a province’s social justice tribunals
commented on how justices are sworn to uphold the rule of law. The executive director was
responding to Behn’s position that Indigenous peoples’ resistance to extractive industries is
authorized under Indigenous law. A possible subtext to the executive director’s comment was
Behn’s relationship to George Behn, Behn’s great grandfather and defendant in Behn v. Moulton
Contracting Ltd.76 In Behn v. Moulton Contracting Ltd., the Supreme Court of Canada did not
consider whether the Behn family was authorised under Indigenous law to oppose Moulton
Contracting’s activities on their land.77 Noting that the Behn family’s actions were not authorised
by the Indian Act band council, the Court characterised their actions as “self-help remedies” that
would “bring the administration of justice into disrepute.”78 In short, the Court reasoned that the
Behn family’s actions were lawless. In the context of the panel’s discussion, the executive
director’s comments implied that Indigenous legal orders were outside, or disorderly, to the
Canadian rule of law. I was stunned. Were we even attending the same conference?
I held out hope that Chief Justice Beverly McLachlin would put the justices’ minds at ease in her
keynote speech. After all, only a few months prior the Chief Justice described Canada’s colonial
policies towards Indigenous peoples as “cultural genocide.”79 Justice Martel Popescul, the future
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trial judge in Gerald Stanley’s killing of Colten Boushie from Red Pheasant First Nation and
former counsel for the RCMP in alleged police informant and White supremacist Carney Nerland’s
killing of Leo LaChance of Big River First Nation, introduced the Chief Justice.80 The Chief
Justice’s speech, however, was very light on the theme of the conference. She spoke at length
about the “access to justice” problem, characterised as Indigenous peoples’ distrust and lack of
knowledge of the Canadian justice system, and of the need for better childhood education about
Indigenous peoples. I remember thinking: you have hundreds of judges and lawyers in this room
right now who can learn if you’d only tell them that it’s OK. After the conference, a judge from
eastern Canada approached us – a group of Indigenous students having lunch – and told us that we
were the generation that would make things right. If you can have the foresight to see what we
could do, why can’t you do it yourself? I left the conference feeling like the CIAJ’s message was:
this is not your time.
I struggled to put my thoughts together after the conference. I focused on my work with the Métis
Settlements Appeal Tribunal in Edmonton, Alberta, with which I was placed through Osgoode’s
Aboriginal Lands, Resources and Governance Intensive. My attention shifted then to the bar
exams, then to my clerkship, my wedding, and practice with Olthuis Kleer Townshend, LLP.
During this period, I watched as Gerald Stanley was acquitted in the death of Colten Boushie and
wondered how racial prejudice on the prairies may have affected the jury’s decision.81 I watched
the circus of the “Stop-SOP”-pers, a cadre of lawyers who opposed the Law Society of Ontario’s
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Statement of Principles and Equity, Diversity and Inclusion initiatives.82 In Ontario, at least, Jordan
Peterson became something of a Jungian archetype for many of those who opposed what they
called the death of free speech and thought – “Diversity, Inclusion and Equity” initiatives, or
“D.I.E.”83 On Valentine’s day, 2018, Justin Trudeau announced a legislative framework for the
Recognition and Implementation of Indigenous Rights, based on some chapters from the almost
two-decades old Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, while leaving Romeo
Saganash’s Bill C-262 to die, which would have started the incorporation of the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples into domestic legislation.84 When the National
Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls concluded that Canada’s
treatment of Indigenous women was genocide, settler editorialists chastised the Inquiry, suggesting
that it would have been more pursuasive if it used lighter language.85
There was momentum to implement the Calls, but I worried that it would slip away as “projects”
were “completed.” For every year I attended the Indigenous Bar Association’s Annual Conference,
Kathleen Lickers and Candice Metallic reported on their efforts within the profession to implement
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the Calls. The Advocate’s Society had released its Guide for Lawyers Working with Indigenous
Peoples, which I felt was a good first step.86 Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto released their
own guide, Communicating Effectively with Indigenous Clients.87 The Ontario Ministry of the
Attorney General, which had been experimenting with voluntary programs for Crown counsel at
least by 2014, modified and adopted an Indigenous cultural competency program for counsel and
support staff while developing its own program, Bimickaway, through the Indigenous Justice
Division. Around this time, I developed an accredited continuing legal education course that
provided a preliminary overview of the prejudice reduction literature and outlined its practical
application for the profession.
I remained concerned that institutions would accept but not apply the decolonial insights of
Indigenous scholars and practitioners, preferring to leave the implementation of the Calls to the
marketplace. I could not imagine the Stop-SOP benchers supporting decolonization, let alone
Indigenisation, initiatives. Even without such aggressive opposition, I was concerned that the
neoliberalization of the profession – both in practice and academia – could undermine the longterm implementation of the Calls.88 My experience as a policy consultant suggested to me that the

Guide for Lawyers Working with Indigenous Peoples, by The Advocates’ Society, Indigenous Bar Association &
Law Society of Ontario (Toronto: The Advocates’ Society, 2018).
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Communicating Effectively with Indigenous Clients, by Lorna Fadden & Aboriginal Legal Services of Toronto
(Toronto: Aboriginal Legal Services, 2017).
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Between 2016 and 2020, I observed that many general service law firms changed the name of their practice group
from Aboriginal law to Indigenous law. On January 12, 2017, I had a conversation with a leading partner of a general
service law firm’s Indigenous law practice group. That partner explained that the name change reflected the language
used by their clients and did not necessarily indicate that the firm practiced Indigenous law. Since then, even the
Lexpert Legal Directory has changed the Aboriginal law category to “Indigenous law”. I am concerned that this type
of change may undermine the actual reform of legal services of Indigenous peoples, a form of preservation-throughtransformation as described by Reva Siegel: Siegel, “The Rule of Love”, supra note 48 at 2184–2185. Moreover, even
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success of such initiatives was often dependent on long-term institutional support. If a decisionmaker did not understand the value of Indigenisation or decolonization (though, economic valuing
of decolonization is oxymoronic), support could vanish. We would return to the heavy burden
placed on individual Indigenous educators and students.
The settler harm reduction approach influences my choice of methodology. Personal experience
informs me that many non-Indigenous settlers and institutions implicitly oppose decolonial and
anti-racist programs and resist engaging respectfully with Indigenous legal orders. A “stop-gap”,
or better yet a stepping stone, was necessary to raise settlers’ critical consciousness of settler
colonialism and racism in Canadian legal education.89 I understood that the problem was not so
much pedagogical technique or content but the comfort of settler colonial privilege and the
unsettling experience of imaging an uncertain settler future. The idea of addressing the settler path
to ethically engaging with Indigenous legal orders became clearer to me. I wanted to better
understand not only my experience but also the experiences of Indigenous and non-Indigenous
students, professors, and legal professionals. What could social psychology tell me about these
experiences and the implementation of the Calls and ILE in Canadian law schools?

Huberman, Boughton Law Corporation, Callison & Hanna, Cassels Brock & Blackwell, Miller Thomson, Norton
Rose Fulbright Canada, Blake, Cassels & Graydon, MLT Aikins, and Rae & Company. For general service firms, I
limited my review to the Indigenous or Aboriginal law practice group (in some cases, the Aboriginal law practice
group was located within the category of energy or resources). Miller Thomson does not list lawyers under their
Aboriginal law practice group, and so was not included. I only counted an individual as an Indigenous lawyer if they
publicly identified their Indigenous community; as a result, some well-known Indigenous lawyers were not included
in my count (approximately 3). I have also not included Indigenous senior counsel or retired partners (approximately
3). The review was completed based on each firm’s website as of January 29, 2020. My review did not include other
significant law firms such as Woodward and Company, Janes Freedman Kyle, and Maurice Law because they were
not listed in the Lexpert index. Of the firms I reviewed, Callison & Hanna is notable in that both of its founding
partners are Indigenous.
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II.

Racial prejudice, stereotyping and discrimination against Indigenous students,
faculty, staff, and Indigenous legal education in Canadian law schools
“It is easier, someone has said, to smash an atom than a prejudice.”90

In this chapter, I explore the manifestation of racial prejudice, stereotyping and discrimination
against Indigenous students and professors in Canadian law schools.91 To do so, I will explain the
social categorization and racialization of Indigenous peoples in Canadian legal education. Having
described some of the ways that Indigenous peoples are categorized by settlers, I will then turn to
key theories in social psychology to explain Indigenous students’ and professors’ experiences of
prejudice. I propose that these theories are helpful for describing and understanding, within a nonIndigenous epistemological tradition, the experiences of Indigenous students and professors, and
the beliefs, attitudes and behaviors of their non-Indigenous peers. Taking up some of these
experiences, I will describe how Indigenous students and professors navigate their identities as
Indigenous professionals in Canadian contexts in light of social categories negotiated by both
Indigenous and non-Indigenous communities. I will expand on this through the concept of
tokenism and stereotype threat, which may explain Indigenous students’ and professors’ responses
to, and experiences of, racial prejudice in Canadian law schools. Because these concepts risk
pathologizing Indigenous peoples and rendering them as passive recipients of harm, I illustrate
how Indigenous students’ and professors’ responses to racial prejudice can be understood through
the concept of survivance.92 I will then reconsider two arguments against Indigenous legal
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education from a social psychology frame: opposition to inclusionary policies (affirmative action)
and opposition to ILE. This framing supports my conclusion that opposition to inclusionary
policies and ILE can be understood as responses to perceptions of threat to settler-colonialism.
This insight is not particularly novel, since Indigenous scholars, activists and communities, and
some non-Indigenous scholars, have, for decades, described this phenomenon as key to settler
opposition to Indigenous peoples and their rights and interests.93 Taken together, these theories
and the experiences of Indigenous students and professors help refine our understanding of the
interventions discussed in chapter 3.
Before continuing, I note that I often cite to Kite and Whitley’s textbook, Psychology of Prejudice
and Discrimination, rather than the theoretical and experimental literature.94 To prepare for this
thesis, I read several recent anthologies in social psychology, as well as some of the experimental
literature, before reading Kite and Whitley’s text.95 For the purposes of this thesis, I use this text
as my cornerstone. First, Kite and Whitley’s text, in my opinion, provides an excellent and
comprehensive review of the key debates and findings in the literature. I am confident that the
textbook refers to much of the same literature that I reviewed. Second, because this text is an
overview of the discipline, it addresses contrasting or conflicting theories in ways that some
researchers, particularly those advocating for a specific theoretical approach, may not. Third, I am
a lay researcher insofar as social psychology is concerned. Kite and Whitley’s text was useful in
orienting my understanding of the literature. I expect that many readers of this thesis will also be
lay readers. Such readers may find this text more accessible than the experimental literature. Thus,
I conclude that Kite and Whitley’s text offers more benefits than risks for this thesis’ purpose. I

See, for example, Pauline Wakeham, “Reconciling ‘Terror’” (2012) 36:1 Am Indian Q 1-33,117.
Whitley & Kite, supra note 24.
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93
94

36

have, however, also cited to the theoretical and experimental literature when it is key to my
argument, particularly with respect to theories of intergroup threat and contact.
1. Social Categorisation and Racialization

After I applied to Osgoode Hall Law School, I was invited to an admissions event at the ShangriLa Hotel in Vancouver.96 I remember sitting at the table with the then-Dean Lorne Sossin and
feeling enthused about law school. Later than evening, I met an esteemed bencher from the Law
Society of British Columbia. At some point in the conversation, the bencher asked me, “Which
one of your parents is Indian?” “That’s not how it works,” I responded frankly.97 I explained that
both of my parents are Métis, but I could see that his interest in me was quickly diminishing. He
may have taken my response as aggression or felt uncomfortable in the interaction; our power
differential due to the bencher’s seniority in the profession may have been relevant. There was a
shuffle of sorts, and like the furthest planet in orbit, I was flung back to the charcuterie. I love
cheese, so I thought “this is fine.”

Processes of social categorisation and racialization were afoot in my conversation with the
bencher. Social psychologists define social categorisation as “the process of simplifying the
environment by creating categories on the basis of characteristics… that a particular set of people
appear to have in common.”98 Social identity theorists expand on this, noting how one’s selfconcept “derives from membership in groups that are important to the person.”99 Social
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categorisation is an intergroup process; it involves negotiation about the boundaries between group
identities.100 This does not mean, however, that such processes are equitable or inevitable in their
outcomes. Racism, for example, is an ideology of subordination on the basis of perceived group
differences.101 Sociologists Omi and Winant define racialization as “the sociohistorical process by
which racial categories are created, inhabited, transformed, and destroyed.”102 Even some
cognitive and evolutionary social psychologists concede that, though social categorisation may be
a “natural” part of human cognition and behaviour, it manifests in social context and action.103

In the law school context, some Indigenous students report being identified by their nonIndigenous peers and on the basis of race. One Indigenous woman who was a law student recalls:

I overheard two women in the back of Torts discussing who was and was not
Indian in the classroom. The assessment was based purely on physical attributes.
More distressing and painful than that was the fact that we were objectified and
examined like some foreign entity in "their" class. I was hurt, alone and labelled
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(2013) 39:1 Ann Rev Soc 359–378.
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36 at 37–38; Oliver Sng, Keelah EG Williams & Steven L Neuberg, “Evolutionary Approaches to Stereotyping and
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Psychology Press, 2015) 3 at 13.
100

38

by women I was to spend the next three years with. I remember that every time
I speak with either of them.104
Processes of social categorisation and racialization obscure personal, professional, and intersecting
identities105 in favour of a perceived homogenous outgroup identity.106 Indigenous women,
because of their intersecting identities, may be perceived to be representative neither of gender nor
Indigeneity, a phenomenon described by some social psychologists as “intersectional
invisibility.”107 Where physical appearance of race is observed as relevant, light skin Indigenous

Tracey Lindberg, “What Do You Call an Indian Woman with a Law Degree - Nine Aboriginal Women at the
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students and professors may experience tensions in how they are included or excluded from, or
identify with, Indigneous and non-Indigneous groups. Indigenous students who are “Whitepassing” or coded as “White” may experience tension between their sense of identity as an
Indigenous person and their White-coded privilege,108 and/or struggle to associate with their
Indigenous and non-Indigenous peers.109 Indigenous persons who “conceal” their identities may
be less likely to identify with stereotypes held about their group membership and may be reluctant
to perceive discrimination against them as harmful.110 Social categories are also important to nonIndigenous peoples. Non-Indigenous judges and lawyers reflect on how their social identities – as
professionals, as European or White, as non-Indigenous – are relevant to their respectful
engagement with Indigenous peoples and Indigenous legal orders.111

supra note 104 at 308. Process of prototypicality (the extent to which an individual is perceived to be typical of his or
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Even though Indigeneity is not a racial category, Indigenous peoples are racialized in Canadian
society. For example, the Federal government has exercised its legislative authority under s. 91(24)
of the Constitution Act, 1867 to define and narrow its obligations to those Indigenous peoples who
are eligible for “status” under the Indian Act.112 Chris Andersen writes that the Indian Act is
“[p]erhaps the most notorious instance of Canadian racial categorization...”113 As legal historian
Bhandar argues, “[Indian] status has become a racialized designation that is determined by an
individual’s gender and marital status and upon which access to one’s land depends…”114 Eva
Mackey illustrates how racialized difference is re-coded as cultural difference through Canadian
multiculturalism: “A settler colony with official policies of multiculturalism and bilingualism,
Canada has an official national culture which is not ‘homogeneous in its whiteness’ but rather
replete with images of Aboriginal people and people of colour. The state-sanctioned proliferation
of cultural difference (albeit limited to specific forms of allowable difference) seems to be the
defining characteristic of Canada.”115 Indigenous peoples’ racial or cultural difference is
juxtaposed against “Whiteness”, which “refuses categorisation other than just ‘normal’ and
‘human’”, and against the “ordinary Canadian.”116
In this way, Indigenous peoples’ political, social, spiritual, and legal differences – their Indigeneity
– are denied through processes of social categorisation based on race and culture. Indigenous
peoples hold rights and responsibilities that are vastly different from other groups or individuals.
For example, s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 affirms and recognizes the collective rights of
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Indigenous peoples.117 The Canadian state also has a unique political relationship with Indigenous
peoples through s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 and through, in some areas, treaties.118
Indigenous peoples root their relationship to the land and to each other through lifeways that
include Indigenous legal orders.119 However, as Glen Coulthard argues, “over the last thirty years,
the Supreme Court of Canada has consistently refused to recognize Aboriginal peoples’ equal and
self-determining status based on its adherence to legal precedent founded on the white supremacist
myth that Indigenous societies were too primitive to bear political rights when they first
encountered European powers. Thus, even though courts have secured an unprecedented degree
of protection for certain ‘cultural’ practices within the state, they have nonetheless repeatedly
refused to challenge the racist origins of Canada’s assumed sovereign authority over Indigenous
peoples and their territories.”120 For these reasons, it makes sense to describe how non-Indigenous
peoples or settlers socially categorise Indigenous peoples on bases other than their Indigeneity.
2. Stereotypes and Prejudice
Gendered and racialized difference is not natural or inevitable; it is a function of social
categorisation and racialization in a particular social context. Stereotypes are the “beliefs and
opinions about the characteristics, attributes, and behaviours of members of various groups.”121
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Generally, social psychologists find that stereotypes may be “positive” or “negative” (in my view,
a problematic and artificial distinction),122 be descriptive or prescriptive,123 change over time and
differ within cultures or subgroups,124 and differ in their (in)accuracy (which is also a controversial
matter).125
Stereotypes about Indigenous people include assumptions about Indigenous peoples, and their
cultures, traditions, and laws. Tracey Lindberg writes how these stereotypes alienate Indigenous
law students:
The traditional image of the Indian is prevalent in the college. True, there are
values, cultural understandings, and historical learnings that we always carry
with us. But we drive cars, use fax machines, and are computer literate.
Somehow, the traditional image of the Indian woman pervades the minds of
some of our colleagues and all of their casebooks. There is a sense that others

stereotypes to change, as we know they do, (b) permits the inclusion of positive and accurate characteristics, and (c)
emphasizes that stereotypes are widely shared – somehow, when a set of beliefs is held by only a few the term hardly
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possess a right not to know about the actualities of Aboriginal lifestyles and
thought. We are not so enabled. […] It is disturbing when any person feels that
she is not taken seriously or is dismissed because of her race.126

Stereotypes may be expressed as beliefs about Indigenous peoples as lazy, as trouble-makers or
militant, as angry, or as unintelligent.127 Indigenous students recall hearing opinions that: “[i]f
[Indigenous students] take their degree a little more seriously they wouldn't get into trouble while
they were here”128 and that “[t]he part-time [law] program wouldn't be in trouble if there weren't
so many Indians in it.”129 Indigenous peoples and their laws may be stereotyped as inferior or
unsophisticated.130 Even stereotypes that appear as “positive”, such as the stereotype that
Indigenous peoples are connected to the environment, obscure or ignore the agency and
experiences of Indigenous individuals and their communities.131 I posit that stereotypes, whether
“positive” or “negative”, pathologize Indigenous students or professors, inoculate the non-
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Indigenous persons against critical self-reflection and accepting responsibility,132 and shape how
courts and lawyers rend law from Indigenous peoples’ experiences and legal orders.133
In contrast to stereotypes, social psychologists define “prejudices” as attitudes, or “evaluations or
emotional responses”, “directed toward people because they are members of a specific social
group.”134 Prejudices include not only out-group antipathy, but also in-group favoritism,135 and
may also be expressed not only as hostility, but also as beneficence or paternalism.136 Some
distinguish intentional or explicit and unintentional or implicit prejudices on the basis of whether
such prejudices are consciously or unconsciously, respectively, endorsed by the individual as
normatively acceptable.137 In another sense, “prejudice” describes an attitude, evaluation or
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emotion towards an outgroup member that is understood by the perceiver’s ingroup or the
outgroup to be non-normative or inappropriate.138 This latter definition is helpful, as it allows us
to track how social context and ingroup or outgroup norms function to define behaviour as
prejudicial or non-prejudicial over time.139
From its origins in the eighteenth century to its manifestation in early twentieth century eugenics,
scientific racism normalized European, or “Caucasian”, racial superiority and pathologized nonEuropeans as deviant and inferior.140 Alongside the advent of psychoanalytic theory and in the
wake of the first and second world wars, the holocaust, and the American civil rights movements,
scientific, social, political and legal norms shifted to condemn the overt racial hostility of a quickly

138

Whether the normative source is from the in or outgroup is important for social sanction. An ingroup member may
be more motivated to act in accordance with ingroup, rather than outgroup, social norms. At the same time, an ingroup
and outgroup may not share the same understanding as to “prejudice.” This makes the term “prejudice” particularly
slippery. Reynolds explains that “[w]hen we condemn particular attitudes as prejudiced or biased this is a basic
reflection of the fact that there are a range of groups in the world... whose vantage point we find not only hard to
comprehend but also sometimes extremely objectionable. Very definitely, this does not mean that we are wrong to do
so”: Reynolds, Haslam & Turner, supra note 100 at 62.
139
The foregoing analysis draws upon research I completed for a directed reading, which I intend to submit for
publishing: “Revisiting Judicial Instructions on Stereotyping and Prejudice Towards Indigenous Peoples in Canadian
Criminal Trials” Scott Franks, (29 March 2020) [unpublished draft with author].
140
For an overview of the history of scientific racism in philosophy and psychology, and its relationship to colonialism,
see Thomas Teo, “The Postcolonial Critique” in The Critique of Psychology: From Kant to Postcolonial Theory (New
York: Springer, 2011) 155 at 155–158, 164–167. For a discussion of the history of scientific racism in psychological
science and its relationship to eugenics, see: Gilman & Thomas, supra note 24 at 28–29, 88, et passim. Gilman and
Thomas argue that “[w]hat social scientific thought had begun to recognize as a social problem in the early twentieth
century gradually became absorbed through [a] form of mental health governmentality, and over time, and like other
social problems, became reclassified as an individual and pathological problem”: ibid at 18-19. A shift towards
genomics has also occurred. TallBear’s critique of the genomics project in Indigenous communities provides a useful
reminder of science’s relationship to colonization and settler colonialism: Kim TallBear, “Genomic Articulations of
Indigeneity” (2013) 43:4 Soc Stud Sci 509–533. Echoing the eugenics project, Indigenous women in Canada continue
to report non-consensual sterilization: National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls,
Reclaiming Power and Place: the Final Report of the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women
and Girls: Part B (Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 2019) at 141; Avery Zingel, “Indigenous women come forward with
accounts
of
forced
sterilization,
says
lawyer”,
CBC
(18
April
2019),
online:
<https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/forced-sterilization-lawsuit-could-expand-1.5102981>.

46

distanced past; racial prejudice and its effects on racialized persons, not race itself, became
pathologized.141 Despite these shifts, racial inequality persisted.
Social psychologists turned toward theories of contemporary prejudice to explain the persistence
of racial inequality between Black and White Americans. In the next section, I consider “modern”
or “symbolic” racism, aversive racism, benevolent racism, and social identity theory alongside the
experiences of Indigenous students and professors in Canadian law schools. Together, these
contemporary theories of prejudice may help us further engage with Indigenous students’ and
professors’ experiences of racial stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination in Canadian law
schools. These theories, however, are not mutually exclusive of each other nor determinative of
our understanding of racial stereotyping and prejudice.
a) Old-Fashioned and Modern Prejudice
In the 1970s, social psychologists David Sears and John McConahay distinguished “oldfashioned” and “modern” prejudices towards Black Americans in the United States.142 Sears
defines “old-fashioned” prejudice as “(a) a belief in the biological inferiority of African
Americans; (b) support for formal discrimination against Blacks in many domains of life…; and
(c) racial segregation of Blacks in those domains, as well as in private domains such as
marriage.”143 Sears proposes that when White Americans lost “the active support of the political
and legal systems” for legal segregation, the “nature of prejudice” in American society shifted.144
The concept of “modern” or “symbolic” racism is intended to describe how White Americans
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justify persisting racial inequality through a set of race-neutral discourses, including the belief that
racism and discrimination no longer exists, that racial inequality is the result of lifestyle or personal
choice, and that efforts to address racial inequality are unfair to White Americans.145
Adapting “old-fashioned” and “modern racism” theory from the United States, Morrison et al.,
distinguish between “old-fashioned” and “modern” prejudicial attitudes towards Indigenous
peoples in Canada.146 In my view, which I will come to, although these distinctions may be helpful
in certain cases, they are largely artificial for understanding anti-Indigenous prejudice in Canada.
According to Morrison et al., “old-fashioned” prejudice against Indigenous peoples is associated
with attitudes and beliefs about Indigenous child abuse and poor parenting, alcohol and drug use,
welfarism, tardiness, uncleanliness, disease, poverty, and appearance, either as innate or as a result
of Indigenous peoples’ lifestyle or personal choices. These stereotypes persist in Canadian legal
education and require critical reflection.
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In 2019, a law professor at the University of Toronto assigned a fact pattern involving the
apprehension of an Indigenous child from their family.147 The context of the apprehension
involved parental drug and alcohol use, the failure of the parents to attend programs, and the
grandmother’s positive engagement with the child. The assignment asked students to compare how
courts would have decided such a case in the past, and how they might decide it under the current
law. In this way, the assignment asked the students to contextualize the Canadian law on
apprehensions of Indigenous children. However, the assignment also received criticism from law
students, who found that the assignment perpetuated stereotypes about Indigenous peoples. The
assignment recalled stereotypes and “old-fashioned” prejudices about Indigenous families. At the
same time, it asked students to apply the law to a fact scenario that appears in practice. In response,
the Dean apologised.148
The take-away from the Indigenous child welfare assignment is clear: “old-fashioned” prejudice
does not exist only in the past and is not isolated from law in its social context. One Indigenous
law student reflects on her experience of “old-fashioned” prejudice in law school:
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I heard one male student jokingly saying that he was from [an urban centre with
a very high Aboriginal population] and that because he was from that town it
was okay if he transgressed the limits of the law because it was all relative. He
stated that he could not be penalized because "he only shot one or two Indians".
I did not say a word. It is too scary to approach someone who feels confident
enough about that belief to say it in a normal tone of voice. 149
Another law student recalls overhearing fantasies150 of sexualised violence against Indigenous and
other racialized women:151
The story we were told is that one of the paying guests at the stag had, upon
hearing there was to be a prostitute in attendance, asked to ensure that the
prostitute was, and I don't believe he was this polite, a Black woman or an Indian
woman. My interpretation of that story was this: at least one member of this
college thought that it was acceptable to objectify a woman and also felt that this
degradation would be more effective if it took place with a woman of colour.
That person is or will be a lawyer; that person will represent women; that person
will represent Indians; and that person will represent Indian women. Every
woman in this college had to attend classes with this person.152
In contrast to “old-fashioned” prejudice, Morrison et al., describe “modern” prejudice against
Indigenous peoples as the opposition to policies that are intended to ameliorate the conditions of
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Indigenous peoples. These attitudes and beliefs include: a refusal to apologize for colonialism; the
characterization of Indigenous rights advocacy as “complaining”, as victimhood, as “special”
interest, or as unfair to Canadians; and opposition to affirmative action, equitable hiring, onreserve tax exemptions, and treaties. In contrast to the American experience, where “oldfashioned” prejudice has decreased and “modern” prejudice against Black Americans has
increased,153 Morrison et al. found that “old-fashioned” prejudicial attitudes and stereotypes about
Indigenous people remain high and relatively unchanged from two decades ago;154 the only change
is that “modern” prejudice against Indigenous peoples appears to have also increased.155
How can we account for the social reality that “old-fashioned” and “modern” prejudice against
Indigenous peoples persists to the degree that it does? I agree with Pehrson and Leach, who
challenge the view that there is any real difference between “old-fashioned” and “modern”
prejudice in the context of settler colonialism. They argue that the experience of settler colonialism
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“should call into question any straightforward view that cultural racism has come into existence
recently as a way of evading the egalitarian norms that have gained ground over the past few
decades. Rather, they can be seen as a continuation of discourses of civilizing missions that were
present throughout the ‘golden age’ of European imperialism. Not only do ‘new’ racisms have a
long history, but supposedly antiquated elements are still expressed directly and continue to be
influential.”156 Teo echoes this point, noting that “scientific racism is to colonialism as hidden
culture-centrism is to neo-colonialism”157 In either form, “old-fashioned” or “modern”, prejudice
facilitates the aim of settler colonialism, which is the denial of Indigenous peoples’ rights, their
political, social and legal difference – most importantly, their Indigeneity –, and the displacement
of Indigenous peoples’ relationship to land.158 However, applied critically, these concepts may
help us identify contemporary prejudicial attitudes towards Indigenous peoples.
b) Aversive Racism
Not all prejudice is explicitly endorsed or expressed as “old-fashioned” or “modern” prejudice. It
can also be implicit, observable through physiological or behavioural responses and alongside
endorsements of equality. In Thunder in my Soul, Patricia Monture-Angus describes the aversive
racism of non-racialized participants at a legal conference. After a presentation by a racialized
woman, Monture-Angus observed a White participant become “quite defensive. He took great
pains to explain that he did not intend to harm anyone, that he was very concerned about 'minority'
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issues and helped 'minorities' whenever he could, but that he was seriously questioning whether
the conference was accomplishing anything.”159 As a rhetorical strategy, the participant dismissed
the racialized presenter’s (and Monture-Angus’) opinions as “experiential” and not academic;
"Let's make this academic and stop feeling for awhile,”160 he demanded. In an aversive flourish,
the participant explained that “[t]he pain of minority people is like television, we can turn it on
and off as we want to.”161
In Monture-Angus’ account, the participant’s response is typical of aversive racism. Aversive
racism theory proposes that some individuals may hold anti-prejudicial attitudes and values
alongside implicit racial stereotypes and negative affective responses. In the American context,
social psychologists Dovidio and Gartner define aversive racism as:
a form of contemporary bias that characterizes the racial attitudes of wellintentioned people, who genuinely endorse egalitarian values and believe that
they are not prejudiced, but at the same time possess conflicting, often nonconscious, negative feelings and beliefs about Blacks that are rooted in basic
psychological processes (e.g., social categorization) that promote racial bias.162

Where anti-prejudicial norms are explicit and authoritative, individuals may self-regulate their
behaviour to appear non-prejudiced. For example, an Indigenous student reports observing or
being aware of aversive behaviours: “[t]he classroom atmosphere at law school is very cautious no one wants to sound racist, sexist, or stupid.”163
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However, where the normative structure is weak or ambiguous, individuals may act according to
their implicitly held racial stereotypes or prejudices.164 At a more complex level, the tension
between one’s non-prejudiced and prejudiced norms and beliefs may be experienced as discomfort,
anxiety, or threat, either to one’s self or group identity as a non-prejudiced person, or to one’s
status.165 This can lead to behaviours ranging from avoidance to self-regulation.166 In addition,
individuals may experience cognitive fatigue when self-regulating, which can result in the rebound
of implicit or unconscious stereotypes and prejudices.167 However, for Keith James, an Onondaga
professor of organizational psychology, “[p]rofessing one set of policies and procedures while
actually operating under another is the essence of corruption.”168 Echoing the proposition that
normative ambiguity facilitates the expression of prejudice, James writes that “many people who
consider themselves to be tolerant of group differences and who would be horrified to have to
acknowledge racist behaviour will still engage in discriminatory behaviour and prejudicial
thinking when circumstances allow them to justify those actions as unrelated to group
membership.”169
c) Benevolent Prejudice
In addition to aversive prejudice, settler prejudice towards Indigenous students and professors may
appear as benevolence. In Monture-Angus’ account, after the conference participant proposed that
the experience of racism was “like television”, the other non-racialized conference participants
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censored their discussions of the encounter from the racialized and Indigenous participants: “[t]he
White people there had already decided that I was not supposed to hear about that [television]
comment,” Monture-Angus recalls.170
Benevolent prejudice challenges our assumption that prejudice is merely the manifestation of
negative beliefs and attitudes. Social psychologists Kite and Whitley define benevolent prejudice
as “a form of prejudice that is expressed in terms of apparently positive beliefs and emotional
responses to targets of prejudice.”171 Developing the concept in the context of gender and sex,
Peter Glick and Susan Fiske argue that ambivalence (the ability to access both “positive” and
“negative” racial stereotypes) sustains both hostile and benevolent forms of prejudice. Glick and
Fiske explain that “[p]rejudice can manifest itself not only in unalloyed hostility but also in sweet,
yet patronizing, guises that may be insidiously effective at maintaining social inequalities.”172
Canadian social psychologists Cherie Werhun and April Penner observed benevolent prejudice
towards Indigenous students at the University of Winnipeg.173 They found that benevolent
prejudice undermines Indigenous students’ competency, increases their anxiety or self-doubt about
confirming stereotypes about their group (stereotype threat), and strengthens negative stereotypes
held about Indigenous peoples as a group.174 Peers may perceive an Indigenous student’s success
to be the result of affirmative-action-based policies or the additional help provided by the nonIndigenous peer or authority; in turn, this can undermine an Indigenous student’s relationship to
his or her peers.175 Whether out of benevolent concern or aversion, Monture-Angus’ and the
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racialized person’s agency was undermined when the non-Indigenous participants decided to
exclude them from discussions about the “television” comment.
Although benevolent prejudice may manifest between peers, it is also present in social hierarchies.
The relationship between professor and student, or professor and administration, are two such
hierarchies. Some Indigenous law students report feeling patronized176 or ignored when they offer
perspectives in class.177 Like Black Americans in the United States,178 Indigenous law students are
keenly aware of their peers’ and professors’ attempts to appear non-prejudiced: “There are faculty
who are "perceived" to be "sympathetic", and there are faculty who are "actually" responsive to
Aboriginal concerns. Some faculty are patronizing to us. Some are helpful, accommodating, and
encouraging.”179 In some cases, benevolent prejudice manifests in seemingly helpful, inclusive
practices, which nevertheless assign greater workloads and responsibilities to Indigenous students.
Harold Johnson explains:
Law schools, in their arrogance, in their perpetuation of the myth that law is a
complex body of thought, continue to assign exaggerated workloads, continue
their abuse of students by elevating stress levels unnecessarily and continue to
insultingly assign extra work to Indigenous and disadvantaged students and
insinuate that the problem is that the students are not smart enough and require
remedial assistance.180
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Indigenous professors may also experience benevolent prejudice from their peers and
administration. An administrator may, for example, place Indigenous law professors “under
quality control” by assigning non-Indigenous faculty supervision.181 Non-Indigenous professors
may make overtures in support of Indigenization and decolonization activities while doing little to
change their own teaching content or methods. For example, some constitutional law professors
oppose teaching section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, instead leaving it to upper-year, topicspecific courses.182 Administrations may tie Indigenous program resources to a discrete fund that,
once depleted, shifts the burden of fundraising to Indigenous faculty.183 Monture-Angus argues
that when White people ask "What can I do to help?", this perpetuates paternalism and the
missionary role.184 This framing, of benevolence and help, may also obfuscate the increased labour
undertaken by Indigenous professors, who may be asked, for example, to provide Indigenousrelated resources or guest lecture for their non-Indigenous peers. These ideologies subordinate
Indigenous students and professors and reassign responsibility for the effects of settler colonialism
onto their shoulders.
d) Effects of Stereotyping and Prejudice on Indigenous Students and Professors
Whether “old-fashioned”, “modern”, aversive, or benevolent, racial prejudice takes its toll on
Indigenous students and professors. Lindberg tells us:
If you think that it is easy to come here the day, week, or month after you hear
these statements, you are mistaken. If you think that these statements do not
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affect how a person gets a legal education, you are mistaken. If you think that
these are not legal issues, you are mistaken. It is a part of the clothing that we
put on every morning when we get dressed to come to school. There are not
many days when we don't notice the additional weight. It colours our perception,
understandings, and interaction in many situations. The chronic pain of a hatredache is time consuming, nagging, and aggravating.185
Such encounters may take the form of microinsults, such as stereotypes of primitiveness or
behaviours of unconstrained voyeurism (“Which one of your parents is Indian?”), or
microinvalidations, such as jealous accusations, misrepresentation, or invisibility.186 In R. v. Van
der Peet, for example, the Supreme Court of Canada cites Mark Walters for a proposition that
Walters properly attributes to Patricia Monture-Angus; in this way, the Court renders MontureAngus’ contribution as an Indigenous academic invisible in the jurisprudence.187 These chronic
encounters with racial prejudice can result in adverse mental and physical health outcomes for
Indigenous students and professors.188
Some Indigenous students and professors report experiencing tokenization. Social psychologists
Kite and Whitley define tokenism as the “preponderance of one group over another.”189 According
to social psychologists, a racialized person’s visibility, the perception of them as novel in the social
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context, and contrast, the exaggeration of group differences, may result in stigmatization by
dominant group members.190 For example, Indigenous students or professors may be singled out
as experts on Aboriginal or Indigneous law, or on Indigenous communities and legal issues.191
Indigenous professors, in particular, may be expected to be experts in all areas of the law that affect
Indigenous peoples including criminal, tort, property, constitutional, child and family, wills and
estates, and administrative law.192 Whether perceived or real, Indigenous students and professors,
particularly those who are women, encounter a greater workload and greater or different emotional
and physical demands than their non-Indigenous peers.193
Tokenism also obscures the complex choices and realities faced by Indigenous students. Some
Indigenous students attend law school after many years of education outside of their communities.
Others may have been further alienated from their communities and legal traditions through legal
dispossession or dislocation (for example, by way of adoption, out-marriage, or expropriation of
land).194 Indigenous students may be learning about Indigenous protocols related to tobacco, gifts,
pipe ceremonies, and teachings for the first time alongside their non-Indigenous peers.195
Moreover, not all Indigenous students aspire to a career in Aboriginal or Indigenous law.196
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Indigenous professors may be expected to teach Indigenous legal orders, regardless of their interest
or ability. To be seen, then, as a representative of an Indigenous community can be alienating.
The insidious nature of tokenism and stereotyping places Indigenous professors and students in a
double bind: their actions are perceived to either confirm or disconfirm the stereotypes held about
their group membership.197 According to social psychologists, “stereotype threat” describes a
racialized person’s motivation to disconfirm stereotypes held about his or her group
membership.198 In academic settings, stereotype threat can impact the performance of racialized
students and professors.199 Individuals may overperform compared to their non-racialized
counterparts or experience cognitive fatigue, anxiety, and burnout. Paradoxically, stereotype threat
may impact the racialized student or professor’s performance.200
Indigenous students and professors’ experiences of stereotype threat is not just about academic
performance. It is also about the incommensurabilities between Indigenous and non-Indigenous
lifeways. Indigenous students and professors are expected to understand Canadian law, despite not
sharing its cultural assumptions or worldview. Indigenous students must contort their thinking and
accept Eurocentric assumptions underlying Canadian law or risk failing.201 Failure brings with it
the possibility of confirming negative racial stereotypes and prejudices about Indigenous peoples.
As Aaron Mills explains, this is a monumental burden on Indigenous students:
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I'm one of the many who found law school extraordinarily challenging. As
dawning slowly rolled over my peers that first year, I fumbled clumsily in the
dark. I waited for my light bulb to appear. I waited and waited, but it never came.
I just couldn't get it. And I didn't understand why; I'd been a strong student until
then. Many of my professors were excellent too; in most instances, I couldn't tell
myself the problem was their teaching. As clarity set over my friends, I slipped
further into a cloud of confusion and I began to question if I belonged. As I
listened to their brilliant questions-which not only synthesized but creatively
applied the material in new ways - I felt stupid.202
In response, Indigenous law students may work unnecessarily harder in their classes to counter
inaccurate stereotypes about Indigenous students' lack of merit: “I try really hard to make sure I
am prepared. This whole "lazy Indian" image really is alive and at work in this college. It is
especially evident in the statements I have heard regarding Aboriginal people in the part-time
program.”203 As an Indigenous student, Lindberg similarly reflects that “… we were studying three
times (which I was later able to reduce to two steps). The first time we studied the cases to pass
the test. The second time we studied to understand Canadian law. The third time we studied it to
give it Nêhiyawak context and de-mystify it.”204 Johnson similarly struggled, but found that
adopting a White man’s perspective made it easier: “When I started looking at law the way I
imagined a white male would look at it, it became much simpler. Law is deeply rooted in white
Western thought.”205
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Stereotype threat also impacts Indigenous students’ and professors’ determination of their personal
and professional identities. 206 In order to advance their careers (or even have one), Indigenous law
students may choose to take non-ILE courses to distinguish themselves from stereotypes that may
be applied to them by potential employers.207 Some students, like Johnson, may assimilate to nonIndigenous norms in order to survive law school. Similarly, Indigenous law professors may selfpolice or regulate their outward behaviour and dress to insulate themselves from stigmatization by
their non-Indigenous peers or students.208 White students, particularly those who are cis-men, do
not have to navigate these sorts of externally imposed racial stereotypes and prejudices in their
personal and professional journeys in Canadian law. The profession, after all, was built for their
advancement.209
Applied uncritically, the concept of “stereotype threat” and “tokenism” pathologizes the effects of
racial prejudice on racialized persons.210 Monture-Angus rejects the pathologization of Indigenous
students and professors as disadvantaged by racial prejudice; “Disadvantage is a nice, soft,
comfortable word to describe dispossession, to describe a situation of force whereby our very
existence, our histories, are erased continuously right before our eyes. Words like disadvantage
conceal racism.”211 Concepts like stereotype threat risk shifting accountability from the institution
to the racialized individual. For example, it is counterproductive and prejudicial to suggest to
Indigenous professors and students that they engage in self-help remedies, such as meditation or
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ceremony, “lower their expectations”, reduce their workload (usually by reducing Indigenousspecific content) or submit to supervision by a non-Indigenous authority figure. Institutions can
reduce stereotype threat by articulating clear policies and procedures for academic evaluation and
discrimination complaints and by working to reduce stereotyping and prejudice.212
The concept of “stereotype threat” can also flatten the personal, professional, and ethical choices
made by Indigenous students and professors. One Indigenous law student asks, “How can I be both
Indian and attorney? How can I be true to myself and true to my people? How can I be prosperous
and proud? How can I be loyal to my tribal heritage as an Indian and faithful to my own as an
attorney? This is quite a challenge.”213 Some Indigenous students and professors may choose to
participate in ways that are inconsistent with their traditional teachings. This can lead to pain for
the student or professor, and isolate them from other students, their Indigenous professors, and
their community.214 Others aspire to fluency in both Indigenous and non-Indigenous legal
orders.215 Indigenous students and professors may also accept additional responsibilities as role
models, caretakers, liaisons, advocates, and friends in accordance with Indigenous legal orders.
These choices are complex and meaningful.
The concept of “survivance” is helpful for understanding Indigenous agency in Canadian legal
spaces.216 Gerald Vizenor describes “survivance” as “moving beyond our basic survival in the face
of overwhelming cultural genocide to create spaces of synthesis and renewal.”217 Viewed from
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the outside, however, these choices may appear to confirm stereotypes, particularly cultural ones,
about Indigenous peoples. To pathologize professors and students as experiencing the paradoxical
effects of stereotype threat is to fail to recognize the resiliency and agency of Indigenous peoples
and their legal orders and the full range of personal and professional choices available to them.
e) Social Identities: Intergroup Threat and Contact
Going back to the concept of social categorisation, we can see how our social identities are
important to our experience of the world and others. According to social identity theory,
individuals receive psychological benefits from identifying with a group or groups.218 The social
identity theory of integrated or intergroup threat proposes that the perception of intergroup threats
predict expressions of prejudice. Stephan, Ybarra and Rios explain that “an intergroup threat is
experienced when members of one group perceive that another group wishes to, or is in a position
to, cause them harm.”219 Threats may be “symbolic”, for example, as a threat to a group or
individual’s values, morals, norms, beliefs, status, worldview, or legal order, or they may be
“realistic”, as corporeal, political, or economic threats to an individual or group.
In this thesis, I flatten the distinction between these two types of “resources” (the “symbolic” and
the “realistic”). In the settler-colonial context, the division between “realistic” and “symbolic”
resources is permeable, or perhaps even artificial. For example, the rule of law, a “symbolic
resource”, is intimately connected to settler property, a “realistic” resource. In Ktunaxa, the First
Nation sought religious protection for Qat’muk, a mountainous area subject to a ski-resort
proposal.220 For the Ktunaxa Nation, Qat’muk is a spiritually important site as it is the location of

Henri Tajfel & John Turner, “The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behaviour” in Psychology of Intergroup
Relations (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1986) 7.
219
Walter G Stephan, Oscar Ybarra & Kimberly Rios, “Intergroup Threat Theory” in Todd D Nelson, ed, Handbook
of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination (New York: Psychology Press, 2009) 255 at 256.
220
Ktunaxa Nation v British Columbia, [2017] 2 SCR 386.
218

64

Kⱡawⱡa Tukⱡuⱡakʔis, the Grizzy Bear Spirit. In response to the ski-resort proposal, the Ktunaxa
Nation argued that permanent human habitation would drive Kⱡawⱡa Tukⱡuⱡakʔis from Qat’muk.221
On appeal, a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada distinguished between the First Nations’
Charter right to carry on a religious practice, for example, to dance or engage in ceremony, from
the “object” of that practice, Kⱡawⱡa Tukⱡuⱡakʔis.222 According to the Court, s. 2(a) does not protect
the object of a spiritual or religious belief system. In Ktunaxa, then, we see the majority of the
Court impose a distinction between “realistic” resources – the corporeal practices connected to
spirituality – and the “symbolic”, the intangible or immaterial nature of the “spirit” itself. Senwung
Luk and Howard Kislowicz propose that the Court’s concern, that Indigenous spiritual rights may
manifest as property rights, belies the property rights afforded by the state to some Christian
denominations in Canada.223 For the Ktunaxa, Qat’muk, Kⱡawⱡa Tukⱡuⱡakʔis, and their spiritual
practices are interwoven. As Mills argues, “In transcendent religions, such as the Abrahamic
religious traditions, the object of religious belief is by definition at some remove from the belief
itself. Indigenous spiritual traditions, however, are immanently rooted in earth […].”224 Finally,
these terms, “realistic” and “symbolic” also carry imprecise connotations. To say that a resource
is “realistic” may imply a certain corporeal priority or importance compared to “symbolic”
resources. For these reasons, I do not distinguish between “realistic” and “symbolic” resources,
but rather, describe the specific “resource” that is of concern, such as the “rule of law”, or
“property”, though even these two examples are partners.
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According to integrated threat theory, a range of individual and group-level behaviours may follow
from the perception of threat ranging from avoidance (consistent with aversive prejudice theory)
to aggression.225 The perception of threat – whether actual or not – depends on various antecedent
factors, including individual-level personality, attitudes and cognitions, prior negative intergroup
contact and relations, and situational factors. In an unfortunate move, intergroup threat is circular;
the perception of threat may lead to negative affective responses, which in turn may predict the
perception of threat where there is none.226 There is some empirical support for the proposition
that the perception of material or immaterial threat is a predictor of prejudice.227
Recall that at the 2015 CIAJ conference some non-Indigenous participants implied that Indigenous
legal orders are inconsistent with the rule of law.228 This view reflects a perceived material threat
of Indigenous rights and title to settler colonialism and its private property regime, and a perceived
immaterial threat to a settler colonial interpretation of the “rule of law”.229 This argument of threat
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is legally available, in part, because of the perceived incommensurability between some collective
Indigenous rights under s. 35 and the priority provided to private property rights. This
incommensurability flows from the Crown’s assertion of its sovereignty over Indigenous
territories. Without ever having to go so far as to apply a sovereign incompatibility analysis,230 the
Supreme Court of Canada has effectively limited Indigenous rights and title from encroaching on
key state and private property interests through a series of internal or inherent limits,231 an
essentialist interpretation of Indigenous culture,232 a framework for justified infringement,233 an
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interpretation of Canada’s legislative and executive branches that excludes Indigenous peoples
from being consulted on legislation that may affect their Indigenous rights,234 and through framing
the observance of Indigenous protocols as an “abuse of process.”235 In some cases, lawyers and
judges may restrict the status of Indigenous legal orders to evidence of Indigenous culture, rather
than respectfully engage with it as law. For example, legal historian Hamar Foster describes how
Crown counsel for Canada argued at trial in Tsilhqot’in Nation that the Tsilhqot’in legal order was
akin to a cultural “elevator etiquette.”236 At trial in Delgamuukw, Chief Justice McEachern
dismissed Antugulilibix’s (Mary Johnston) presentation of Gitxsan adaawk (law) through song,
reportedly opining, “It’s not going to do any good to sing to me… I have a tin ear.” 237 This
prejudice, that some Indigenous societies were too primitive or unsophisticated to have legal
orders, is also found in the colonial jurisprudence.238 Canadian law’s adversarial stance – not
necessarily lost within a duty to consult and accommodate framework that privileges the Crown
as decision-maker239 – further structures the perception of threat in legal issues related to
Indigenous peoples and their rights and laws. In the end, what is legally recognizable is limited to
what is tolerable to settler colonialism. Rather than reconcile, Aboriginal law establishes points of
conflict between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples. At any juncture, there is a risk that an
Indigenous Nation will say no, though the Court has made sure that this is unlikely to be
effectual.240 Regardless of how well the law is aligned with settler interests, Indigenous rights
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retain their threatening quality to settler normalcy. Leslie Hall Pinder, counsel for the plaintiffs in
Delgamuukw, recalls warning a community member, who had come to hear about Justice
McEachern’s trial decision, to step back from the courthouse because a sniper had been placed on
the roof.241 Even the presence of Indigenous legal orders, which offer a sui generis relationship of
respect and reciprocity founded on treaty, are perceived as threats to the Canadian rule of law. For
example, when Enbridge received the peaceful welcome of eagle down from a Wet’suwet’en elder
in 2012, the company interpreted it as an act of hostility.242 Integrated threat theory offers a
different lens from which to understand these “legal” conflicts.

We can also apply contemporary theories of prejudice and integrated threat to our understanding
of opposition to inclusionary admissions policies and to ILE. Taking the first, inclusionary
admissions policies, a pernicious stereotype exists that Indigenous law students are admitted to
law school on the basis of their race through affirmative action programs rather than intellectual
merit.243 One Indigenous law student describes her experience of non-Indigenous opposition to
inclusionary policies such as affirmative action:
…We are all affirmative action, we are all from reserves, we are all paid to come
to school. I am an urban Indian who receives a scholarship, who had a great
GPA. I feel proud of how I look but I am distressed at being a brown page in
their [other law students'] previously written book of experiences. I sometimes
feel like I am on the outside looking in.244
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Non-Indigenous students, staff and professors may express opinions that affirmative action
programs come at the cost of rejecting deserving non-Indigenous students.245 A related stereotype
is the belief that all Indigenous law students receive funding to attend law school from the Federal
government; this stereotype is connected to the belief that Indigenous peoples do not pay tax and
receive public benefits at the cost of non-Indigenous taxpayers.246 More broadly, this stereotype
correlates with “modern” prejudicial attitudes that Indigenous peoples receive special, unfair
benefits that non-Indigenous peoples do not247 and the perception that inclusionary admissions
policies threaten non-Indigenous students’ education, status and access to the profession.

Non-Indigenous students, staff and faculty may also resist and oppose ILE. Non-Indigenous
students may intentionally avoid or ignore Indigenous perspectives248 or reject critical reflections
on racism and colonialism in Canadian law and policy.249 When non-Indigenous students oppose
learning ILE, they may rely on liberal and jurisprudential sources to support their arguments. This
makes it difficult for Indigenous professors to teach and appropriately evaluate non-Indigenous
law students.250 In some cases, non-Indigenous students may respond to either the content of ILE
or to their professor’s evaluation of their progress by filing a discrimination complaint.251 A nonIndigenous student may complain that the professor was not objective, or that they were biased or
politically opinionated, thus recalling stereotypes of Indigenous militance and hostility.252 These
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“reverse racism” complaints function to delegitimize the Indigenous law professor's pedagogical
role and content as well as to secure the non-Indigenous student or professor’s resources.
In some cases, non-Indigenous students, and sometimes professors, may oppose ILE as a matter
of “academic freedom.” Karen Drake describes this opposition as a claim that “certain universities
have become beholden to a political agenda, and that this agenda is the driving force behind the
push for required Indigenous content.”253 Drake writes:
[…]

The

implication

is

that

non-Indigenous

content

requirements are neutral, unbiased, and impartial, while Indigenous content
requirements are the result of pandering to social and political agendas. The
problem with this line of thought is that non-Indigenous content requirements
are not neutral; they reflect a privileging of non-Indigenous worldviews, nonIndigenous epistemologies, non-Indigenous ontologies, and non-Indigenous
normative principles […].254

Drake suggests that the reason why some oppose mandatory Indigenous legal training is because
of a “misapprehension about the rationale” underlying calls for such content. 255 To this claim,
Drake responds that mandatory Indigenous law courses are not about a particular viewpoint, but
rather that “the goal is to teach content and skills to students... so that they can properly interpret
and apply section 35.”256 Another way to understand opposition to ILE is through a lens of threat.
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Non-Indigenous peoples may perceive ILE as a threat to the dominance of Canadian law and its
inequitable distribution of resources to settlers. Integrated threat theory suggests that opposition to
mandatory ILE and the incorporation of Indigenous legal orders may reflect an affective and
behavioural response to the perceived threat to settler resources, such as professional privileges or
the belief in a normative order that excludes Indigenous legal orders. This discomfort, whether an
expression of aversive prejudice or the perception of threat, becomes legitimated through legal
argument and discourse.

f) Indigenous-Settler Incommensurabilities: Beyond Prejudice Reduction Theories
In some ways, social psychology cannot adequately explain the impact of Canadian legal education
on Indigenous peoples, their perspectives, and legal orders. Lindberg reflects:
You teach your ownership, your history, your rules in schools. We are forced to
attend and continue to learn our ways, try to acknowledge yours, and continue
to live ours. We wonder if you are able to hear voices that do not sound like
yours.257
The expression of prejudice, whether “old-fashioned”, “modern”, aversive, or benevolent, is
certainly an important barrier to the implementation of the Calls and ILE in Canadian law schools.
However, the challenge is much deeper than implicit or explicit prejudice; it is also about the
structure of Canadian law, which presents Indigenous peoples and their legal orders as
incommensurable with the rule of law.
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Despite jurisprudential support for ILE,258 Indigenous students and professors continue to
experience the marginalization of their perspectives and laws in Canadian legal education. Echoing
Marie Battiste’s concept of cognitive imperialism in Canadian education,259 Lindberg argues that
Canadian law’s “imperial legal determinism” reinforces bias and inequity against Indigenous
peoples.260 Henderson describes how European assumptions of universality attempt to enclose or
reject Indigenous peoples’ perspectives and legal orders.261 Johnson illustrates the invisible
dominance of European culture on Canadian legal education: “If the people who write the law and
the people who interpret the law and the people who teach the law are all from the same culture
and share the same values, as they were when I went to law school, they do not have to fully
explain their reasoning or even question it.”262 Canadian law’s “imperial legal determinism”
ensures that Indigenous students, professors, and Indigenous legal orders, remain marginalized in
Canadian legal education and practice.263
g) Summary
Racial prejudice, stereotyping and discrimination against Indigenous peoples in Canadian law
schools is not always obvious. It can sometimes be difficult to put one’s fingers on, especially
when expressed through ostensibly neutral and objective legal argument. Aversive racism theory
can help us explain why non-Indigenous peoples may avoid discussions related to Indigenoussettler relations, including ILE, settler colonialism, and racism. Aversive behavior may manifest
in rhetorical strategies that distance Indigenous peoples’ experiences as “not academic” enough,
as in Monture-Angus’ experience. Integrated threat theory may explain some non-Indigenous
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peoples’ opposition to ILE and inclusionary admissions or hiring policies. Such a theory may
explain why some non-Indigenous students believe that inclusionary admissions policies come at
the cost of their own professional advancement, or why some legal scholars and lawyers continue
to believe that Indigenous legal orders are akin to a cultural “elevator etiquette.”264 Indigenous
students and professors also navigate the effects of racial prejudice, stereotyping and
discrimination in Canadian law schools. Some may get the sense that they are “tokens” and either
resist or assimilate to stereotypes held about their group. Those who resist stereotyping may find
themselves overworked and overextended, fighting a shadow cast through another’s eyes. Even if
students succeed in adapting to the “imperial legal determinism” of Canadian legal education, there
are countless ways that Indigenous law students can fail. Affirmative action programs cement
bureaucratic and procedural barriers – forms for financial assistance, mandatory academic support
sessions, and micromanagement by non-Indigenous administrative staff – that increase Indigenous
students’ fatigue, burnout, and overload. Moreover, Indigneous law students and professors
experience the effects of prejudice and racism from their non-Indigenous peers and administrators.
Reflecting on his time in law school, Johnson reflects, "we needed life support", not academic
support.265 In the end, Indigenous diversity and inclusion may be more likely to transform the
Indigenous student than legal education or the practice of law, inclusion operating as enclosure.266
Johnson concludes, “[b]y the time we enter the courtroom, most of us will have spent almost
twenty years outside of our culture and much of that time will have been spent outside our
communities. We will be changed.”267
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The preceding is one description of how racial prejudice, stereotyping and discrimination may
function as a barrier to the implementation of the Calls in law schools. In the next section, I will
provide a brief overview of the literature on prejudice reduction interventions before turning to an
inventory of current ILE initiatives in Canadian law schools.
III.

Interventions for reducing anti-Indigenous stereotyping and prejudice in Canadian
Law Schools
“I invite you to reflect for a moment on a time when you too were completely
out of your comfort zone. How did you arrive at that uncomfortable place? What
made it so uncomfortable? What did you do to adapt or adjust? How did it shape
who you are today?”268

In 1946, social psychologists Ronald Lippitt and Marian Radke wrote that, in regards to racial
prejudice, “[i]n no other aspects of interpersonal and intergroup relations is there a more urgent
need for social scientists to get out and do something.”269 Generally, social psychologists consider
two processes for reducing prejudice: individual and intergroup.270 Individual processes include
the self-regulation of stereotypes and prejudices, a mainstay of many implicit bias training
programs. Intergroup contact processes include direct and indirect contact, and the recategorization
of social identities (changing how we think of each other and ourselves with respect to social
groups). In addition, there is a wide range of specific interventions that may be employed, such as
perspective-taking, narrative and storytelling, intergroup dialogue, and media portrayals, to name
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only a few. Meta-analyses and reviews of these interventions suggest that some may be more
successful than others at reducing “prejudice” in the short, medium, or long term.271 Although
these approaches may reduce intergroup prejudice, they may not necessarily reduce social
inequality. Interventions that prioritize intergroup harmony or understanding may come at the cost
of undermining collective action. For example, it is entirely possible for an individual to report
greater liking for Indigenous peoples and still oppose policies intended to ameliorate the effects of
settler colonialism (or to decolonize). For that reason, I also consider collective action for social
change to be a distinct process with its own interventions. Intergroup contact and the selfregulation of prejudice is a start, but to implement the Calls, institutional commitment and reform
is also necessary.
i.

Individual-level Processes

Individual-level processes leverage the non-prejudiced attitudes and norms of individuals to selfregulate against racial stereotypes and attitudes. Implicit social cognition and cognitive
psychologists distinguish between explicit and implicit cognitive processes.272 According to
implicit social cognition theory, most racial stereotyping and prejudice is the result of implicit
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cognitive processes.273 These implicit processes facilitate efficient decision-making in social
contexts. Unfortunately, our reliance on these processes can sometimes be misplaced. In such
cases, we may benefit from monitoring and regulating these implicit processes. Implicit bias
training is structured on the assumption that most racial bias is the result of implicit processes that
can be regulated through intentional retraining.274
Counter-stereotypes are one way that individuals may regulate against the application of
stereotypes or prejudices.275 For example, a common stereotype of older individuals is that they
are “bad with technology.” When this association becomes relevant to an individual, they may
remind themselves of counter-stereotypical exemplars like Bill Gates, an older man who is most
assuredly “good with computers.” However, this kind of intervention requires concentration and
appropriate motivation. An individual who is monitoring and countering stereotypes may
experience fatigue. It takes mental effort to monitor and then think of counter-stereotypes. For
some individuals, thinking about the stereotype may actually result in the activation and
application of the stereotype, a phenomenon known as “stereotype rebound.”276 In short, when
you concentrate on “not thinking about the elephant”, you may very well end up thinking about an
“elephant.”
As noted above, one’s motivations and ability to self-regulate against stereotyping and prejudice
is important. Self-regulation models describe a process of monitoring and retraining implicit
cognitive processes in accordance with one’s non-prejudiced attitudes and norms. As discussed
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previously, aversive racism theory proposes that some individuals are motivated to appear or to
act in accordance with their anti-prejudicial norms. Jody Armour cautions against an interpretation
of aversive racism that “characterize[s] people who report nonprejudiced personal beliefs as either
hypocritical, sub rosa racists or unconscious, aversive racists.”277 As Armour notes, individuals
who report non-prejudiced beliefs may be genuinely committed to those beliefs.278 For Armour,
the challenge is in breaking the prejudice habit between one’s genuine non-prejudiced beliefs and
his or her behaviour.
According to Margo Monteith’s Self-Regulation model, an individual monitors herself for the
accessibility and activation of stereotypes when social categories (such as “old” or “young”
person) are present in a situation.279 To take up the “old person bad with computers” example, if
she is aware of her prior stereotypes of older individuals, she may watch out for implicit
stereotypes related to computer savviness. If she activates and applies the stereotype, she can then
reflect on her prejudiced response and on her motivations to appear as non-prejudiced or act in
accordance with her non-prejudiced norms. She may think to herself, “Bill Gates is good with
computers,” or “I do not believe in or value discrimination based on age.” In some cases, she might
be reminded of her non-prejudiced beliefs by others, such as a friend or someone she respects.280
Consciously aware of this contradiction, she can then establish cues for control, reminders, that
can be used to interrupt her application of that stereotypes in a future encounter. These cues for
control may be affectively felt, as guilt or compunction, or thoughtfully considered. In future
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encounters, she can rely on, and reinforce, her cues for control to interrupt, and hopefully
dismantle, the activation and application of those stereotypes of which she has become aware.
Patricia Devine’s Breaking the Prejudice Habit model is a similar self-regulation model that has
been successful at reducing prejudice in the short to long term.281 Although these models may not
work as well, or at all, for individuals who are low in internal motivation to self-regulate or high
in explicit prejudice,282 these models demonstrate that prejudice reduction interventions can be
learned and successfully applied by some individuals outside of the original intervention context,
such as a workshop or training session. Implicit social psychologists like Monteith and Devine
propose that through practice, implicit cognitive processes may become retrained, such that
stereotypes are less accessible and prejudiced responses are less likely.
In the American context, “egalitarianism” has been suggested as one possible norm for selfregulating against prejudice and stereotyping. However, Morrison et al.’s findings that “oldfashioned” prejudice (characterised by antipathy and hostility, and essentialist understandings of
race) persists and co-exists with “modern” prejudice towards Indigenous peoples in Canada,
suggests that multicultural and egalitarian norms that function to suppress racial prejudice against
Black Americans may not operate in the same way for Indigenous peoples in Canada.283 That is
not to say that such norms are not helpful at all, but rather, that they are likely too ambiguous to
function as anti-prejudicial norms in the settler-colonial context. I suggest that this ambiguity
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arises from the conflict between liberal norms and the recognition of Indigenous peoples’ political,
social, and legal difference – their Indigeneity. As Monture-Angus notes, “[n]ot only is inequality
as sameness simplistic but such a notion of equality can create situations of grave injustice.”284
Even “reconciliation” may be too ambiguous, or perhaps biased in favour of the settler state, to
function as an effective anti-prejudicial norm. In a study of non-Indigenous Truth and
Reconciliation Commission event volunteers, Jeffery Denis and Kerry Bailey found that some
volunteers rejected “reconciliation” as too ambiguous or contextually contingent to endorse.
Volunteers preferred integrationist, incremental and inclusive definitions of “reconciliation” rather
than one that respects Indigenous peoples’ autonomy and self-determination.285 Indeed, even some
Indigenous scholars question whether “reconciliation” has become co-opted within a state-centred
and neoliberal discourse.286 This ambiguity, which can be employed in favour of the state or
individual interests, is what makes “reconciliation” questionable as an anti-prejudicial norm.
Although guilt may motivate some individuals to self-regulate, acknowledgement of responsibility
is perhaps more appropriate from an Indigenous perspective. Monture-Angus describes how nonIndigenous peoples shift affective feelings of guilt onto Indigenous and other racialized
individuals; she asks, “[h]ow can you continue to look to me to carry what is your responsibility?
And when I speak and the brutality of my experience hurts you, you hide behind your hurt. You
point the finger at me and you claim I hurt you. I will not carry your responsibility any more. Your
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pain is unfortunate. But do not look to me to soften it. Look to yourself.”287 Lindberg proposes that
the objective of ILE is not to inspire settler guilt, but to deconstruct and challenge settler
colonialism and detail settler responsibility:
“The time when we can expect guilt to motivate non-Aboriginal people is over.
We have to get over it and move on or we will continue to live lives of despair.”
I wrote it down and have been thinking about that since. I think that there is a
profound difference between inspiring guilt and requiring that people take
responsibility for their actions and for perpetuating the actions initiated by their
forefathers. My reason for writing, for speaking, and for requiring people to
examine White supremacy in the guise of law is not to inspire guilt. It is painful
to address it and discuss it, but if we do not raise the veil on the actions, words,
and intent of White supremacists and White supremacy, then our silence renders
us complicit. We need to examine it because the impact and the entrenchment
of that supremacy are so ingrained in the language of Canadian law that we may
not even see it. Identifying it, naming it, and translating it defuses its power and
gives us a voice and lets us participate in establishing anti-colonial and antiracist strategies and agendas. We cannot talk about nation building in the
absence of identifying the source of damage to our nations. Similarly, we cannot
identify rebuilding strategies without determining the nature of the damage. In
this carefully woven braid of rejuvenation, reclamation, and rebuilding, we have
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to make sure we identify the rot that has infected and affected the ancient
fibers.288
According to Lindberg, allies should act “not [out of] curiosity, for classroom purposes, or to settle
their fears” but because “they respect Aboriginal people and accept that the responsibility for
keeping Aboriginal peoples and issues alive is their concern as well.”289 Thus, although social
psychologists identify guilt as an affective response in self-regulation, we should also consider
feelings associated with responsibility. We may also consider other individual-level processes that
may support the reduction of prejudice. For example, a high level of empathy is associated with
reduced prejudice.290 Some of these individual level processes may complement Indigenous legal
principles that inform social interactions, such as the Anishinaabeg principles of dabaadendiziwin
(humility)291 and debwewin (truth),292 and the centrality of agency and responsibility in some legal
orders.293
To return to a point made in the introduction, individual-focused interventions are helpful insofar
as they provide individuals the tools for taking responsibility for their racial stereotyping and
prejudice. As Jonathan Kahn argues, much implicit bias training has become a form of
“recreational anti-racism”, an activity taken up from time to time to make relationships just a bit
less confrontational.294 When “implicit” biases are seen as “natural” or “unintentional”, the effects
of racial stereotyping may become easier to minimize or rationalize away. Rather than ensure
accountability, the language of “implicit” stereotyping and prejudice may obscure the social
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agency of individuals. Even worse, this language may be co-opted and prioritized in legal
discourse, thereby advancing a view that intent distinguishes those who are and are not
“prejudiced.” Thus, it is important that we maintain focus on the social and situational side of
racial stereotyping and prejudice.
ii.

Intergroup-level Processes

“We are all here to stay” is a phrase that conjures up harmonious intergroup relations. Intergroup
contact theory proposes that positive encounters may reduce prejudice and promote intergroup
harmony under certain conditions.295 These conditions for positive intergroup contact are equal
status between groups, common goals, intergroup cooperation, institutional support, and the
potential for cross-group friendship.296 Other conditions may facilitate the reduction of prejudice,
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including the successful completion of a group task (failing the task may leave a negative
impression), self-disclosure, voluntary contact, equal numbers of members from each group,
application over an extended period and in a variety of contexts and situations, individuation, and
ideological homophily. Intergroup contact may reduce prejudice by providing individuals with
individuating knowledge about members of outgroups or cultural knowledge about outgroups,
reducing negative affective responses towards outgroups or its members (such as through reducing
perceptions of threat and intergroup anxiety or increasing empathy), and by developing and/or
maintaining norms that support individual and intergroup processes.297 Meta-analyses suggest that
intergroup contact holds promise for reducing prejudice between groups.298 Many of the ILE
programs discussed in chapter 3 satisfy the conditions for intergroup contact, a point to which I
return.
Intergroup contact may not be feasible or successful in every contact situation. Some forms of
intergroup contact may be less effective, or even detrimental, in cases of protracted, asymmetrical
conflict like that of settler colonialism in Canada.299 For example, a shared joint project, such as
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Impact Benefit Agreement (an agreement between a First Nation and a proponent that may address
procedural components of the Crown’s duty to consult and accommodate and that establishes a
contractual relationship between the First Nation and proponent related to a resource development
project, for example, in the form of an agreement to receive revenue from a mine or forestry
operation), may not necessarily engender respectful and ethical relationships, especially where the
proponent or Crown exercises significantly greater resources. Moreover, establishing conditions
of cooperation, equal status, and common goals can be difficult where Indigenous and nonIndigenous worldviews are incommensurable. In some cases, individuals high in prejudice,
particularly its aversive variant, may avoid intergroup encounters entirely.300 I imagine that some
cottagers in northern Ontario may avoid travelling through reserve or attending summer powwows. Although high prejudiced individuals may experience a significant change in their beliefs,
attitudes, and behaviors after intergroup contact, frequent intergroup contact is usually required
for this to occur. Moreover, intergroup encounters that are perceived to end negatively may
increase or maintain perceptions of threat, negative outgroup stereotypes, and prejudices.
Similarly, prior negative contact experiences may prime participants to perceive an intergroup
encounter as negative. I will return to these limitations shortly, in a discussion of intergroup contact
and perceptions of threat in northern Ontario.
So far, I have discussed direct intergroup contact. Extended contact – for example, a friend-of-afriend – may also reduce prejudice.301 When we know about successful intergroup friendships, we
may be more likely to see intergroup encounters positively and to fear rejection less. Intermarriage,

emphasize group conflict and seek to empower disadvantaged groups towards collective action for social change.
Though confrontational models may result in change, they can also result in backlash. Finally, narrative models engage
both advantaged and disadvantaged group members in intergroup dialogue. The Truth and Reconciliation
Commission’s methodology, particularly settler involvement as witnesses, exemplifies the narrative model.
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for example, may function as a form of indirect contact, though I will discuss the limitations of
this below. For those who are aversive to intergroup encounters, extended contact may prepare
them for closer engagements. In addition to extended contact, individuals may imagine contact
encounters, either in contemplation alone or through group rehearsals. Imagined contact is helpful
because it prepares individuals for either negative or positive encounters; this can take the sting
out of negative encounters and prepare individuals for engaging in positive intergroup
behaviors.302 Finally, media contact – reading Thomas King’s An Inconvenient Indian,303 or
hearing the music and advocacy of A Tribe Called Red – may also facilitate the reduction of
prejudice.
Intergroup contact theory is closely related to the social identity theory of self-categorization. Selfcategorization theory describes how individuals come to see themselves as members of groups (it
is related to social categorization theory, which is how groups are socially categorized). Social
identity theorists propose at least three categorization interventions for reducing prejudice between
groups: decategorization (personalization/individuation), mutual intergroup differentiation, and
recategorization.304 Decategorization interventions individuate members from their outgroup
identity and may help participants develop empathy and reduce intergroup anxiety.305 The
humanization of racialized victims of police or state violence, for example, may function to
personalize these individuals separate from their group identity. However, like color-blind
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ideologies, which purport to treat racialized individuals qua individuals,306 decategorization
interventions see group differences as less meaningful, even when real and relevant. In contrast,
mutual intergroup differentiation interventions emphasize the positive and real, though different,
characteristics of groups.307 In this way, group identity remains salient in the intergroup encounter,
which can assist in generalizing the effects of positive intergroup contact to other outgroups or in
future encounters.308 Finally, recategorization interventions, of which there are two variants,
expand the contours of the ingroup to include formerly excluded outgroup members.
The first variant, the Common Ingroup Identity model, recategorizes outgroup members within a
broader, more inclusive ingroup.309 This more inclusive ingroup identity often takes its starting
point from the dominant or advantaged group identity. For example, the extension of citizenship
rights to Indigenous peoples, such as the right to vote and hire a lawyer, marked a turning point
towards a common ingroup identity as Canadians. However, this turn, exemplified by Pierre
Trudeau and Jean Chretien’s 1969 White Paper, may come at the expense of an outgroup’s social
(and in this case, legal) identity.310 It can, in short, advance an assimilationist ideology, one that
requires the assimilation of outgroup members to a common ingroup identity defined by the values,
norms, attitudes, and beliefs of the dominant, advantaged group. This is the “darker side” of
intergroup contact.311 Where intergroup contact leads to the formation of common ingroup
identities (drawing a more inclusive boundary around the ingroup, such as by saying that
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Indigenous peoples are “Canadians too”), individuals – both advantaged and disadvantaged – may
be less likely to advocate for social change.312
The second variant, the Dual Identity model, most resembles a multicultural or polycultural
ideology.313 This model restructures a more inclusive common ingroup identity while respecting
intergroup differences and outgroup members’ distinct identities. As discussed earlier, many
Indigenous law students desire to retain their identity as Indigenous peoples as they negotiate their
identities – and careers – in Canadian legal practice and education.314 Gordon Christie challenges
the assumption that Indigenous peoples, who arguably lead a “hybridized existence”, must
“accommodate themselves to the fact of an existence embedded within a liberal democratic
state.”315 Instead, we may apply the “dual identity” model in a way that prioritizes Indigenous
peoples’ identities. Mill’s rooted constitutionalism or Henderson’s treaty federalism models
provide frameworks through which non-Indigenous persons can imagine a dual identity based on
a more inclusive sui generis identity rooted in Indigenous legal orders.316 Either of these
Indigenous models may permit non-Indigenous peoples’ involvement as kin within this sui generis
identity, and, if necessary, respects non-Indigenous peoples’ non-involvement.
As I mentioned earlier, it is unclear whether intergroup contact and self-categorisation reduces
settler prejudice towards Indigenous peoples and supports collective action toward social change.
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In a 2014 study of seven Canadian prairie cities, social psychologists Lashta, Berdahl and Walker
found that familial or friendship-based intergroup contact correlated with lower levels of “oldfashioned” (characterised by antipathy and hostility, and essentialist understandings of race) and
“modern” prejudice, but that general contact only correlated with reduced old-fashioned prejudice
towards Indigenous peoples.317 In contrast, in a series of studies in northwestern Ontario, Jeffery
Denis found that although intergroup contact was associated with less “old-fashioned” prejudice,
it was not necessarily associated with reducing the superior group position of White individuals
relative to Indigenous (First Nations and Métis) residents.318 Echoing my arguments on intergroup
threat and settler incommensurabilities in the previous chapter, Denis concludes that antiIndigenous prejudice “is not defined by an absence of intergroup friendships; it is a defensive
reaction to perceived group threat.”319
In one study, Denis describes the municipality of Alberton’s opposition to the construction of the
Weechi-it-te-win Family Services (WFN)’s Training and Learning Centre for Indigenous
children.320 Denis describes how the municipality employed a series of strategies to oppose the
project without disclosing any explicit racial animus. The municipality delayed its decision
constantly, offered race-neutral justifications and unsolicited, self-serving, and paternalistic
advice, denied any racial motives, played the victim, created new rules for WFN to satisfy, and
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censored non-Indigenous supporters of WFN’s proposal as “traitors.”321 In response to the
Alberton residents’ strategies, WFN avoided the topic of race. Instead, WFN provided “neutral”
information to counter stereotypes and prejudices, emphasized common interests (à la an
intergroup contact approach), expressed positive affect (‘stayed positive’) and avoided explicit
conversations about racism, consistent with traditional Indigenous decision-making processes and
implicit social cognition theory.322 Even though the municipality’s decision was likely
unreasonable and incorrect, WFN chose not to appeal the municipality's decision, possibly
recognizing that they would have to fund their appeal and that even if successful, they would
continue to face resistance from the municipality's residents (which would not be safe for the
Indigenous children in care).323 WFN’s experience casts considerable doubt on the efficacy of
intergroup contact in settler colonial contexts, where Indigenous peoples’ rights and interests are
perceived as threats to settlers’ resources.
In a second study involving 18 months of fieldwork and 160 interviews with Indigenous and nonIndigenous residents of a town in northern Ontario, Denis investigated the resiliency of antiIndigenous prejudice despite the prevalence of cross-group friendship and intermarriage in that
community. Denis found that although intergroup contact was associated with less “old-fashioned”
prejudice, it was not necessarily associated with reducing settler residents’ superior group position
relative to Indigenous (First Nations and Métis) residents.324 Denis argues that three social
processes reinforce the settler residents’ superior group position relative to Indigenous peoples and
justify racial inequality. First, settler residents subtype their Indigenous friends as exceptions to

Ibid at 459–462; Recall, as well, Werhun and Penner’s study of benevolent prejudice against Indigenous peoples,
which involves the offering of unsolicited, paternalistic advice and the subordination of Indigenous individuals into a
“helping” position: Werhun & Penner, “Benevolent Prejudice Toward Aboriginal Canadians”, supra note 155.
322
Denis, “Transforming Meanings”, supra note 155 at 459, 462.
323
Ibid at 464.
324
Denis, “Small Town Settler Colonialism”, supra note 155 at 231.
321

90

their otherwise prejudicial norms. Second, settler residents lean towards friendship with
Indigenous peoples who share their settler ideology, making the experience limited in its
generalizability. Finally, settlers, and to some extent Indigenous residents, avoid discussing race
and Indigenous peoples' political rights or interests with their friends. Furthermore, Denis argues
that the local context – particularly the history of Indigenous subordination through colonial
processes and the recent trend towards greater political and legal status for Indigenous peoples –
informs the reproduction of racism in that town, particularly non-Indigenous persons’ strategies
for maintaining group dominance.325 In short, residents generally avoid meaningful conflict in
favour of harmonious relationships that do not challenge settler colonial dominance. Denis’s
research challenges the viability of intergroup contact in the Indigenous-settler context and the
implications of the study of Lashta, Berndahl and Walker.
iii.

Collective Action Towards Social Change

Prejudice reduction approaches, such as self-regulation and intergroup contact, rest on a series of
assumptions about social change that may be insufficient in a settler-colonial context. Social
psychologists John Dixon and Mark Levine summarise these assumptions as part of the “prejudice
problematic”, a focus on individual rather than collective action and change, irrationality and error
as the source of contemporary prejudice, affective negativity (fear, disgust) rather than seemingly
positive affects (such as those that accompany paternalistic forms of prejudice), and an
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overreliance on the prejudice reduction model as a model for social change.326 Margaret Wetherell,
who coined the term “prejudice problematic”, notes that lay and academic discourses of prejudice
“draw attention away from immediate social reform”, “provide a logic and method for justifying
individual conduct”, and “establish a positive identity and a benevolent 'vocabulary of motives' vis
a vis other, supposedly less enlightened individuals.”327 As Stephen Wright and Gamze Baray
argue, it is not enough that ingroup members feel better or enjoy more harmonious relations with
subordinated group members:328
Although it is clear efforts to reduce rampant antipathy, overt expressions of
hostility, and active denigration of other groups would need to be part of a
scheme to improve many intergroup relations, it also appears reasonable to
consider the limitations of a focus on prejudice reduction, and recognize that it
may actually directly conflict with another important means by which positive
social change occurs - collective action. Failure to recognize these limitations
will very likely lead us into the trap that many members of the advantaged group
seem to fall into - assuming that because interpersonal interactions across groups
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are convivial and warm that intergroup inequalities are either gone or are
acceptable.329
Social change theory reminds us that “[c]onflict is […] the fire that fuels social change rather than
a threat to extinguish at the point of conflagration.”330 Stephen Reicher adds that we “need to direct
our practical attention from changing the views of dominant group members to sustaining the
collective actions of subordinate group members” because “prejudice is a practice relating to
ingroup authority and ingroup power.”331 As such, social change theory is tailored towards
countermobilization and the support of collective action by subordinated groups, their members,
and allies.332 This does not mean that prejudice reduction approaches are not helpful, but rather,
that the focus must remain on collective action towards social change and the anti-subordination
of Indigenous peoples and their legal orders.
In chapter 1, I described why intergroup contact theory appealed to me. Its central proposition –
that relationships are key to change – resonated with my ethics and sensibilities as a Métis person
from northern Saskatchewan. Although my own experiences in La Ronge, Saskatchewan echo
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Denis’ insights from northern Ontario, I hope that relationality, as an Indigenous legal principle,
may be a key to change. Chief Thomas’ request to “gather together” at the 2015 CIAJ reflected
this hope. However, as I note in the previous section, intergroup contact may not always result in
any meaningful change in social positions and may undermine collective action. Moreover,
especially in the settler-colonial context, Indigenous peoples’ differences may be perceived as a
threat to settler normalcy and futurity. When I reflect on the role of “threat”, I feel uncomfortable.
This is not because threat itself makes me uncomfortable, but that seeing the world through a lens
of threat feels inconsistent with my commitment to relationality. But as Hewitt and Borrows
remind us, conflict and disagreement are an important part of change; and this conflict, or
contradiction, is valuable within Nêhiyawak and Anishinaabeg lifeways.333 I argue that a
commitment to social change – ultimately, decolonization – must be a part of any individual or
intergroup approach. This will be uncomfortable and unsettling.
None of the theories presented in Chapter 2 or 3 are determinative. They offer explanations for
understanding the manifestation and effects of racial stereotyping and prejudice against Indigenous
peoples and their legal orders in Canadian law schools. Implicit social cognition theory and
individual-level interventions may be helpful as starting points for individuals who are resistant to
taking accountability for their beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours. However, to the extent that these
approaches undermine accountability, they may be counterproductive as pedagogical
interventions. Contemporary theories of prejudice, such as “modern”, “symbolic”, “aversive”, and
“benevolent” prejudice are not mutually exclusive. They are useful insofar as they (re)affirm
Indigenous peoples’ experiences of racial stereotyping and prejudice and assist non-Indigenous
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persons understanding of these experiences. These theories may not be accurate in a settlercolonial context, owing to their development in the American context of White and Black
intergroup relations. Although intergroup contact theory is attractive for its relational focus, its
prioritization of intergroup harmony may undermine the kinds of social change that are required
for settlers’ ethical and respectful engagement with Indigenous legal traditions. Integrated threat
theory comes closest, in my view, to an accurate description of how racial stereotyping and
prejudice is associated with settlers’ motivation to maintain the inequitable distribution of
resources under settler-colonialism. Together, these theories provide a more comprehensive
account of the kinds of normative decisions that non-Indigenous courts, lawyers, professors and
law students make in Canadian legal education and practice. These theories also disclose the
layered quality of the “obsidian quandaries” that Indigenous professors and students face in
Canadian legal education and practice.
Helpfully, many current and planned ILE initiatives, such as mandatory Indigenous law courses,
Aboriginal law camps, intensives, clinics, institutes and summer programs, may reduce racial
prejudice and stereotyping and its effects on Indigenous students and professors, articulate antiprejudicial norms grounded in Indigenous legal orders, and motivate non-Indigenous students and
professors to engage ethically and respectfully with Indigenous legal orders and perspectives.
Institutional commitments may further establish the resources and norms necessary for ILE and
eventually, the decolonization of Canadian legal education and practice. These activities also
support Indigenous students’ and professors’ determination of their own personal and professional
identities. In the next two sections, I inventory current and planned Indigenous programming and
institutional commitments, and describe how these programs and commitments may function as
prejudice reduction and settler harm reduction interventions in Canadian law schools.
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1. Indigenous programming
In the preceding section, I introduced two models for reducing individual and intergroup prejudice.
I also challenged the limits of these models for the purpose of implementing the Calls and ILE in
law schools. In this section, I inventory current and planned Indigenous programming in Canadian
law schools and review it alongside the social psychology on prejudice reduction interventions.
a) Critical Indigenous Legal Education
Critical Indigenous legal education prioritizes Indigenous peoples’ perspectives, legal orders, and
legal issues, contextualizes and deconstructs Canadian law, and educates students on Indigenous
legal orders within Indigenous pedagogical contexts. Such courses challenge the assumptions that
deny Indigenous perspectives and uphold colonization,334 such as “perspectivelessness”335, the
prioritisation of “objective” truth,336 the invalidity of Indigenous law as law,337 and the
neoliberalization of Indigenous legal orders in the Canadian legal marketplace.338
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Constitutional,339 property,340 tort,341 and criminal law342 are prime subjects for contextualization
and deconstruction.
Contextualizing Canadian law is necessary but not sufficient for implementing the Calls.
Indigenous legal orders must also be part of the curriculum. As Lindberg writes, “I trust the ability
of others to exclude information that is culturally biased, but I question all people's abilities to
include information that is excluded.”343 Mills proposes a mandatory course in rooted, Indigenous
constitutionalisms for all law students, not just those who want to learn about Indigenous legal
orders or practice in Indigenous communities.344 Otherwise, Mills warns, there is a risk that
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Canadian property law is based on the assumption that the Crown has a legal claim, outside of treaty, to land in
North America. This assumption is incompatible with Indigenous peoples’ legal orders and relationship to land. As a
result, Indigenous students experience Canadian property law as alienating.340 As one student reports, "The legal
concepts in property law were difficult to comprehend as well, such as air trespass - in the Indian world, nobody owns
the air we breath except the Creator.”: quoted in Lindberg, “What Do You Call an Indian Woman with a Law
Degree?”, supra note 104 at 318. Tracey Lindberg describes how Canadian property law obscures Indigenous peoples’
relationship to land:
339
340
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roads on top of the layers of protection of that initial understanding of supremacy. The English
legal language is used as a trowel to smooth over places where earth and plants break through
the pavement. Sitting in one of my law school classes one day, I was able to observe an exchange
between my property law professor and a colleague. Their language was a brick heavy to me,
landing with a thud – to my ears they lobbed it with the ease of those who were playing tennis –
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students will “proceed to read and distort Indigenous law through the liberal constitutional lens
they know, even if unbeknownst to them.”345 Furthermore, both Canadian and Indigenous legal
education require critical reflection on the role of gender and sexuality in legal education and
practice (an important aspect that is sometimes neglected).346
Indigenous law courses may also facilitate the reduction of prejudice among non-Indigenous
students. For example, students in Mill's Anishinaabe constitutionalism course at Lakehead
University responded positively to the shift in pedagogical and epistemological context.347 The
process of contextualizing Canadian law encourages students to reflect on their unstated, implicit
beliefs, attitudes and behaviours, a hallmark for the self-regulation of prejudice. It also introduces
students to another normative and legal structure through which they may assess their conduct,
thus facilitating the integration of anti-prejudicial norms that are consistent with Indigenous legal
orders. Although this process may, in some cases, result in increased perceptions of threat (for
example, a belief that the recognition of Indigenous title means the appropriation of settler land,
or as an attack to a rule of law that excludes Indigneous legal orders), when facilitated
appropriately it may support students’ self-regulation of their racial beliefs, attitudes, and
behaviours. For non-Indigenous students, critical Indigenous legal education contextualizes their
own identities, as settlers, and asks whether they can imagine living differently.
These courses also respond to the needs of Indigenous law students, who desire courses that reflect
their interests and their personal and professional identities.348 Indigenous students report feeling
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alienated by course materials that predominantly reflect the experiences of White cis men.349 In
response, Indigenous law students seek out textual and personal resources to support and sustain
their engagement in law school, often at the expense of an increased workload.350 Indigenous
students may choose courses that better reflect their experiences of the Canadian legal system,
such as courses with a critical legal theory component351 or that incorporate Indigenous
pedagogies, epistemologies, morality, ethics, and legal issues.352 Mills describes how he turned to
unassigned readings to satisfy his learning spirit: “I began to read papers that hadn’t been
assigned”, he writes; these papers reflected what he cared most about, “how Canadian law works
for and against Indigenous peoples.”353
A key debate in critical Indigenous legal pedagogies is whether courses on Indigenous legal issues,
or Aboriginal and Indigenous law, should be mandatory or elective, and/or integrated or standalone in the curriculum.354 For example, Drake recommends both integrating Indigenous legal
orders throughout the curriculum, so as not to marginalize Indigenous legal orders, as well as
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offering a mandatory stand-alone course, through which students may engage exclusively with
Indigenous lifeways.355 From an integrated threat perspective, mandatory Indigenous
programming may increase the likelihood of non-Indigenous student, professor and staff
opposition to Indigenous legal orders, and the expression of anti-Indigenous prejudice. On the
other hand, elective Indigenous programming may only reach those who are low in prejudice, high
in motivation to self-regulate against prejudice, or, who are committed to norms, such as
reconciliation, or to a career in Aboriginal or Indigenous law. Integrating Indigenous legal issues,
and Aboriginal and Indigenous law, throughout the curriculum may establish a norm and
expectation that competency in Aboriginal and Indigenous law is required for the practice of law
in any area and that Indigenous legal orders are law just as much as Canadian statutory and
common law. There are other objectives, aside from the reduction of prejudice, that support
making ILE mandatory. These objectives include establishing norms for the respect and
acceptance of Indigenous legal orders, perspectives, and peoples, meeting Indigenous students’
and professors’ academic needs and interests, and ensuring that law students are competent to
provide legal services and to fulfill their civic responsibilities as members of the profession.
In between the contextualization of Canadian law and the teaching of Indigenous legal orders in
context, the Indigenous Law Research Unit’s (ILRU) case briefing methodology offers a shared
framework for engaging with Indigenous legal traditions in Canadian and Indigenous legal
spaces.356 John Borrows argues that Indigenous stories share commonalities with common law
precedent and that these commonalities open Indigenous legal traditions to interpretation and
application by common law trained jurists.357 Napoleon and Friedland propose that the ILRU
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method offers a “transparent, transferable and shared framework” and a “pragmatic way forward”
for teaching and applying Indigenous legal traditions.358
The ILRU methodology incorporates the case study method with Indigenous storytelling and oral
history. Learners receive Indigenous stories from knowledge and law holders in the Indigenous
community.359 Once they have received these stories, they consider the facts, issues, related stories
or precedents, principles, and decisions disclosed in each story. A learner’s context – for example,
iwhether they have prior familiarity or training with the traditions, or their gender – also informs
their interpretation of a story.360 For this reason, learners bracket elements of a story that they do
not understand and seek further clarification from knowledge or law holders and the land.
Introspection is also important; the learner is a participant in his or her interpretation of an
Indigenous story. Learners bring their cultural context to the interpretative act. For this reason,
learners consider, for example, whether they are applying common law or Indigenous categories,
or how gender is relevant, in their interpretation of an Indigenous story.361 Through a process of
analogy, learners draw out legal principles from their interpretation of a set of Indigenous stories,
much like how ratios are divined through the case study method. Indigenous communities drive
this process.362
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Hanna Askew, a settler lawyer, applied the ILRU method in her work with the Chippewas of
Nawash Unceded First Nation at Neyaashiinigmiing (Cape Croker). Reflecting on the ILRU
method, she found that “the transition to creating case briefs for Anishinabek traditional stories
[was not] an especially difficult leap to make.”363 She explains:
… although the task of case briefing Indigenous stories is hard work,… the
familiarity of the exercise helped to provide an initial bridge between my
previous common law training and the first weeks to beginning to learn
Anishinaabe law. That said, I do not wish to overemphasize the commonalities
between judge-authored decisions and Indigenous stories. Perhaps the most
important of these differences is the way that Indigenous stories are intended to
engage listeners holistically – that is to say, spiritually and emotionally as well
as intellectually.364
Askew’s experience is informative for how other settler legal professionals may engage with
Indigenous law through the ILRU method. First, Askew’s experience demonstrates the
accessibility of the methodology for persons unfamiliar with Indigenous stories and their related
lifeways. Second, she critically contextualizes the use of the methodology as different from its
application to the common law. In its original form, Christopher Columbus Langdell
conceptualized the case study and briefing method as a means to distill “as a science… certain
principles or doctrines” from a wide array of legal decisions.365 The Langdellian method’s
aspiration to scientific objectivity persists in its common sense use by many law students. In my
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view, Askew’s critical contextualization flows from her acceptance of debewewin, “a quality of
intellectual humility” that is oppositional to the Langdellian method’s claims to objectivity and
universality.366 If the ILRU case-briefing methodology works, it works because it alleviates the
burden on settler students to learn Indigenous legal orders within its own distinct epistemological,
ontological and cosmological context.367 However, there remains a risk of misuse or distortion of
these stories within a non-Indigenous epistemological and ontological framework. Though
Indigenous legal orders may be made of “stronger stuff”,368 we should still proceed with caution
when engaging settlers through non-Indigenous epistemological frameworks, as I hope I am doing
in this thesis.
b) Indigenous Awareness Camps
Indigenous legal orders are rooted in Indigenous peoples’ relationship to land. The land is a “legal
archive” of knowledge about how to live well in the world.369 It governs or models social, political,
spiritual, and even economic relationships. To understand Indigenous legal orders, then, requires
understanding law in its “outside” context, in Indigenous communities and on-the-land.370
Indigenous awareness camps (also called Indigenous law camps) contextualize Canadian law,
illustrate the practice of Indigenous law qua law in its Indigenous context, and assist students in
developing a range of self-reflexive, critical, cultural, and practical skills. Students observe and
value Indigenous communities and the land as knowledge holders and as agents of self-
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determination.371 In this way, place and land-based learning fulfills a core competency of
Indigenous legal training.
Place-based learning may also facilitate the reduction of prejudice towards Indigenous peoples and
their laws. Learning law from and in the community offers opportunities for intergroup contact
and dialogue under near-optimal conditions. Deborah Curran, for example, finds that face-to-face
interaction at field camps “fosters an appreciation of different points of view, and ideally,
understanding and an ability to think through multiple pathways for solutions.”372 Placed-based
learning may also encourage students to think critically about their personal and professional
identities, as lawyers or as participants in reconciliation.373 Askew, for example, describes the
purpose of law camps, which is to “broaden law students understanding of what constitutes law
and expose them to Indigenous legal orders, while simultaneously building valuable relationships
between law faculties and host communities.”374
Law camps have profound impacts on both Indigenous and non-Indigenous students. Mills credits
UVic’s Aboriginal Law summer program375 as having “opened an entirely new world” for him:376
If the articles I'd read had been signposts for a new door to walk though, that
program blew the door wide open. I understood that my life wouldn't have to
pass either in the darkness of permanent critique or in fighting within a system
at its best unrepresentative of how I understood law and at its worst openly
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hostile to that understanding. I could actually develop my own positive project
based in Anishinaabe law and build understanding and professional community
from there. I can't overstate the importance of this gift for my life. 377
Berry Hykin reports that the camp changed her career aspirations and life as a non-Indigenous
lawyer:
AbCamp gives you a rare opportunity at the beginning of your legal education
to have a hands-on experience and obtain a different perspective on law and its
practical aspect […]Especially for people going into the legal profession, I think
it’s extremely important that this vital part of our community is made tangible
through the participatory experience of something like AbCamp.378
Law camps also create space for students to contextualize Canadian law and deconstruct its
relationship to Indigenous legal orders. Jasleen Johal describes how her experience with the
Osgoode Aboriginal Law Camp and the Chippewas of Nawash Unceded First Nation at
Neyaashiinigmiing379 reoriented her understanding of Indigenous legal orders and Indigenous
legal methodologies:
Following the feast on the last night of our stay, Jasmine, a young community
member, asked some of us if we wanted to go out and look for plums…. [I]t is
an exercise in patience, of wide eyes and open ears as a cluster of furtive bodies
scrambles from tree to tree in a thicket of bush and net fences … it occurred to
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me how the same passion that characterized the discourse of law by daylight
now possessed us in this small but earnest pursuit of something sweet but
elusive, a satisfaction that hid amidst a woody thicket of ambiguous shapes and
voices. We came back empty handed, but the night was hardly fruitless—in fact,
the next morning, as we were packing up, a beaming Jasmine produced a handful
of dewy plums for our trip back.380
For Allison Grandish, the Osgoode Law Camp demonstrated the importance of contextualizing
Canadian law’s relationship to Indigenous legal orders, instilling, for her, a feeling of cultural
humility:
What I took from the experience was a humbling understanding of what the law
can do when it twists and contorts to tell a story that suits one side’s
understanding.381
Before leaving we sat around the sacred fire as it burned to embers, sharing our
reflections. The common theme, beyond how grateful we were to be part of the
experience, was a shared desire to learn more about the intersections between
Indigenous law and what we hope to practice, to be conscientious about how our
approach to practice may serve to unite communities or reinforce systemic
oppression, and to remain committed to the values that drove us to law to begin
with. 382
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Law camps also foster new relationships between Indigenous and non-Indigenous students through
opportunities for intergroup contact. Serena Dykstra shares her experience at the Osgoode camp:
The most profound thing about the law camp was how my relationships with
other students deepened. I have been in law school with some of these students
for two years, and yet knew very little about their personal lives. At the camp
we were able to be vulnerable with each other through sharing circles, singing
around the fire, and midnight strolls along the shores of Georgian Bay.383
For Zachary D’Onofrio, his experience at the Osgoode camp relocated his place as a settler in
Indigenous territories:
I had passed by Cape Croker multiple times en route from Owen Sound to
Tobermory without ever becoming acquainted with the Neyaashiinigmiing; I
had never taken the time to learn about the community at more than a cursory
level, and therefore could not appreciate the many environmental and legal
issues that it faces. Similarly, I lacked an understanding of Anishinaabe legal
traditions, and the potential that they have to influence the Canadian legal
landscape. Although there is still much to learn, this experience opened my eyes
to important issues that had always been right in front me, but that I was unaware
of until now.384
Thus, Indigenous awareness camps offer opportunities for intergroup contact in near optimal
conditions, and for contextualizing and deconstructing Canadian law.
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c) Clinical Legal Education
Community legal clinics also offer unique pedagogical and service opportunities for Canadian
legal education. Clinics fulfill a public need for marginalized and Indigenous clients, support law
schools’ public service commitments, and offer theoretical and practical training for law
students.385 In addition to these objectives, Indigenous legal clinics also offer opportunities for
intergroup contact and dialogue, and social recategorization (for the law students), through a mix
of cognitive, affective, and behavioral interventions. Indigenous legal clinics support settler harm
reduction and may offer a bridge towards decolonial activities in legal practice and education.386
The success of these clinics also supports the establishment of permanent law school legal clinics
that serve local Indigenous communities.387
At the University of British Columbia, law students may participate in the Indigenous Community
Legal Clinic (ICLC). The ICLC provides legal services to the Indigenous community in
Vancouver’s downtown eastside. Patricia Barkaskas and Sarah Buhler locate the clinic’s activities
as a settler harm reduction approach.388 As a “stopgap” against colonialism, the clinic centers its
Indigenous clients’ experiences and stories of colonialism in its legal services.389 Over time,
however, Barkaskas and Buhler imagine that successive cohorts may challenge the assumptions
and structure of Canadian legal practice and education, opening up further transformative
possibilities.390
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At the Indigenous Community Legal Clinic (ICLC), law students critically reflect on their ideas
of “justice, settler colonialism, the history of Indigenous/settler relations in Canada, the veracity
of the Canadian legal system, and the current debates about reconciliation.”391 Students apply three
processes in their clinical practice: (1) situational relatedness, or the capacity to be mindful of
one’s personal and collective history and its impact on interpretation; (2) respectful listening,
which requires deep listening without judgment and a respect for personal and intellectual space;
and (3) reflective witnessing, which requires “meeting each person where they are at” and
witnessing their experience on its own terms.392
By fostering trust and dialogue, the ICLC provides a space for settlers to approach unsettling
topics, such as White privilege, fragility, and guilt.393 For some non-Indigenous law students, these
sensitive topics impede decolonial work. Madeleine Northcote explains her journey from guilt to
responsibility:
This is all hard work. Settler colonialism and decolonization can feel like issues
that are all-encompassing, and so the process of sifting through one’s own
feelings and positionality can feel overwhelming and daunting. For this reason,
the relationships developed through the clinic, both with fellow students as well
as instructors, is crucial to create a safety framework through which these
feelings can be interrogated in a generative way.394
While not the same as discussing decolonization, discussing these surrounding
topics establishes a community where we can talk and grow in a safe
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environment, and practice speaking about uncomfortable topics, so that we may
be better advocates […]395
Kate Gotziaman echoes Northcote’s observations about the unsettling process of learning about
one’s personal history and responsibilities as a settler. For Gotziaman, her experience at the ICLC
“served as a reminder that the Canadian legal system is a particular legal system that arose from,
and is sustained by, particular political circumstances.”396 Ryan Adair shares Gotziaman’s
reflection, and notes the importance of localizing one’s understanding of settler colonialism:
I believe it is easy for people without personal connection to view the impacts
of colonialism as historical and abstracted, and intergenerational effects as
amorphous and tangible. It is necessary to hear individual stories and the
concrete ways that colonial history has shaped their lives to combat this
skepticism.397
In this way, the Indigenous legal clinics encourage students to reflect on the structures that sustain
the inequitable and unjust redistribution of these resources to the settler state. Working through
the discomfort under trained supervision, non-Indigenous law students come out of the process
with a fuller understanding of law’s situatedness and their sense of themselves as lawyers
practicing Canadian law.
The ICLC also offers a safer space for Indigenous law students to articulate their personal and
professional identities. Jennifer Mackie describes her experience at the clinic, which helped her
“plan [her] future in much greater detail.” Through the clinic, Mackie reflected on her White-coded
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privilege and the ubiquity of legal control over Indigenous peoples’ lives. Mackie’s experience
resonates with other Indigenous law students, who understand their role as occupying two different
positions – that of an Indigenous person and a lawyer:
…I will often imagine I am speaking to my ut’soo who would let me know in
her subtle-not-so-subtle ways when I was sounding too much like a city-girl
ivory tower type person. When I could eventually catch her hint, I would
renegotiate my words to the space. I recognize this now as part of my shapeshifting ability navigating these myriad worlds.398
In these ways, Indigenous legal clinics offer opportunities for intergroup contact in which group
differences and structural inequity are meaningfully considered. Most importantly, Indigenous
legal clinics motivate students to engage in legal practice as a form of settler harm reduction, while
remaining oriented towards processes of decolonization.
d) Indigenous Cultural Competency
Taking a different approach, law schools may offer courses or certificates in Indigenous cultural
competency (ICC). For example, the Allard Law School at the University of British Columbia
offers a certificate in Indigenous Cultural Competency.399 The ICC program at UBC offers
Indigenous and non-Indigenous students an opportunity to learn about Indigenous legal orders and
perspectives within a cross-cultural framework. Over the course of eight months, students
participate in seven modules, six of which occur over two days of teachings and talking circles. In
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the first module, students attend an Indigenous awareness retreat. At the end of each module,
students submit reflections on what they have learned. In this way, the program facilitates
intergroup contact and provides motivation for self-regulation.
The purpose of UBC’s ICC program is to assist students in “developing better understandings of
colonial assumptions, beliefs, and biases that form the foundation of the Canadian legal system,
the history of colonial practices and policies in Canada, Indigenous perspectives on law, and what
decolonization means for the practice of law.” Participants learn about “implicit bias, anti-racism,
histories of Indigenous-Crown relations, including colonial policies and practices enacted through
law, Indigenous perspectives on legal issues, and Indigenous law.” UBC’s ICC program reflects
current practices in prejudice reduction interventions, anti-racism pedagogies, and cultural
competency. It also achieves much of the content set out in the Calls, particularly the requirement
for courses on the history of residential schools and training in Indigenous cultural competency.
The literature on ICC is well-established in the healthcare context, particularly with respect to the
concepts of cultural safety and humility,400 and is becoming increasingly influential in legal
education.401 From these insights, Canadian law schools may implement localized ICC programs
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for law students, as continuing professional development for practitioners, and as training for
professors and administrators.402Although ICC is a good start, like prejudice reduction interviews
its implementation must remain focused on decolonization.403
e) Indigenous Law Degrees and Institutes
Indigenous law degrees and law institutes go the furthest towards the revitalization of Indigenous
legal orders and decolonization of Canadian law. Borrows argues that “…properly advanced, the
resurgence of Indigenous law [through Indigenous law degrees] could be one of the most important
initiatives in legal education for indigenous peoples in a long while.”404 The University of
Victoria’s Joint Degree Program in Canadian Common Law and Indigenous Legal Orders405
creates “the chance to build strong relationships with host communities and give students an
immersive experience in one or more Indigenous legal traditions.”406 It also “empower[s]
community members to claim more space for their own legal orders and engage with state legal
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systems from a position of greater confidence and knowledge.”407 As Hewitt notes, Indigenous
law degrees challenge the role of Canadian law schools in colonization.408
Call to Action #50 directs the development of Indigenous law institutes “for the development, use,
and understanding of Indigenous laws and access to justice in accordance with the unique cultural
of Aboriginal peoples in Canada.”409 Indigenous law institutes point to the need for institutional
reform, taking the teaching of Indigenous legal orders out of the Canadian law classroom and into
Indigenous communities and contexts.410 Together Indigenous law degrees and institutes go
beyond settler harm reduction to achieve the transformative, decolonizing work necessary for the
revitalization of Indigenous legal orders and the empowerment of Indigenous Nations’ selfdetermination and sovereignty.411
f) Northern Law Schools
Indigenous programming may also focus on the experiences and resiliency of Indigenous law
students. Northern law schools offer opportunities for immersion in Indigenous legal traditions
and communities, and for the inclusion of Indigenous law students and professors in a culturallycongruent context.412 Northern law schools ground Indigenous students and professors in
Indigenous legal traditions, support the amelioration of settler harm, and reinforce Indigenous
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students’ resiliency. Such programs also provide an opportunity for students to negotiate their
personal and professional identities as an Indigenous person in Canadian legal education and
practice.
Established in 2001, the Akitsiraq Law School (“ALS”) provides Inuit students a chance to receive
a juris doctor degree while residing in Nunavut. The ALS’s intent is to increase the number of
Inuit lawyers practicing in Nunavut and to support Inuit legal traditions in the territory.413 Prior to
the ALS, southern law schools struggled to retain Inuit law students.414 Originating in a partnership
with the Nunavut government and the University of Victoria, the Nunavut Law Program (“NLP”,
formerly ALS) now resides at the University of Saskatchewan.
The ALS/NLP has had some success improving the retention and graduation of Inuit law students.
At southern law schools, Inuit students experienced dislocation and alienation from their
communities and legal traditions.415 Siobhan Amatsiaq-Murphy, an Inuk law student, explains her
experience in a southern law school:
Inuit typically come from a very close knit community of less than a 1,000
people. When an Inuk youth wants to further their education, they are doing it
without their family and support system to guide and protect them. After a
lifetime of knowing everyone you meet on the street, knowing about their life,
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you are faced with the daunting difference in the south, where you look over a
sea of faces, not knowing a single soul. You see more people than you could've
ever imagined at one time, but most importantly, you see none of your people.
The south is completely different to the north. Concrete, high rises, masses of
people, it is culture shock. Although the effects would seem to wear off, it is
amidst this foreign culture that a lone student is attempting to succeed.416
The ALS/NLP offers Inuit law students a culturally congruent space in which to express their
relationship to law and lawyering. For example, Elisapee Karetak describes how she was supported
in her decision to leave the ALS: “Telling them was an emotional, beautiful experience… We had
come to trust one another enough to tell our most intimate thoughts; and what was hindering us.”417
Madeleine Redfern, the first Inuk law clerk for the Supreme Court of Canada, described the ALS’s
capacity to deliver an exceptional legal education in a northern context:
It was an amazing experience to not have to relocate down south, and yet have
teachers whose quality was first-class… A lot of professors did preparatory work
to make sure they understood the aboriginal context. Frankly, I think it ended up
being much, much better than a southern university program.418
If we consider the social psychology on the effects of stereotyping and prejudice, we can see why
the ALS/NLP has been successful. Indigenous students receive community and peer support and
learn about Canadian and Inuit law within a culturally congruent context. The opportunities for
stereotyping and prejudice from qallunaat (settler) peers and professors is minimized, either
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through the prevalence of Inuit norms or through training. However, one of the key challenges
facing the ALS/NLP is resourcing and institutional commitment.419 After its first iteration, thenpremier Paul Okalik expressed concern that the program “took lots of resources from the
government… It was successful, but it was also expensive.”420 A mix of insecure funding and
institutional commitment leaves the ALS/NLP with a less than clear future. The success of the
ALS/NLP program for training Inuit lawyers, however, points to the need for a northern law
school, one with stable funding and commitment.
g) Preparatory Programming
The Program of Legal Studies for Native People (PLSNP) at the University of Saskatchewan has
received attention from Indigenous students and professors for its pre-law programming. The
PLSNP is a rigorous, academically challenging law bootcamp for Indigenous students.421 Roger
Carter, the founder of the PLSNP, stated: “... it can fairly be said that these students are faced with,
and have to satisfy, added requirements – rather than the contrary.”422 In some ways, the Program
may even function as an additional barrier for some law students.423
However, like the ALS, the PLSNP also offers a culturally congruent space for Indigenous law
students to learn Canadian and Indigenous property law and to negotiate their personal and
professional identities as Indigenous peoples in Canadian legal contexts. It also establishes a
support network for Indigenous law students who complete the program. One student reflects:
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I am fortunate because I know I can rely on the other Indian people I met through
the summer program. It is not academic support. The presence of other Indian
people in the college makes me feel visible. I thought I would vanish in law
school ... somehow become White. With other Aboriginal people here I am
constantly reminded that I am here for many important and good reasons.424
These features establish the program as more than an “affirmative action” program. The PLSNP
is a harm reduction program that enhances Indigenous law students’ resiliency and agency during
their time in Canadian legal education and practice through a combination of culturally safe and
congruent education, spaces, and laws. It provides an opportunity for students who struggle on the
Law School Admissions Test (LSAT) to enter law school after completing the program. It may
even possibly mitigate the risks of stereotype threat on Indigenous students, not only by reducing
their workload in their first year of law school (most law schools, except the University of Toronto,
provide credit for first year property) but also by clarifying what will be academically required of
them in law school (thus, potentially reducing the risk of stereotype threat). In my view, as long
as Indigenous students are underrepresented in law schools and face systemic barriers and
prejudice, preparatory programs will be valuable.

h) Summary
Indigenous law camps, legal clinics, intensives, Indigenous cultural competency training, and
critical Indigenous legal education satisfy many of the conditions that facilitate positive intergroup
contact: equal status between groups, common goals, intergroup cooperation, authority sanction,
and the potential for cross-group friendship. Although community members hold knowledge about
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their legal traditions and stories, both community members and learners enter their relationship
under conditions of relatively equal status in accordance with Indigenous laws and related
protocols, such as humility. These approaches actively seek a shared framework for resolving
conflict, rooted in Indigenous legal orders. All participants share the common goal of, and
cooperate in, drawing out legal principles from Indigenous peoples’ stories, traditions, and
histories. The interaction between learner and knowledge or law holder is sanctioned by the
Indigenous community and, in some cases, authorized under Indigenous law; to the extent that a
settler participant requires settler authorization, such authorization can be found in judicial
precedent or institutional support. Because interactions are personal and familiar, occurring around
shared activities such as forest walks425 or a client or community-centered relationship,426 these
encounters offer the potential for cross-group friendship. The more of these conditions that are
satisfied, the more likely the encounter may reduce prejudice, enhance empathy, decrease anxiety,
and correct faulty generalizations about Indigenous peoples and their legal traditions.
ILE programs also facilitate intergroup dialogue. Intergroup dialogue is a “process that allows for
collective exploration of social identities in the context of social inequality and promoting social
change.”427 Trained facilitators stimulate dialogue between participants in a climate of
“communication symmetry.”428 Self-disclosure429 and storytelling430 provide opportunities for
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disadvantaged group members to share their experiences, which may in turn enhance intergroup
comfort and understanding.431 Listeners develop and apply a critical empathy, which requires
them to establish affective connections with others, reflexively consider their own values and
beliefs, and link dialogue with action.432 Intergroup dialogue interventions attend to the ways that
discourse may unintentionally reinforce dominant group norms, intentionally control others, or
obfuscate inequality.433 Thus, these programs may facilitate “a mutual and reciprocal learning
process that involves sharing and learning about racial/ethnic identities, introspective learning
about one's own group and bridge building across differences.”434 Over an extended application,
non-Indigenous learners develop critical skills, including awareness of one’s own culture435 and
cultural humility.436
These programs’ broader objectives – the development of a sui generis Indigenous and nonIndigenous legal order and the revitalization of Indigenous legal orders – address one of the
fundamental drawbacks of the intergroup contact approach. Although positive intergroup contact
is associated with reduced prejudice between groups and better intergroup relations, it may come
at the cost of undermining collective action towards social change. This phenomena - the darker
side of “we” - is also found in social recategorization approaches that emphasize a common
ingroup identity (for example, “we are all Canadians” or “we are all here to stay”) or social
harmony (which is how some Canadians understand “reconciliation”).437 These programs
431
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explicitly motivate non-Indigenous and Indigenous peoples to engage in the reconciliation of
Canadian law with Indigenous legal traditions; they remind everyone that “we are all here to stay,
but not in the same way.” Moreover, by centering the source of Indigenous law and stories in
communities and emphasizing Indigenous self-determination and agency, these programs motivate
learners to respect Indigenous difference. These differences are rendered salient to learners through
culture, stories, ceremonial protocol (such as drum groups, round dances, and tribal authority
closing), and Indigenous-land relationships. Indigenous community members and their laws are
not required to assimilate or accommodate a common ingroup identity. When Indigenous
difference is centered, settler difference becomes explicit. When properly articulated to learners,
these programs ensure that Indigenous lifeways are respected. These programs – Aboriginal law
camps, legal clinics, intensives, and Indigenous cultural competency training and critical
Indigenous legal education – also offer opportunities for each student to articulate their personal
and professional identity. For Indigenous students, preparatory programs and northern law schools
may also provide a culturally congruent and safer learning environment in which they may define
their own personal and professional identities as Indigenous persons engaging in Canadian legal
education and practice.
2. Institutional Commitment
As law schools respond to the Calls, it is important to maintain institutional resolve. MontureAngus argues that “[r]eal change requires a full and systemic institutional response. Such a
response will never be found unless the institutional commitment to eradicate all barriers is
sincere.”438 If Canadian law schools do not change, Indigenous students, professors and
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communities may abandon their efforts in Canadian legal education and practice and turn to other
options.439
a) Representation and Facilities
First, law schools can further this work by recognizing and supporting Indigenous spaces within
the surrounding area. Underneath the law school’s physical infrastructure lie Indigenous legal
orders, the “hidden but underlying bedrock upon which the Crown and its assignees have built
their claims.”440 For example, Philosopher's Walk, a footpath on the St. George Campus at the
University of Toronto, runs along a buried stream, ziibiing, that remains significant to the
Anishinaabe.441 No Canadian law school is immune from the settler colonial displacement and
erasure of Indigenous peoples from their territories. However, like birds nesting in urban canopies,
Indigenous laws survive.442
Law schools may further recognize Indigenous peoples’ governance and the arrival of settlers
through territorial acknowledgments. Rima Wilkes identifies five types of acknowledgement: of
land and title, of specific treaties and political relationships, of multiculturalism and heterogeneity,
of no recognition at all, and “of people, territory and openness to doing more.”443 Although some
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Indigenous scholars critique a politics of recognition and question its intent,444 such
acknowledgments may establish institutional norms that support, or may lead to support for,
intergroup contact and dialogue, Indigenisation and decolonial practices. These possibilities
depend on the strength of the acknowledgment and whether it is accompanied by action.445
Law schools may follow through on their territorial commitments by funding and resourcing
Indigenous peoples’ revitalization of Indigenous spaces and facilities on campus. Indigenous
presence may be represented through framed declarations or treaties,446 and aesthetically,
politically and spiritually significant objects, such as posts,447 wampum replicas,448 and
contemporary installations.449 Settler objects may also contribute to the recognition of Indigenous
presence, such as Kevin Berk’s Two-Row Table at Windsor Law.450
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Many Indigenous legal orders require adherence to protocols before teachings. For example,
smudging may be used to ensure that the teacher and learner engage with each other in a good
way. For this reason, law schools must also provide facilities for these protocols to be followed.451
Related to this concern, Indigenous law students and professors require culturally safe spaces to
foster peer support networks, enter dialogue about the negotiation of their personal and
professional identities, receive teachings specific to Indigenous legal orders, and engage in
Indigenous legal ceremonies. Such spaces may be opened for non-Indigenous students in certain
circumstances, depending on the needs of the community for whom the facility is designated.
Already, many Canadian universities have supported the construction of Indigenous facilities for
these purposes.452 These activities respect and normalize Indigenous peoples’ presence in law
schools and reduce the harmful effects of racial stereotyping and prejudice on Indigenous students
and professors.
b) Peer Support Groups
Institutions may also further support Indigenous students and professors by funding activities and
spaces for Indigenous peer support groups.453 Some Indigenous law students turn to each other to
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“[take] comfort into the room” with them.454 Lindberg describes the Indigenous peer support
network as:
a base network that is like a basket woven from similar experiences and
backgrounds. This basket is coloured with the fibres of our differences. In the
basket, we place our law school experiences. While the bulk of our time is spent
filling the basket, we recognize daily that it is the basket that supports the load.455
On a practical level, peer support fulfills an inclusionary role. Indigenous law students, particularly
those who are women or mature students, carry with them unique family and community
responsibilities.456 Peer support groups function as an in-school community and support system:
“There is a general sense that we [all law students] share a common experience, but I receive
support specifically from both Aboriginal men and women both academically and personally and
I cherish it.”457 However, peer support groups are not the only way in which Indigenous students
may be supported. While some desire the support of culturally safe or Indigenous support groups,
others may want to be treated as an individual.458 Others may look to existing support networks,
such as LGBTQ2S+ organizations.459 In this way, peer support groups also function as life support
systems.460
On another level, peer support groups offer a safer space in which Indigenous students, professors
and staff may navigate their personal and professional identities in Canadian legal context. Thus,
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the resourcing of Indigenous peer support groups by law schools may reduce settler harm to its
Indigenous members, support Indigenous members’ engagement in intergroup contact and
dialogue, and support Indigenous members’ negotiation of their personal and professional
identities in Canadian legal education and practice.
c) Inclusion of Elders and Community Relationships
Establishing institutional norms is a critical part of the implementation of the Calls in law schools.
So too, however, is fostering relationships between Indigenous legal orders and Canadian legal
education. For this reason, institutions should establish Advisory Circles of Elders that are
permanent on Faculty and Governance Councils and whose members are remunerated as faculty,
in recognition of their expertise in Indigenous legal orders.461 An Elder’s Residence Program may
complement Indigenous peer support groups as well as provide advice to the institution.462 To
support the development of relationships between law schools and their host communities,
community liaison positions and community relationships should also be funded and supported in
agreements.463 These initiatives may establish institutional norms in support of intergroup contact
and dialogue, assist in the reduction of prejudice and settler harm to Indigenous students, support
related programming, and lead to processes of Indigenisation and decolonization of Canadian legal
education and practice.
d) Financial Resources and Funding
Institutions should also permanently and meaningfully fund Indigenous programming, grants, and
student scholarships. Institutions may prefer to displace the cost of the implementation of the Calls
onto Indigenous students and professors or onto public and third-party sources. In this way,
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Indigenous students and professors are forced to engage with a small number of ethical funding
sources or, in some cases, compromise with less ethical sources (such as law firms that serve
extractive industries). Implementing the Calls requires permanent, ongoing, meaningful, and
reliable financial resources and funding.464 Law schools – and society – benefit from the inclusion
of Indigenous legal orders and peoples in Canadian legal contexts. Monture-Angus rejects the
argument that law schools are strapped for cash: “I am not very persuaded by fiscal restraint
arguments. They are racist. Just when Aboriginal people have some access to previously denied
spaces, the country goes bankrupt. This is still my land being shared, and an obligation is still
owed. Fiscal constraint is not my problem!”465 Therefore, law schools should adequately
compensate, fund and resource the programs that make all that possible. These public funding
commitments also establish institutional norms that support intergroup contact and dialogue and
enable Indigenous-led collective action toward social change.
e) Hiring and Advancement
Hiring policies must address who is qualified to teach Indigenous law and recognize the unique
workload of Indigenous professors. First, there is nothing limiting non-Indigenous professors from
teaching Aboriginal or Indigenous law; in some cases, particularly for Aboriginal law courses,
non-Indigenous professor instruction may be beneficial for non-Indigenous student learning. It
appears that individuals respond more positively to prejudice reduction interventions when led by
members of their own ingroup.466 In addition, non-Indigenous professors’ participation is
necessary to reduce the disproportionate and inequitable workload assigned to Indigenous
professors. As with any course, non-Indigenous professors must be competent to teach Aboriginal
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and/or Indigenous legal orders. Since interpretive meaning is found in Indigenous languages,
professors should demonstrate some competence, or at least committed to learn, an Indigenous
language(s).467
Institutions must also develop clear and transparent hiring and advancement policies that reflect
the unique contributions of Indigenous professors. The reality is that Indigenous professors
experience a higher teaching, research and service workload than their non-Indigenous peers, even
those who teach Aboriginal or Indigenous law or are involved in Indigenous-related committees
and activities; Monture-Angus observes that “[e]quality stops somewhere before my office
door.”468 Indigenous professors are expected to participate in additional committees or projects
related to the institution's efforts at reconciliation,469 provide additional learning resources to meet
the academic interests of Indigenous students, counsel and mentor Indigenous students,470
complete additional research ethics approval processes for their research involving Indigenous
communities and laws, maintain expertise in both Indigenous and non-Indigenous legal orders
(including Aboriginal law, which requires competence in several areas of law including criminal,
constitutional, child and family, tax, and property law) and pedagogies,471 ameliorate the failure
of the Canadian elementary, secondary and post-secondary education to prepare non-Indigenous
students for ILE, explain the value and importance of ILE to tenure committees and peers,472
facilitate intergroup contact and dialogue between Indigenous and non-Indigenous students and
communities, navigate the harm caused to their person by the prejudice, stereotyping and
discrimination of their non-Indigenous students, peers, and the institution, and carry many of the
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same familial and community responsibilities as Indigenous students. Indigenous faculty are
essential to the implementation of the Calls to law schools, and to the reduction of settler harm to
Indigenous students and peers. For this reason, law schools must recognize and weigh
appropriately the unique teaching, research, and service activities of Indigneous law professors in
their career advancement and compensation.
f) Admission and Advancement
The legal profession has historically excluded Indigenous peoples from the practice of law.473 Until
1951, individuals with status under the Indian Act could not attend law school without being
emancipated from their reserves and treaty rights. After these legal restrictions were repealed,
Indigenous peoples were excluded from the profession through prohibitive academic
requirements, professional norms, oaths of allegiance to the Queen,474 and persisting systemic
barriers to education. Today, non-Indigenous students, and some professors, oppose inclusionary
policies as an unfair special advantage or as lowering the standard of education.475 In the 1980s
and 1990s, Canadian law schools prioritized affirmative action, or inclusionary, policies to
ameliorate Indigenous peoples’ lack of representation in the profession.476 These practices,
however, appeared to be based more on Indigenous peoples’ demographic inclusion – and
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potentially enclosure – than their contribution to our understanding of law, particularly Indigenous
legal orders.477
Admissions policies should recognize Indigenous students’ unique contributions to law schools
and commit to supporting them as they navigate their personal and professional identities. This
means identifying the connection between admissions policies and broader institutional policies
related to Indigenous programming, representation, facilities, funding and resources, and the
support of Indigenous peer support, community relationships, and elder involvement. It means also
recognizing and appropriately supporting Indigenous students’ unique familial and community
responsibilities. Indigenous students are critical to the implementation of the Calls and are a
necessary participant in intergroup contact and dialogue activities undertaken in law schools.
Inclusive policies are only meaningful insofar as they respectfully and support the unique
contributions of Indigenous law students to the implementation of the Calls.
g) Anti-Racism and Harassment
Recall Monture-Angus’ accounts of reverse racism complaints made by non-Indigenous students
in response to unsettling content about settler colonialism.478 Anti-racism, discrimination and
harassment policies and training must be responsive to Indigenous peoples’ experiences of
prejudice and the rhetorical resources that non-Indigenous peoples employ to avoid responsibility,
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such as “reverse racism”.479 Such training should also include factual training intended to counter
beliefs associated with “modern” prejudice towards Indigenous peoples.480 These policies provide
the institutional support necessary for intergroup contact and dialogue, and are necessary for the
reduction of settler harm to Indigenous law students and professors. More work is required to
develop anti-racism, anti-domination, and harassment policies that are responsive to antiIndigenous stereotyping and prejudice in Canadian law schools.
h) Decolonization Plans
The reduction of prejudice, which is the focus of this thesis, is only a most preliminary step towards
the implementation of the philosophy underlying the Calls. Hewitt cautions against projects, such
as Indigenisation, that function “to side-step other responsibility-filled, harsher-sounding words
like ‘decolonizing’.”481 In many ways, Hewitt’s concern echoes my concern with the limits of a
prejudice reduction approach, which can become myopically focused on intergroup harmony and
non-Indigenous peoples’ comfort rather than on collective action toward social change. Our
projects must remain oriented towards decolonization.482
Hewitt proposes the creation, institutional entrenchment, and valuing of decolonization plans
based on local Indigenous legal orders.483 Such plans reflect the reality that decolonization applies
to both non-Indigenous peoples and Indigenous peoples trained within the Canadian legal
system,484 and that decolonization is specific to the Indigenous territory and legal orders in which
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a law school and its members is located.485 Some Canadian law schools are clearly at the point in
their implementation of the Calls that they can sincerely consider implementing decolonization
plans. These law schools, such as the University of Victoria, have established robust Indigenous
programming and have recruited Indigenous students and professors in large enough numbers, and
with enough institutional support, to begin to decolonize legal education and practice.
IV.

Evaluating the Implementation of Prejudice Reduction Interventions

Having inventoried several individual and intergroup interventions and compared them to current
ILE programming, the next logical step would be to ask how these activities might be measured.
It is possible that implicit and explicit measures of prejudice may be used to evaluate the success
or impact of prejudice reduction interventions.486 Implicit measures, such as the Implicit Bias
Association Test, may be used to evaluate implicit racial stereotyping towards Indigenous peoples.
These measures evaluate the physiological and behavioural responses of participants to external
stimuli, such as the presence of a racialized person.487 Explicit measures, such as the OldFashioned and Modern Prejudicial Attitudes Toward Aboriginal Scales (O-TAPAS and MTAPAS, respectively), may be used to evaluate an individual’s self-reported beliefs and
attitudes.488

However, as I will argue, such measures are insufficient for evaluating the

implementation of the Calls and the decolonization of Indigenous legal education and practice.
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Outside of a research context, these measures can be carefully used to inform and assess the impact
of programming or activities in Canadian law schools. The application of measures in this context
should be approached cautiously, with a mind to the inherent limitations of the scientific method.
For example, the O-TAPAS and M-TAPAS may be used before, during and after (including at
further intervals) an Indigenous awareness camp to assess changes in common indicators of “oldfashioned” and “modern” racial beliefs and attitudes towards Indigenous peoples. Where
appropriate and with the consent of the individual, this evaluative data may be shared with the
individual so that they may reflect on any inconsistencies between their results and any nonprejudicial beliefs or attitudes that they hold.489 In turn, this information may assist individuals in
self-regulating against prejudice. Pre, mid and post-intervention data may also be used to assess
the impact of a program or activity. This data may also be used to support the qualitative
experiences of facilitators, professors, and students.
In my view, the use of measures from social psychology cannot be used independently of
qualitative assessments that consider a broader range of social and political objectives (apart from
prejudice reduction) and that are based on the experiences of Indigenous students and professors.
First, individuals may underreport or not report beliefs or attitudes that they know could be
perceived as prejudicial. This “social desirability effect” may make some explicit measures of
prejudice unreliable.490 Second, measures of prejudice may lose their currency, since the content
of stereotypes and prejudices change over time and place.491 Third, some are of the view that the
results of a “modern” prejudice measure may reflect a political position rather than prejudice.492
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Since I propose that racial prejudice is an endorsement of behaviours or policies that maintain
racial subordination, I do not place much weight in this critique; prejudice is political. Fourth, in a
law school context, implicit bias testing will likely be impractical. Moreover, recent research
suggests that the most common implicit measure, the implicit association test, may be unreliable
in some cases.493 I am also skeptical as to whether implicit bias is the kind of prejudice that we
should be concerned about. Finally, measures require interpretation and decision-making. What is
the appropriate course of action when a program does not reduce prejudice (and of what kind?) in
its participants? As law schools contemplate or implement mandatory ILE, we must consider the
possibility that, despite our best efforts, students’ pre-existing racial stereotypes and prejudices
might not change. If this occurs, is the appropriate response to make ILE elective? To have it
taught only by non-Indigenous faculty, since such instructors may be perceived as more
authoritative to non-Indigenous students? To separate Indigenous and non-Indigenous students in
separate sections so as to reduce the impact of stereotyping and prejudice? What should happen if
it raises and/or lowers prejudices in some students but not others? Should we think about elective
courses, where students self-select ILE that may reflect their anti-prejudicial and decolonial values,
differently from mandatory courses? Do we consider the individual-level differences of students,
such as their personalities, prior contact experiences, or commitment to Indigenisation or
decolonization? Ultimately, how ILE is implemented is a complex decision, one which reflects
many different objectives and normative considerations and that will require many different tools.
For these reasons, I propose that the success of ILE, even as a prejudice reduction intervention,
cannot be evaluated only with measures from social psychology. In my view, social psychology
supports, but does not encompass or supplant, Indigenous peoples’ experiences of racial
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stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination in Canadian legal education and practice. As Jonathan
Kahn warns, social psychology cannot be prioritized over the complicated reality of racial
stereotyping and prejudice.494 Not only is the scientific discipline methodologically limited, it
cannot acquire its vaunted universal and objective truth. When we prioritize science over human
experience – and law – we obscure the messy, never-quite-perfect, social, political, and ethical
decisions that we must make as agents. Indigenous and post-colonial scholars further remind us of
the role that science has played in dominating and displacing Indigenous peoples. For these
reasons, there are empirically and socially significant reasons why psychological measures, alone,
are insufficient for telling us about the impact of Indigneous programing on the reduction of
prejudice and the implementation of the Calls.
Conclusion
I doubted myself many times when writing the first chapter of this thesis. I have taken care to
locate and prioritize the experiences of Indigenous students and professors throughout. I felt like
this was not only methodologically appropriate and necessary, but the only way I could
communicate how I understand the relevance of the social psychology on stereotyping, prejudice,
and discrimination. For several years, I have journaled my own experiences in Canadian legal
education and practice, but never really considered them worth sharing. Somehow, through the
process of writing this thesis, I have come to see that my experiences are my contribution –
doctrinal, practical, and relational.
If you return to the first chapter with what you have read in this thesis, you will notice the hallmarks
of all the concepts introduced in subsequent chapters. I have shared how processes of social
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categorisation complicated the British Columbian bencher’s perception of my identity as a Métis
person. In my account of the 2015 CIAJ conference, I observed: the aversiveness of the former
Chief Justice, who spoke about Indigenous peoples’ access to legal services rather than the
integration of Indigenous legal orders or the impact of systemic racism on Indigenous peoples; the
benevolence of the justice who interrupted our informal peer support debrief after the conference
to tell us that it was our task to change things; and the perception of threat by some non-Indigenous
conferences participants who excluded Indigenous legal orders from their understanding of the
rule of law. In describing my experiences as co-chair of the Osgoode Indigenous Students
Association, I illustrate how chronic stereotyping and prejudice and stereotype threat impacted me
and my peers.
You will also see that I struggled with my own sense of whether individual self-regulation was
sufficient to reduce the harms to Indigenous students and professors and to Indigneous legal orders.
My interest in the buddy-system, as I called it, reflected my interpretation of Métis-Nêhiyawak
relational ethics but also found support in self-categorisation and intergroup contact theory. In my
account of the 2015 CIAJ conference, I reflect on the theme of the conference, “We are all here to
stay”. In this thesis, I articulate how this phrase – and the “reconciliation” norm – may be
insufficient, even counterproductive, at least as commonly interpreted by settlers. My sense at the
conference, affirmed by Monture-Angus and Lindberg’s own scholarship, was that settlers must
unsettle themselves, transform their anxiety and guilt, and accept responsibility.
I have also benefited immensely from some of the best in ILE. I was fortunate to attend the
Program of Legal Studies for Native People at the University of Saskatchewan, where I received
some of my most meaningful personal and professional relationships, and to participate in
Osgoode Hall Law School’s first and sixth Anishinaabe Law Camp with the Chippewas of Nawash
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Unceded First Nation at Neyaashiinigmiing, in the Kawaskimhon Aboriginal law moot in New
Brunswick, and to be placed with the Métis Settlements Appeal Tribunal in Edmonton, Alberta
through Osgoode’s Intensive Program in Indigenous Lands, Resources and Governments. These
programs reduce the effects of racial stereotyping, prejudice and discrimination on Indigenous
students, professors and legal orders in Canadian legal education, and offer non-Indigenous
professors and students opportunities for ethically and respectfully engaging with Indigenous
peoples and their legal orders and perspectives. I hypothesized that the social psychology literature
would support these programs for these purposes. My research confirms this intuition.
The social psychology literature on racial stereotypes and prejudices (re)affirms the experiences
of Indigenous students and professors in Canadian law schools. Though none of these theories are
determinative, nor without their own faults, each offer explanations for understanding the
manifestation and effects of racial stereotyping and prejudice against Indigenous peoples and their
legal orders in Canadian law schools. Implicit social cognition theory and self-regulation
interventions offer a helpful starting point for individuals who are resistant to taking accountability
for their intentional or conscious beliefs, attitudes and behaviours. However, implicit approaches
fail when they “naturalize” racial stereotyping and prejudice and obfuscate our agency in social
contexts. Contemporary theories of prejudice, such as “modern”, “symbolic”, “aversive” and
“benevolent” prejudice, round out our understanding of racial stereotyping and prejudice.
Although these theories (re)affirm Indigenous peoples’ experiences of racial stereotyping and
prejudice in Canadian law schools, it is important to recognize that these theories are socially
contingent, owing their origins and objectives to the development of social psychology in the
American context of Black and White intergroup relations. Integrated threat theory offers a
description of how racial stereotyping and prejudice is associated with settlers’ motivation to
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maintain the inequitable distribution of resources under settler-colonialism. When brought
together, these theories may provide settlers a familiar framework or heuristic for naming and
addressing racial stereotyping and prejudice against Indigenous peoples and their legal orders in
Canadian legal education. We can see, too, how these theories help us understand the “obsidian
quandaries” that Indigenous students and professors face in Canadian legal education and practice.
Applied critically, with an eye towards collective action toward social change, these theories may
offer a more comprehensive account of the kinds of normative decisions that non-Indigenous
courts, lawyers, professors and law students make in Canadian legal education and practice.
Intergroup contact theory and the experiences of Indigenous and non-Indigenous professors and
students also supports the proposition that many ILE programs, such as Indigenous awareness
camps, may function as prejudice reduction interventions. These theories also describe how
institutional commitment, including resourcing and funding, is necessary to not only establish antiprejudicial norms but also support the implementation of the Calls. Finally, I have made it clear
that all of this – settler harm reduction, prejudice reduction interventions, and cultural competency
training – must be oriented towards the decolonization of Canadian legal education and practice.
In the meantime, before decolonization is more widely applied, these theories and interventions,
none of which are a panacea, may reduce the harm caused by settler colonialism and racial
stereotyping and prejudice towards Indigenous peoples and their legal orders in Canadian legal
education and practice.
Justice LaForme’s words, “We are all here to stay, but not in the same way”, strike me as a call to
action that is consistent with my reading of the prejudice reduction literature. “We are all here to
stay…” is an echo of a shared sensibility, a possibility of “gathering together” that has otherwise
become co-opted in a way that sustains settler colonialism. The “but” poses conflict. Is it a threat?
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Or is it a contradiction for us to resolve together? To say that we will stay “not in the same way”
is unsettling. What does it mean to be “not in the same way”? To me, that unsettling proposition
is a call for collective action toward social change, that is, for all of us to respectfully and ethically
enter a space of ethical engagement. If we do so together, we must not reinforce a common identity
that sustains settler colonialism and that denies Indigenous peoples’ Indigeneity in this land. We
must imagine new identities, new possibilities, that respect Indigenous peoples’ determination of
their own identities. Ultimately, “not in the same way” also requires the decolonization of
Canadian law, which I define as the dismantling of racial and settler-colonial hierarchies embedded
in the rule of law. It is my hope that this thesis functions as an introduction for some settlers, a
review and orientation for others, and an affirmation for Indigenous students and professors that
the implementation of the Calls and the decolonization of Canadian legal education and practice
is possible and necessary.
[W]e have accepted the responsibility of educating ourselves. We have risen to
the challenge of remaining Aboriginal in the search for knowledge in a system
that challenges our make-up. We respect the wisdom that we have gained. We
honour the teachers who have tried to change a vision of their world in order to
include other worlds. We have found ourselves immersed in a value system that
is strange and foreign to many of us. We have struggled academically,
personally, and in innumerable other ways to include, or at least to respect, your
vision of the world. It is your turn.495
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